# AFF-NEG – PRISM – CPWW – Michigan Summer Debate Institutes 2022

## Notes

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# AFF

## 1AC – PRISM

#### “The world might, in fact, be transformed into a human zoo, a zoo so intelligently managed that its inhabitants are not aware that they are there merely for the purposes of observation and experiment”[[1]](#footnote-1)

#### The zoo is vectoralist control – the myth of history must be disenchanted as critical theories fall into reproduced sameness – we can’t go to the archive and call it truth. Increasing abstraction of commodification of information has produced a new class relation – the vectoralist and hacker classes are a layer-on-top, a piece of information that must be considered to avoid total environmental collapse. Make some Noise and generate a new form of thought for our times.

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Introduction)//gideon

Why is there so much resistance to even thinking about whether all this is a component of a new mode of production? I start in Chapter 1 with why **we want to believe this is capitalism even if we hate it**. If you take a step back, this really does seem a bit odd. Even its opponents have started to imagine that Capital is eternal. Perhaps it’s time to ask whether the concept of Capital has ended up being rather more of a **theological** production than Marx would have intended. Hence Capital is Dead proceeds along two lines at once. It makes a minimally plausible case that the thesis of a new mode of production is worth investigating, and at the same time it is a critical account of how we got stuck trying to explain all emerging phenomena as if they were always expressions of the same eternal essence of Capital. Most **Marxists** like to think they have separated themselves from religion but have **made a religion of** this **separation**.35 If Capital is to function as a historical concept, then the question of how and when it ends has to be an open one. Where we seem to have ended up is with a not very logical but still emotionally compelling way of thinking: since communism has not prevailed, this must still be capitalism. The reality and the language of the present are anchored in an imaginary future. The challenge is to disenchant this myth of history without losing the ability to think of historical time as having other possibilities.36 Critical theories of the culture industry tend to stop short of thinking through the extent to which **the production of critical theory itself is now a minor genre within the culture industry**. 37 It has some of the characteristic hallmarks: a repetition of received ideas, narrative forms that resolve in predictable ways, a culture of exegesis that reproduces sameness. **Critical theory becomes hypocritical theory**. And so in Chapter 1, I try to combine the critical impetus of Marx with approaches to writing drawn from the historic avant-gardes that attempt to break from such habits, which treat writing as a more open-ended material practice. Perhaps the writing of critical theory texts is part of the same information political economy as everything else. Perhaps the distinctive property form of the information commodity saturates such objects as it does so many other things. Perhaps treating the archive of such texts as the archive of private property is part of the problem. In Chapter 1, I advocate another relation to the archive, to writing, one advanced by the situationists: détournment. It works and plays as if writing were a practice of a literary communism.38 After looking at habits of belief and practices of writing, Chapter 2 elaborates on the thought experiment that this may not be capitalism any more, but something worse. Here I restate in condensed form an argument I first made in A Hacker Manifesto (2004), updated to take account of the further unfolding of the tendencies of this peculiar mode of production.39 Here I assign its features some temporary names: I call the emerging ruling class the vectoralist class, because their class power derives from ownership and control of the vector of information. The vector of information includes the capacity to transmit, store, and process information. It is the material means for assembling so-called big data and realizing its predictive potential. The vectoralist class owns and controls patents, which preserve monopolies on these technologies. It owns or controls the brands and celebrities that galvanize attention. It owns the logistics and supply chains that keep information in its proprietary stacks. One thing that is distinctive about an information political economy is the way it instrumentalizes difference rather than sameness. The farmer and worker produce units of commodities that are equivalent within their kind. What I call the hacker class has to produce difference out of sameness. It has to make information that has enough novelty to be recognizable as intellectual property, a problem that landed property or commercial property does not have. By hacker class I mean everyone who produces new information out of old information, and not just people who code for a living. Part of the struggle of our time is to see a **common class interest** in all kinds of information making, whether in the sciences, technology, media, culture, or art. What we all have in common is producing new information but not owning the means to realize its value. And yet the way we go about this is not quite the same thing as labor, just as being a worker is not quite the same thing as being a farmer. As is much clearer from Marx’s political writings than from Capital, there are always many subordinate classes, just as there can be more than one ruling class.40 Modes of production are multiple and overlapping. Chapter 3 asks whether developments in the forces of production changed the relations of production and threw up a new kind of ruling class with different interests. But this is not a story where the forces of production are outside of historical struggle and simply develop on their own. On the contrary, the forces of production take a form determined by a series of class struggles as well. Who are the agents to that struggle? What role do scientists and engineers play? Could things have turned out otherwise? To even ask this involves questions about the selective tradition within which we think about the twentieth century. 41 What we imagine happened, and who we imagine are the committed writers who struggled in and against it, is a picture mutilated by the Cold War. 42 The scientific left was stripped from the picture. They were Communists or fellow travelers. Their legacy has been suppressed, even on the left. Here I present the current state of the forces of production not as some supposedly inevitable outcome of the metaphysics of technics but as the result of a lost struggle over the form of technology and the labor of creating new information in **scientific and technical fields**. The first time something like a transnational farmer, worker, and hacker alliance was even posited was in the thirties. It was subsumed into the global struggle against fascism and into Soviet realpolitik, and it was defeated (on both sides) by the Cold War. One of the consequences of defeat is the **unchecked acceleration** of more and more **abstract forms of commodification**, reaching from land to labor to information. The instrumentalization of information enables all of the earth to appear as a resource to be mobilized under the control of information, but where that control is based on information that treats everything, including information itself, as a commodity. This might not be the commodity in its classical form, as Marx thought it in the middle of the nineteenth century. 43 The commodity form is not eternal. Commodification now means not the appearance of a world of things but the appearance of a world of information about things, including information about every possible future state of those things that can be extrapolated from a quantitative modeling of information extracted from the flux of the state of things, more or less in real time.44 A commodity today appears as nothing but a vector, as a potential fulfilled through the interface of your phone or tablet or computer. Looking closely at the forces of production is not quite the same thing as the study of technology. The difference is that the former asks questions about agency, and in particular class agency. 45 Chapter 4 brings us to a broader consideration of questions of class. Here, we look at what distinguishes Marxist approaches to class from other sociological theories. Once we have a means of analyzing class not just as a category but as forms of antagonism, we can ask whether new kinds of class relations may be emerging. A class antagonism may arise out of relations of property, authority, or expertise.46 If we combine thinking about emerging forces of production with attention to class, we can ask whether the production of information as a force of production also **modifies class relations**. The information vector is clearly connected to new kinds of property, authority, and expertise. While based in patent and copyright, intellectual property as a suite of near private property rights in all kinds of novel information is a relatively new development.47 The evolution of these legal forms both responds to and further enables changes in the forces of production. Information also gave rise to new kinds of authority. We just don’t live in Foucault’s Panopticon. It’s far worse. Whole new fields of expertise have emerged quite recently, reshaping the university and turning the university itself into a site for managing risk in the production of intellectual property. 48 Chapter 4 is a slice through the social formation, showing its workings in cross section. Chapter 5 is a speculation on its genesis. It always seems strange to me that people who imagine they are thinking like Marxists offer a strictly idealist view of recent history: everything has changed because of ideas, and those ideas are “neoliberal.” These then become policy and law through the agency of political actors.49 This seems to me to betray every last principle of a materialist view of history. The irony is that in order to think a materialist history in a really quite “orthodox” way, one is forced to think in a heretical manner in relation to received ideas on the intellectual left. The very same forces of production that enable this unprecedented mobilization of the world in the service of control through information also enable a science of the earth which shows conclusively that continuing to misvalue the whole of the world can’t go on. Sooner or later (but probably sooner), **it will crash the whole climate system of the planet**.50 Chapter 6 looks for ways to think about how the transformation of Capital beyond itself, into Vector, comes in contact with the very thing it lacks the means to properly know: the earth as the home from which it has expelled us. There are two classic ways to think about capitalism being superseded by another mode of production. Either capitalism accelerates its movement to the point of qualitative transformation; or the proletariat that it produces as its own antagonist negates it from within.51 The problem is that both of these are merely social theories, or at best, social-technical theories. Neither puts history back in the context of natural history, and in the era of the Anthropocene, of climate disruption and much else, that is the information that must be included in our thinking if it is to be at all timely. 52 Chapter 6 adds two other kinds of historical narration into the mix. The first extrapolates from natural history, looking for ways we can learn about forms of organization of matter, energy, and information that are adaptable and enduring. Extrapolation is not reductionist, its key proposition is that very different kinds of form are possible at different scales of organization. Extrapolation opens the door to creative and speculative ways of producing collaborative knowledge across very different fields and assembling corresponding social movements. It’s a way for the hacker class to think and act as a class, producing not only collaborative knowledge but also experimental prototypes of another way of life. The counterpoint to this is what I call inertia. How is it that despite all the evidence that it is on a suicide mission, **the current mode of production keeps accelerating toward failure**? **Why won’t it change course**? Where extrapolation stresses the possible connections between natural history and social history, inertia stresses the difference. We act in and against a world that remains other to us. Reduced to **nothing but users,** and our actions forced into the commodity form, our collective work and play produces a world over and against us, one that massively persists in its own habits of functioning.53 Worse, collective human labor made a world for a ruling class that keeps making not only itself but us in its image. Extrapolation opens exciting possibilities for thinking and acting collaboratively to build another civilization, here in the ruins of this one. Inertia is a sobering reminder of how hard that is going to be. I conclude Capital is Dead with a commentary on Raoul Peck’s film The Young Karl Marx (2017). What I stress there is how Marx and his closest comrades changed the language and style of the progressive movements of their time. They freed themselves from received ideas, from selective tradition, even from radical selective tradition. In vulgar terms: they were punks. **Radicals can be the most conservative of people when it comes to textology, or faith in the exegesis of the written word from the archive as a form of knowledge**.54 We have to produce and defend knowledge in the face of a dominant ideology that insists that those texts are either useless or dangerous. (That it is an ideology is clear from its insistence in these incompatible faults). Wanting to **move on from those cherished texts** is assumed to be an attack on what they stood for. Sometimes the moment comes to summon your inner punk rock goddess and **do things differently**. **Make some noise**. **Our knowledge-production methods might have become a bit too genteel for the times**. It may at least be a better way to channel one’s rage than ordering Patti Smith albums on Amazon. Chapter 7 defends vulgar Marxism for its closeness to the everyday and to emerging technics of cultural and critical production. Here I look at four kinds of vulgar thinking, two from (or about) the twenties and two from the sixties. These are vulgarians who know something about how developments in the forces of production change the space of possibility for daily life and daily struggle. Unlike more genteel kinds of critical theory, they detect mutations in historical forms because they are not bound to residual and archaic forms of cultural work. They are already multiple and diverse, in terms of race, sex, sexuality, as the vulgar includes all of those excluded or marginalized within genteel institutions. For years I was one of what the so-called alt-right calls a “cultural Marxist,” interested mostly in what happens in the political and cultural superstructures of modern society, rather than in the technical and economic base. However, trying to understand culture will lead you to understanding media, which will lead you to try to figure out some things about technology. Then it turns out that the genteel forms of **Western Marxist thinking** taught in universities for several generations now are **not good at understanding how the forces of production actually work**.55 That requires some actual technical knowledge and experience, or at least a willingness to concede that others may know about such things and to learn from them. The production of counterhegemonic knowledge can really only be comradely and collaborative.56 We have to start from the tensions apparent in the present and freely adapt the textual resources from the past to that situation. This might work better than starting with fidelity to the texts or events of the past and ignoring anything in the present that does not conform to them.57 I read Peck’s film as celebrating a will to transform even this closely cherished radical language in the interests of comprehending a present historical time in terms that enable it to appear as actionable, transformable. In that sense, it’s a work of art that should give us courage to not just repeat the received ideas, even those of dear old Karl, but to embark on the collaborative production of a knowledge of the present that might help lead us out if it.

#### Edward Joseph Snowden is an American former computer intelligence consultant who leaked highly classified information from the National Security Agency when he was an employee and subcontractor. His disclosures revealed numerous illegal global surveillance programs, many run by the NSA and the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance with the cooperation of telecommunication companies and European governments.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### Snowden gradually became disillusioned with the programs with which he was involved and tried to raise his ethical concerns through internal channels but was ignored. On May 20, 2013, Snowden flew to Hong Kong after leaving his job at an NSA facility in Hawaii, and in early June he revealed thousands of classified NSA documents to journalists[[3]](#footnote-3)

#### Snowden revealed a system worse than capitalism – a self-consuming, ever accelerating system eats our brains and bodies. Data asymmetry from internet searches, DNA lookups, banks, retail, and mapping software aggregates a vectoral power that is at the root of technological problems, financialization, neoliberalism, and biopolitics. The NSA understands this relation and gathered it into a program of control. This cannot be understood with genteel high theory – The 20th century is long gone – modernity must be deconstructed through a new lens

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 2: Capitalism—or Worse?)//gideon

So how is this worse than capitalism? The vectoral infrastructure throws all of t**he world into the engine of commodification**, meanwhile **modifying the commodity form itself**. There is nothing that can’t be tagged and captured through information about it and considered a variable in the simulations that drive resource extraction and processing.26 Quite simply, we have run out of world to commodify. And now commodification can only cannibalize its own means of existence, both natural and social. It’s like that Marx Brothers film where the train runs out of firewood, so the carriages themselves have to be hacked to pieces and fed to the fire to keep it moving, until nothing but the bare bogies are left.27 It is worse also in that rather than some acephalous multitude, they are complex class alliances and conflicts at play. 28 The trickiest part of it is the politics of the hacker class, which after all is the class most of us here reading and writing this stuff belong to. Yes, it appears as a “privileged” class, among those whom Bruce Robbins calls the beneficiaries of global relations of exploitation.29 And it is a class that has a very hard time thinking its common interests, because the kinds of new information its various subfractions produce are all so different. We have a hard time thinking what the writer and the scientist and artist and the engineer have in common. Well, the vectoral class does not have that problem. What all of us make is intellectual property, which from its point of view is as equivalent and as tradable as pink goo. The hacker class experiences extremes of a **winner-take-all** outcome of its efforts. On the one hand, fantastic careers and the spoils of some simulation of the old bourgeois lifestyle; on the other hand, precarious and part-time work, start-ups that go bust, and the making routine of our jobs by new algorithms—designed by others of our very own class. The hacker class was supposed to be a privileged one, shielded from proletarianization by its creativity and technical skill. But it too can be made casual and precarious. A controversial ad campaign for the website Fiverr embodied all these contradictions. It played on the desire to quit one’s lousy job and become a boss, by offering the pleasure of subjecting others to the tyranny one feels as a precarious creative or technical employee these days. The ads promise a way to hire versions of your old self who are “doers.” The most notorious ad showed a black and white picture of a hollow-cheeked, sad-eyed young woman staring directly at the viewer: “You eat a coffee for lunch. You follow through on your follow through. Sleep deprivation is your drug of choice,” it reads, concluding: “You might be a doer.” Another slogan was “Nothing like a safe, reliable paycheck to crush your soul.” And “How much did you make for your boss today?” The one I most often saw defaced read “White Collars Can Come With Leashes.” The slogans appear under pictures of a “diverse” workforce, of course: the algorithm is in theory very **tolerant about who it exploits**. The old dream of labor, that it could organize itself, is supposed to be dead. **There can be no dream of the hacker class to self-organize** in any way, whether like labor or in some other form. Such desires are unspeakable, even if they keep erupting in all sorts of interesting ways. Sanctioned desire is neatly summed up in the image and slogan of a cellphone company: “Boss Revolution.” The image is of a raised fist, with a cellphone in it, in red. **The only desire** permissible **is to become a boss**, like Don Draper. This has not stopped some interesting and promising signs of hacker self-organization in technical and creative industries, from the unionization of creatives at Vice Media to the Google walkout to refusal to work on border control or military projects across the tech industry. 30 Baby steps, to be sure; it is always a tough argument to propose common interests among subordinate classes. Counter-hegemony is hard. Hackers, like workers or farmers, are distracted by particular and local interests. As with other subordinate classes, class consciousness is rare among hackers. Most of us are rather reactionary, even in the nontechnical trades. But then class consciousness is always a rare and difficult thing. Unlike other identities, it has to be argued contrary to appearances. The feeling of belonging to a class rarely extends beyond appearances. It appears that one is a “creative” or working in “tech,” for example. There could be a myriad of such classes. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this self- understanding of class restricts itself to appearances and masks not an essence but a structural question as to how one’s efforts end up being commodified and who reaps most of the benefit of that. The received ideas within which one is asked to think about one’s identity don’t help when it comes to thinking how one is located within an information political economy, one where the hidden side of appearances is not eternal essence, just things one usually doesn’t see—the forces of production. To come into an awareness of class is to speak another language. It is to **refuse the terms that are given and seek other terms**, other concepts. This can be difficult. I can tell you from experience: the American college students that I meet cannot even pronounce bourgeoisie, let alone conceptualize it. Everything it once meant culturally has evaporated. The outward signs and styles of the ruling class don’t look bourgeois. Our newstyle overlords only wear suits when called before Congress; otherwise they wear discreetly expensive t-shirts. You don’t see them cutting ribbons at factory openings. They don’t preach hard work and thrift; they preach creativity, mindfulness, and ethical consumption. The bourgeois culture with which generations of Marxist aesthetics had a love—hate relationship is effectively extinct. The ruling class is not what it used to be. Maybe it needs another name. What is even harder is to name those whose location in the political economy of information is the making of new information. It isn’t exactly labor, as it’s not the same thing every day; it’s a different thing every day. Output is not quantifiable in increments, although that won’t stop the vectoralist class from trying. One popular attempt to describe them (us) was as the creative class?31 More radical approaches have called what we do immaterial labor or postfordist labor, and us the cognitariat?32 But there’s something a bit mystifying about the language of creativity, something a bit idealist about the immaterial, something backward looking about just adding a modifier, and something of a rationalist bias in the category of cognition, given that the management of feelings can be part of our job description, too.33 I opted to call us the hacker class. Twenty years ago, that was perhaps too romantic a term, on the border of legality, outside the logic of commodification.34 Now it has more exclusively criminal associations. If anything, **it’s an index of how much the vectoralist class has succeeded**. It is all but inconceivable now that there could be an open-ended, playful, experimental approach to making the new appear out of the old in techniques of information that would not be entirely contained with the commodification and control of the information vector. But just as the industrial working class retained a utopian feeling about what labor should be like from craft labor, so too it is possible to hold onto a feeling about what it’s like to make elegance appear that wasn’t there before with a technique for transforming information, and to do it on one’s own time, with one’s own goals and objectives.35 That is what it might mean to hack. Some of the more compelling scenes in both Mad Men and Halt and Catch Fire try to find a televisual language for these joyful moments, caught though they are, as the narrative arc reminds us, within the commodification of information. To think that one’s class is the hacker class might now be not unlike repurposing the word queer, or any of the other negatively charged terms that those so designated reclaim with pride—just as Marx and Engels reclaimed the word communist from its denouncers in the opening poetic gambit of the Manifesto. That was an artful bit of **détournement**. They refunctioned found language from the common store, deleted false meaning, pasted in fresh ones. **To clear a space for thought is to work in and against language, to put some pressure on it**. What if we took a more daring, modernist, defamiliarizing approach to writing theory? What if we asked of theory as a genre that it be as interesting, as strange, as poetically or narratively rich as we ask our other kinds of literature to be? What if we treated it **not as high theory**, with pretentions to legislate or interpret other genres, **but as low theory**, as something **vulgar, common**, even a bit rude —having no greater or lesser claim to speak of the world than any other?36 It might be more fun to read. It might tell us something strange about the world. It might, just might, enable us to act in the world otherwise. A world in which the old faith in History is no more, but where there are histories that still might be made— in a pinch. The end of the dominance of capitalism as a mode of production is not a subject that has received much useful attention. For its devotees, it has no end, as it is itself the end of History. 37 For its enemies, it can end only in Communism. If Communism—a state that exists mostly in the imaginal realm, always deferred into the future—has not prevailed, then this by definition must still be the reign of Capital. Let’s pause for a moment over the ideological freight attached to this poetic conceit and its consequences: **the present is defined** mostly **in terms of a hoped-for negation of it**. Some theology! If capitalism is to be of any use as a historical concept, then the question of its end has to remain an open one. The thought experiment as to whether it may already have been surpassed by another dominant mode ought at least to be one that can be posed. The concept of Capital is theological precisely to the extent that questions of its possible surpassing by other exploitative modes of production remain off limits. How then can a concept of capitalism be returned to its histories? By abandoning the duality of its essence and appearance. Theories of the eternal quality of Capital’s essence, its unity and identity through time, tend to focus on the analysis of the relations of production. One can extract from Marx’s Capital a quite remarkable theoretical armature that appears in the negative through the critique of the theological concepts of bourgeois political economy. This conceptual armature is so robust that there are few phenomena that resist interpretation as surface appearances of these concepts when posited as a hidden essence. Two things **slip from view** in this procedure. First, that **the bourgeois political economy** that Marx took as the object of critique i**s now itself a museum piece**.38 Second, that in this focus on the relations of production, **the forces of production receive very little attention**. We don’t spend enough time on how the brain-fryer is a different machine from the meat grinder. This is something of a problem, as surely the dynamism of those forces of production under capitalism was one of the salient points of the theory in the first place. But where **the relations of production can be understood theoretically**, **the forces of production cannot**. They don’t lend themselves to an abstract, conceptual overview by a master thinker within a genteel high theory. They can really only be known through the collaborative production of a critical theory sharing the experiences of many fields. That would include those with a **knowledge of information technology, artificial intelligence, supply chain management, material science, computational biology**, and much else besides. We’re way past the steam engines that Marx was sketching in his notebooks.39 Is it not possible, then, that there have been sufficient transformations in the forces of production to break out of the fetters of a strictly capitalist mode of production? There are two versions of this question. One is looking for a theological justification for this appearance of something new as finally putting an end to the more troubling aspects of capitalism for vectoralist class apologetics. But the more salient version of the question might be to ask whether what has emerged, in addition to and laminated on top of a capitalist mode of production, is something qualitatively different, but which generates new forms of class domination, new forms of the extraction of surplus, even new kinds of class formation. The emergence of information as a material force of production looked for a while like it might escape the confines of existing relations of production and that it could negate existing property forms. (I return to this topic in Chapter 4). It looked for a while as though the one thing that really could form the basis of the commons was information. It blew apart the old culture industry. Producers of information started to think not just about their craft or trade interests but about a class interest. Or so it looked early in the twenty-first century when I wrote A Hacker Manifesto. What I did not anticipate was the emergence of a whole other technique for the capture of creation. While there are still elements among the ruling class that want to confine creation within ever stricter forms of private property, some took the opposite tack. Rather than police or restrict free creation, this other strategy was to move its capture to a more abstract level. The production of information can be **outsourced** to free labor, to people who work but **need not** even **be paid**, and the aggregate value of their production of information can then be captured and treated as a resource that can be **monetized**.40 This new kind of ruling class does not appropriate a quantity of surplus value so much as **exploit an asymmetry of information**. **It gives**, sometimes even **as a gift**, **access to** the location of a piece of **information** for which you are searching.41 Or it lets you assemble your own social network. Or it lets you perform a particular financial transaction. Or it gives you coordinates on the planet and what can be found at that location. Or it will even tell you some things about your own DNA. Or it will provide a logistical infrastructure for your small business. But while you get that little piece of information, this ruling class gets all of that information in the aggregate. It exploits the asymmetry between the little you know and the aggregate it knows—an aggregate it collects based on information you were obliged to “volunteer.” In practice, this emergent ruling class of our time insists on the confinement of particular acts of creation within the property form and access to collective creative activity, from which to harvest information in the aggregate. This is the vectoralist class. If the capitalist class owns the means of production, **the vectoralist class owns the vectors of information**. They own the extensive vectors of **communication**, which **traverse space**. They own the intensive vectors of **computation**, which **accelerate time**. They own the **copyrights**, the **patents**, and the **trademarks** that **capture** attention or assign **ownership** to novel techniques. They own the logistic systems that manage and monitor the disposition and movement of any resource. They own the financial instruments that stand in for the value of every resource and that can be put out on markets to crowdsource the possible value of every possible future combination of those resources. They own the algorithms that rank and sort and assign particular information in particular circumstances. This **vectoralist class comes to dominate** not just subordinate classes, but **other ruling classes as well**. Just as capital came to dominate landed property, subsuming its control over land in a more abstract and fungible property form, so too the vectoralist class has **subsumed and outflanked capital** in a more abstract form. The capitalist class finds itself at a disadvantage. Owning the means of production, labor materialized into capital in the sense of plant and equipment, is a rigid and long-term investment. Owning and controlling the vector, the hack of new information materialized into patents, copyrights, brands, proprietary logistics. It is more abstract, flexible, adaptive. It is not more rational, but it is more abstract. The vectoralist class monopolizes the crossroads where information traffics, feeding like Michel Serres’s parasite on the buzz of information and noise at crucial junctures.42 The most obvious aspect of vectoral rule in everyday life is its monopoly of attention, although it is not reducible to this. As Yves Citton notes, in a world awash in digital data, what is rare is the attention paid to it.43 **Commanding attention** through the ownership and control of brands, celebrities and media “properties” is the public face, the **disintegrating spectacle,** of vectoral economy. 44 In part, this descends from what was formerly the culture industry. But it is no longer an industry apart, commodified leisure. It’s now integrated into the whole of production and consumption. This brief sketch of the supersession of capitalism as a dominant mode has the advantage of enabling many of the features of contemporary life that are often treated as separate to appear as aspects of the same historical development. The **rise of technology, financialization, neoliberalism, and biopolitics** appear as **effects of the same transformation** of the forces of production, putting pressure on the relations of production, to the point where what bursts forth is a new ruling class formation. In the usual historical narrative, by the end of the seventies, the forces of labor had fought capital to a standstill in the overdeveloped world.45 In this story, financialization and neoliberalism come to the rescue. **But how**? **What** material means **made financialization** even **possible**? What underlying social forces enabled neoliberal ideas to even appear plausible as policy instruments? Why does this **coincide with the** apparent **birth of “tech”** as an **industry** sector? In the thought experiment I am sketching, all of these developments fit together in a novel way. The capitalist class was searching for a way out of the impasse of confronting the demands of labor at a time when improvements of the old means of production no longer yielded much by way of a productivity increase. The capitalist class thought it found a way out by replacing labor with the vector and escaping along it. **Globalization, deindustrialization, and outsourcing** would enable it to be free from the power of labor to block **the flows of** production. The same information vector would enable not just a more abstract and flexible kind of production, but also of consumption, through the financialization of everyday life.46 Workers as producers found their jobs had moved elsewhere; workers as consumers found their purchasing power restored— at least temporarily. **Here’s the twist**: what at first appeared to assist capital to defeat labor in the overdeveloped world was also **a defeat for capital**. The novel forces of production that enabled this outflanking of labor became themselves the new dominant forces of production. Power over the value chain moves from the ownership and control of the means of production to ownership and control of the vectors of information. Whole new industries arose, as did whole new corporations—the so-called tech sector. But actually **all corporations** become increasingly **organized around** the ownership and control of **information**. Control over the value chain through ownership of the information vector extends even **into life itself**. This is not the least reason, incidentally, that it is no longer helpful to posit the vitalism of living labor against capital as dead labor. 47 Not capital but **the vector enters the flesh** and commands it, and not just as meat, but also **as information**, through **monitoring** its states, through **modifying** its functions with drugs that alter chemical signals, through **patenting** aspects of life as design.48 What is at stake is neither a bios nor a polis but a regime of property in information extending into the organism. The novel forces of production as they have emerged in our time are also forces of reproduction and forces of circulation. The power of the vectoralist class is not cognitive; nor is it a power over the general intellect.49 It thrives just as well on noise, on volatility, on bad information as it does on any kind of intelligence or reason.50 It reaches just as far into the corporeality and even sexuality of the human as it does into the intellect.51 The forms of **artificial computational order** it is creating are **not extensions or imitations of human cognition** but something else entirely. 52 One **cannot interpret** the strangeness of this mode of production **using** the received **hermeneutic conceptual categories**, derived as they are from a critique of the relations of production of nineteenth-century steam-powered capitalism. Indeed, one sees now how incomplete Marx’s critique was and remains. Even his critical understanding of capitalism is still thinking capitalism metaphorically as like a giant, dysfunctional steam engine, set to blow at any moment from unregulated internal pressures.53 **Marx is not able to think critically about information** in the contemporary sense of the concept because it is not one that the forces of production of his time have yet produced. Marx found what was absent in the theories of Capital in his time. He lifted the veil between exchange and production and found the exploited labor that makes it. He wrote the heresy that Capital is dead labor— congealed pink goo—and he went on to write from the point of view of the labor that capital exploits. So: let’s go looking for what is absent in theories of both Capital and information in our time. Let’s find that peculiar class who own and control information. Let’s find the exploited class or classes that make it and are subjected to it. In vulgar terms: the capitalist class eats our bodies, **the vectoralist class eats our brains**. Returning this thought experiment to the present, one might then be able to think the historical specificity of the contemporary moment. This, after all, was Marx’s great achievement. He thought his moment. His present did not look to him like his past. It had novel features that called into being concepts adequate to the situation. Which leaves us with the paradoxical and provocative thought that any theory in which **the present appears as** in essence the same as the past of **Marx’s time**, only different in a few matters of appearance, **can’t** really **be** a “**Marxist**” one, as such fidelity is necessarily a betrayal of his achievement. Debord: “And theories are made to die in the war of time.”54 Perhaps we can **leave** such **theological questions to the faithful**, who are in any case an embattled and diminished band. Instead, here is a research agenda: what are the **current forces of production**, and how can they be understood (in a preliminary way) under a modest set of concepts? How do those forces of production give rise to contemporary forms of class power, and how has that power in turn shaped the particular form those forces of production have taken? At what points might the subordinate classes, obliged to live within the world those forces of production make in the interests of those ruling class, be able to assert agency and autonomy? **What other world is still possible**, given the damage this general economy has done to the world, with the means that it has hitherto developed?55

#### On June 21, 2013, the United States Department of Justice unsealed charges against Snowden of two counts of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and theft of government property, following which the Department of State revoked his passport. Russia later granted Snowden the right of asylum.[[4]](#footnote-4)

#### The vector consumes all – US intellectual property laws allows the extraction of value from the hacker class by commodifying creativity and controlling freedom, pushing the world to extinction. Snowden’s expulsion and isolation with threats of execution is proof of the extend our government will go to protect its data

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 5: A Time Machine Theory of History)//gideon

It is a strange thing, this mode of production. What Bernal and Richta called the scientific and technological revolution really did happen, and in the West, not the East. But it was the product of a weird kind of “socialism.” It came out of a **wartime socialization of scientific and technical power**. Scientists and engineers, in academic and corporate laboratories, **cooperated** with each other. Their **innovations weren’t immediately patented, they were shared**. That laid the groundwork for postwar developments in the forces of production. To some extent this “socialism” continued, under the auspices of the Pentagon’s Advanced Projects Research Agency, which among other things funded key work in computation.52 If there was a key innovation that came out of this strange western statesocialist military—industrial complex, it was **the technics of information**. It took a while for the pieces to come together. By the early twenty-first century, the odd thing is that the state-socialist sponsored scientific and technical effort, made first to defeat the Axis powers and then to defeat the Soviets, ended up being a way to compete with Japanese industry abroad and to defeat the working classes at home. A basically **socialized research program** became **the means to build** an infrastructure—what Benjamin Bratton calls the stack, what I call the vector—for a systematic and global privatization of objects, subjects, and the information in between them.53 That this was not an inevitable destiny of science and technology was masked by the **suppression of critical and dissenting voices** among scientists themselves. Bernalism, or the Social Relations of Science movement more broadly, was **shut down in** the **red scare politics** of the Cold War. In the relative absence of that strand of thinking, the available stories for accounting for this historical period have lacked a sense of the class conflicts internal to these new forces of production and the extent to which they were likely to transform capitalism, such as it was in the late twentieth century, into something else. The story that is best known about science and technology during the war is the Manhattan project and the atom bomb. But perhaps it was not the only piece of the puzzle that mattered. The war in the Pacific was probably the biggest logistical operation ever conducted up until that time. Robert McNamara, who would later run the Ford Motor Company and then the Pentagon, was an apprentice logistics expert during the war. These were pioneering efforts to control the movement and combination of incredibly complex arrays of resources across vast territories using communication and computation.54 What started out as the means to beat the Axis powers, and then contain the Soviets, and then to compete with Japanese industry, was in the end the means to **globalize production**, **exploit** the newly available **cheap labor of** the People’s Republic of **China**, and **destroy** the power of **organized labor** within Italy, the United States, and throughout much of the overdeveloped world. But there’s a paradox attendant to this. Capital thought it was using some new kinds of communication and computational power in its struggle with labor, but in the end the **capitalist class** too ended up being **subsumed under that power**. The capitalist class became a subsidiary ruling class to the vectoralist class. **Capital is dead; the Vector lives**. A capitalist class owns the means of production, the means of organizing labor. **A** vectoralist class owns the means of organizing the means of production. The vector has a double form: the form of vector along which information is to be routed (**the extensive vector**), and the form of the vector along which information can be stored and computed (**the intensive vector**). A vectoralist class also owns and **controls the production process** through patents, copyrights, brands, trademarks, proprietary logistical processes, and the like. It is curious that if one looks at the world’s biggest corporations these days, a lot of their power and property is in vectoral form. Many of them **don’t** actually **make the things they sell**. They control **the** production **process by owning and controlling the information**. Even when they do still make the stuff, a quite remarkable amount of the valuation of the company comes from portfolios of intellectual property, or proprietarydata about their customers, and so on. Capital was subsumed under a more abstract form of technical power. When considering the vectoralist class, then, three further points suggest themselves. First, it seems to be able to extract value not just from labor but from what Tiziana Terranova calls free labor. 55 Even when you just stroll down the street, the phone in your purse or pocket is reporting data back to some vectoralist entity. The vectoralist class seems to be able to extract revenue out of qualitative information in much the same way as banks extract it out of quantitative information. Perhaps the exercise of power through control of quantitative and qualitative information is characteristic of the same ruling class. Second, the vectoralist class subordinates the old kind of ruling class, a capitalist class, in the same way that capitalists subordinated the old landlord class that subjected rural production to commodi-fication through ground rent. In that sense, the rise of a vectoralist class is a similar and subsequent development within intra-ruling class dynamics. The vectoralist class still sits atop a pyramid of exploited labor, but it depends also on extracting a surplus out of another, fairly privileged but still subordinate class. I call it the **hacker class**. Bernal already had an inkling of this development when he tried to articulate the interests of scientific workers in and against capitalism, but this was not quite the hacker class yet. That had to wait for the development of sophisticated forms of intellectual property, which are in turn embedded in the design of the interface for the **creative process**. This transforms the qualitative work of producing new forms of information in the world into property that can be rendered equivalent in the market. In short, a new class dynamic, between vectoralist and hacker, was added to an already complex pattern of relations between dominant and subordinate classes. Third, the political economy of the former West rather than the former East was the one that was able to develop the implications of the scientific and technical revolution, in the form of the rise of the vectoralist class. But it was **the state form of the former East that has prevailed in the former West.** **The vector** is not just a means of transforming production. It is also a way of **transforming state power**. 56 Data can be collected for the purposes of a logistics of **economic control**; data can also be collected **to run the surveillance and security apparatus of the state**. The western states too had their surveillance apparatus, but it was never as total as those of the East. The new model worldwide uses the vector to **realize the dreams of the KGB** of old, an information state. This is what Guy Debord called the stage of the integrated spectacle, **combining the worst of the former East and West**.57 The West is now **the former West**. Its economy became something else. It isn’t capitalism any more—it’s worse. It takes even more control away from work life and everyday life. It expands the exploitation of nature to possible extinction. It is certainly not the wonderful dream of a “postindustrial society,” still less Bernal and Richta’s accelerationist socialism. It is a relatively new and more elaborate form of class domination, one in more or less “peaceful coexistence” with the Russian former East, whose global significance is reduced to that of predatory oligarchy monopolizing a resource export economy. 58 The Soviet Union paid a high price for not figuring out the role of information and reaching a modus vivendi with its scientific workers.

#### Snowden has been variously called a traitor, a hero, a whistleblower, a dissident, a coward, and a patriot. U.S. officials condemned his actions as having done "grave damage" to the U.S. intelligence capabilities. Snowden has defended his leaks as an effort "to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them." His disclosures have fueled debates over mass surveillance, government secrecy, and the balance between national security and information privacy.[[5]](#footnote-5)

#### The west refused Snowden and continuously produced propaganda to hide his revalations.

#### NATO security cooperation is the lynchpin of this western securitization – justifications for NATO action are securitizations that produce anti-communist operations and imperial exploitation.

**Hellmann et al. 17** (\*Gunther Hellmann, \*\*Benjamin Herborth, \*\*\*Gabi Schlag, and \*\*\*\*Christian Weber, \*PhD, professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt. His research interests are in the fields of international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and international security; \*\*PhD, professor, DAAD fellow at AICGS, \*\*\*academic councilor at the Institute for Political Science, \*\*\*\* Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences. Journal of International Relations and Development, "The West: a securitising community?", 4/18/2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.9, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.

NATO's (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep **institutionalisation of military cooperation** with an integrated command structure including US **nuclear weapons**, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, **this project was continued** but it has certainly changed in form. **Out-of-area operations** and the development of **a globally active alliance** is one of the most visible expressions of such self-authorising practices. These dynamics were central to **re-constitute NATO** during critical junctures and have been **productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today** (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an **inherently normative rhetoric** when it stated that the parties ‘**are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’** (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a **common culture** and even ‘**civilisation’** (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interest-driven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘**indivisibility of allied security’**.Footnote6

Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the **inclusion of an autocratic state** such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked **narrative of shared norms**, values, and a common heritage **provided** a sufficiently strong **rationale for** **defending** the North Atlantic Area **against any** potential **threat**. Moreover, it also legitimised taking **whatever measures** were deemed ‘**necessary’** to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO's post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an **alliance in ‘crisis’** as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the **invocation of a normative foundation** of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation **even against the background of internal political dissent** was as much a **securitising move** as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation **was** only manageable **by** invoking **such a** normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.

The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany's membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO's double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of **alliance disruption** that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up **of the Atlantic alliance**. In these situations **strategic concepts** turned out to be crucial in **re-establishing coherence** and unity by **reaffirming the authority of the alliance** and its **ability to (re-)act**. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO's post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at **justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance** against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).

In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.Footnote7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance's global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a **global mission** to NATO's members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards **self-authorisation** in **the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’**. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, **NATO** itself **became a** **producer of a common law** where **the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention**. The specific formation of NATO's strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’être. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the **attack on ‘Western’ values** as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of **our citizens**, and **their human rights and civil liberties’** were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to **combat this scourge**. Our **security requires no less’** (NATO 2001).Footnote8

During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but **feel secure’** (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO's strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a **nuclearisation** of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.

#### On September 2, 2020, a U.S. federal court ruled in United States v. Moalin that the U.S. intelligence's mass surveillance program exposed by Snowden was illegal and possibly unconstitutional. The name of the program – PRISM.[[6]](#footnote-6)

#### The resolution’s conceptualization of data as an international political tool stimulates endless growth with limited regulation – it’s creating a new PRISM of global control and destruction

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Data form an increasingly essential element of contemporary politics, as both **public and private actors extend claims of their legitimate control in diverse areas** including health, security, and trade. This paper investigates **data governance** as a site of fundamental **normative and political ordering** processes that unfold in light of ever-increasing inter- and **transnational linkages**. Drawing on the concept of jurisdictional conflicts, the paper traces the evolution of data governance in three cases of transatlantic conflicts as diverging definitional claims over data. The paper argues that these conflicts reveal varying conceptualizations of data linked to four distinct visions of the social world. First, a conceptualization of data as an individual rights issue links human rights with the promotion of sovereignty to a vision of data governance as local liberalism. Second, **proponents of a security partnership promote** global security cooperation **based on the conceptualization of** data as a neutral instrument. Third, a conceptualization of data as an economic resource is linked to a vision of the digital economy that endorses progress and innovation with limited regulation. Fourth, a conceptualization of data as a collective resource links the values of universal rights and global rules to a vision of global protection.

The ever-increasing relevance of the internet has contributed to the recognition of data as a key concern in social, political, and economic lives. How data are collected, processed, and shared has significant implications for contemporary politics in areas, such as security, health, democracy, and human rights (van Puyvelde, Coulthart, and Hossain 2017; Davies and Wenham 2020). After the 2013 Snowden revelations of mass surveillance by intelligence agencies around the world but also following potential voter manipulation in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, data governance has experienced a “salience shock” (Kalyanpur and Newman 2019). Data governance describes ordering processes by actors including but not limited to states, international organizations, local authorities, and private companies that relate to the processing, transfer, sharing, and general use practices of digital data. Regulatory measures on the international, regional, and domestic level have proliferated. Of the 132 countries that have at least minimal data privacy laws in place, 55 countries have adopted such legislation only in the last ten years (UNCTAD 2020). As even tech companies have increasingly called for regulation (Hern 2019), former European Commissioner Martine Reicherts has claimed that “[d]ata protection is the new business model” (Reicherts 2014). While there seems to be convergence around common standards (Bradford 2020), conflicts resulting from different approaches to the governance of digital data have shaken particularly transatlantic relations in the last decade (Farrell and Newman 2019). Actors face significant incentives to avoid such conflicts. In 2013, the European Centre for Political Economy estimated that a serious disruption in transatlantic data flows could have a negative impact on the EU Gross Domestic Product of between 0.8 and 1.3 percent (ECIPE 2013, 3). Yet, overlapping claims of control have adversely affected the transatlantic data transfer regime multiple times. For instance, in 2015 and again in 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the main transatlantic data sharing agreement for commercial transfers exposing more than 5,000 businesses to legal uncertainty.

#### To bring forth the new age of knowledge, that is both realistic and practical, we must commit ourselves to a radical transformation of both epistemology and culture within existing institutions

Kleiner 10

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Despite copyleft’s beneficial role in forming a valuable common stock of software, it remains problematic when the model is retrofitted back to the domains of art and culture from which dissent against intellectual property sprung. Cultural works, unlike software, are a consumer good, not a tool for use in production, or a producer’s good. Producer’s goods, as mentioned earlier, are the assets used in production, such as the tools and equipment required to produce consumer goods sold for profit. Capital demand is distinct from consumer demand. Capital demand is the demand for producer’s goods; consumer demand is the demand for consumer goods. Capitalism doesn’t require that a profit be made on the production of capital goods because profits are made through the control of the circulation of consumer goods. Anything that decreases the cost of capital consequently increases the potential profit that can be captured through the sale of the goods. Failure to understand the difference between capital demand and consumer demand propagates the myth that the success of free software can be a template for free culture. Under capitalism, only capital can be free. That’s why software can be free, but culture cannot be free without more fundamental shifts in society. Art is not, in most cases, a common input to production as software is. Thus, the demand for it is consumer demand, not capital demand. There are certainly cases in which art works could be considered productive inputs, such as sound effects, clip art, music clips, and the like, and the tradition of artists drawing on the work of their predecessors has been discussed at length above; however, when we discuss the economics of content-based works, like poems, novels, films, or music, as well as entertainment-oriented software titles such as games, we are not talking about producer’s goods, but consumer’s goods. Capitalist publishing firms and entertainment industry giants will support the creation of copyleft software in order to employ it in production. However, in most cases, they will not support the creation of copyleft art. Why would they, as art is a consumer good, and the industry is not in the business of giving away consumer goods for free. They are in the business, however, of earning profits by controlling the distribution of consumer goods. Like all copyable, reproducible information, content-based works have no direct exchange value, and, unlike software, they rarely have use value in production either. Use value exists only among the fans of these works, and, if owners of property cannot charge these fans money for the right to copy, why would they fund the production? And if owners of property will not support copyleft art, which is freely distributed, who will? The answer is unclear. In some cases, institutions such as private and state cultural funds will, but these can only support a very small number of artists, and only then by employing dubious and ultimately somewhat arbitrary selection criteria in deciding who does, and who does not, receive such funding. The problem is obvious when attempting to translate copyleft to cultural works. If someone releases a novel under a copyleft license, and Random House prints it and makes a profit off the author’s work, Random House has not violated copyleft as long as the copyleft is passed down. To be ‘free’ means to be open to commercial appropriation, since freedom, in the terms of copyleft, is defined as the non-restrictive circulation of 41 information rather than as freedom from exploitation. It comes as no surprise that the major revision in applying copyleft to the production of artworks, music, and texts has been to permit copying, modifying, and redistributing as long as it is non-commercial. Wu Ming, a group of anti-intellectual property authors from Italy, claim it is necessary to place a restriction on commercial use, or use for profit, to prohibit the parasitic exploitation of cultural workers. They justify this restriction, and its divergence from the General Public License version of copyleft, on the grounds that the struggle against exploitation and the fight for a fair remuneration of labor is the cornerstone of the history of the left. Other content providers and book publishers, for example Verso, have expanded this restriction by claiming that copying, modifying, and redistributing should not only be nonprofit, but also in the spirit of the original, without explaining what this ‘spirit’ means. Indymedia Romania revised its copyleft definition to make the meaning of ‘in the spirit of the original’ clearer after repeated problems with the neo-fascist site Alter media Romania, whose ‘pranks’ ranged from hijacking the indymedia.ro domain to copying texts from Indymedia and lying about names and sources. Indymedia Romania’s restrictions include, not modifying the original name or source because it goes against the desire for transparency, not reproducing the material for profit because it abuses the spirit of generosity, and not reproducing the material in a context that violates the rights of individuals or groups by discriminating against them based on nationality, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality because that contravenes its commitment to equality. Other versions of copyleft have tried to add further restrictions based on a stronger interpretation of the ‘left’ in copyleft, based not on a negative freedom from restrictions but on positive principles, like valuing social co-operation above profit, non-hierarchical participation, and non-discrimination. The more restrictive definitions of copyleft attempt to find an information common that is not just about the free flow of information but sees itself as part of a larger social movement that bases its commonality on shared leftist principles. In its various mutations, copyleft represents a pragmatic, rational approach that recognizes the limits of freedom as implying reciprocal rights and responsibilities. These different restrictions represent divergent interpretations about what these rights and responsibilities should be. Yet, given the poor economic conditions of most artists who reserve full copyright, the prospect of non-commercial mutations of copyleft improving the economic conditions of artists seems remote. The chief advantage of reserving commercial rights as an artist is the ability to license work to the entertainment industry under other terms; as it is commercial, it doesn’t qualify for free access under the terms of a non-commercial license. However, artists lack the resources to manufacture and distribute on a commercial scale. Thus, they are in fact reliant on those who have the capital to do so, and cannot bargain for anything more than their subsistence. In essence, selling their ideas is like other workers selling their labor. This is illustrated in ‘Music Artists’ Earnings and Digitisation: A Review of Empirical Data from Britain and Germany’ by Martin Kretschmer, Professor of Information Jurisprudence at Bournemouth University, where he concludes that ‘the creator has little to gain from exclusivity’.41 Similarly, in his 2006 study ‘Empirical Evidence On Copyright Earnings’, Kretschmer states: ‘Earnings from non copyright, and even non-artistic activities, are an important source of income for most creators’.42 This study includes many startling figures. For example,the median payment distributed by the Performing Right Society (UK) in 1994 to its copyright holders was £84.43 While non-commercial terms may provide a way to integrate artists who produce free culture into an otherwise proprietary entertainment industry, they do not challenge that proprietary entertainment industry or address the embedded exploitation in it. Non-commercial 42 terms are very problematic for those in the socialist left who advocate for workers’ self-organized production, as these terms restrict the ability of non-capitalist enterprises to reproduce such works. Thus, such licenses are detrimental not only to the interests of artists but to all workers, as they are not compatible with the general objective of the socialist left: the creation of a worker-controlled economy. In order for copyleft to mutate into a revolutionary instrument in the domain of cultural production, it must become ‘copy-far-left’. It must insist on workers’ ownership of the means of production. The works themselves must be a part of the common stock, and available for productive use by other commons-based producers. So long as authors reserve the right to make money with their works and prevent other commons-based producers from doing so, their work cannot be considered to be in the commons at all and remains a private work. A copyfarleft license must not restrict commercial usage, but rather usage that is not based in the commons. Specifically, copyfarleft must have one set of rules for those who are working within the context of workers’ communal ownership, and another for those who employ private property and wage labor in production. A copyfarleft license should make it possible for producers to share freely and to also retain the value of their labor product. In other words, it must be possible for workers to earn remuneration by applying their own labor to mutual property, but impossible for owners of private property to make profit using wage labor. Thus, under a copyfarleft license, a worker-owned printing co-operative could be free to reproduce, distribute, and modify the common stock as they like, but a privately owned publishing company would be prevented from having free access. In this way, copyfarleft remains free in the same sense as copyleft, despite restrictions on proprietary redistribution. Copyfarleft only prohibits subtraction from the commons, not contributions to it. A copyfarleft license would allow commons-based commercial use while denying the ability to profit by exploiting wage labor. The copyleft non-commercial approach does neither, it prevents commons-based commerce, while not effectively restricting wage exploitation which requires a change in the distribution of wealth. Copyleft provides a solid foundation for software in commons-based productions. Copyfarleft could potentially provide a workable foundation for cultural works to also become part of the common stock employed by independent producers. Only the promotion of a workers’ economy, not simply the prevention of commercial use, can change the distribution of wealth. However, for copyfarleft to have an impact, it would need to be employed within the context of a nascent workers’ economy that includes various forms of production, such as cultural and material (art as well as food, etc.). In the absence of such an environment, copyleft and its various mutations have little advantage for the majority of artists, for whom the prospects of gaining financially by way of commercial licensing are negligible. For these artists, anticopyright retains its strong appeal. Anticopyright is a gesture of being radical that refuses pragmatic compromises and seeks to abolish intellectual property in its entirety. Anticopyright affirms a freedom that is absolute and recognizes no limits to its desire. While some mutations of copyleft have multiplied restrictions, others have rejected any restriction at all, including the single restriction imposed by the initial copyleft. It is the movement around peer-to-peer file sharing that comes closest to the gesture of anticopyright. The best example is the Copyriot blog by Rasmus Fleischer of Piratbyrån (Bureau of Piracy), an anti-intellectual property think tank, and the one-time founders of Pirate Bay, the best-known Bittorent site in the P2P community. The motto of Copyriot 43 is ‘No copyright. No license’. But there is a difference from the older anticopyright tradition. Fleischer claims that copyright has become absurd in the age of digital technology because it has to resort to all sorts of fictions, like distinctions between uploading and downloading or between producer and consumer, which don’t actually exist in horizontal peer-to-peer communication. Piratbyrån rejects copyright in its entirety, not because it was flawed in its inception, but because it was invented to regulate an expensive, one-way machine like the printing press, and no longer corresponds to the practices that have been made possible by current technologies of reproduction. However, despite the absurdity of the fictions on which copyright rests, the broader political context suggests that copyleft-inspired models also have an important role to play. The outright rejection of the legal environment is not always possible when practical considerations are considered. Building alternative ways of producing and sharing, ‘building the new society within the shell of the old’, requires us to operate within the capitalist legal system where the logic of capture and exploitation is embedded. While space for defiant gestures exist, we must also get on with the business of finding the forms and structures required to build and expand the commons. It seems clear that restrictions such as those of copyleft and copyfarleft serve to protect the commons and keep it free. So long as copyright continues to exist, copyleftinspired licenses continue to beneeded in orderto allow forintellectual freedom within the copyrightregime. Only when workers have achieved their historical role of creating a society without classes, can we create a truly free culture without restrictions.

#### We advocate for venture communism , a platform where material wealth can be shared and allocated to build free networks and free societies.

Kleiner 10

(Dmytri Kleiner is a software developer working on projects that investigate the political economy of the internet, and the ideal of workers’ self-organization of production as a form of class struggle. Born in the USSR, Dmytri grew up in Toronto and now lives in Berlin. He is a founder of the Telekommunisten Collective, which provides internet and telephone services, as well as undertakes artistic projects that explore the way communications technologies have social relations embedded within them, such as deadSwap (2009) and Thimbl (2010). Telekommunisten, Armsterdam Octorber 2010, "The Telekommunist Manifesto," <http://telekommunisten.net/the-telekommunist-manifesto/> DOA July 19, 2022)

Venture communism provides a structure for independent producers to share a common stock of productive assets, allowing forms of production formerly associated exclusively with the creation of immaterial value, such as free software, to be extended to the material sphere. Part of the apparatus that allowed the free software community to grow and spread was the creation of copyleft, a type of license that allows for the re-use of the software it covers, so long as the derived works are also licensed under compatible terms. By releasing software under such licenses, the work becomes a collective stock for all free software developers. The core innovation of copyleft was to turn the copyright system against itself. The chief vehicle of asserting control under copyright is the license a work is released under, which establishes the terms under which others are permitted to use the copyrighted material. Copyleft effectively hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege over intellectual assets, using the authority granted by the copyright license to guarantee access for all, and require that this freedom is passed on. This is consistent with copyright laws, and dependent on them, because without copyright and the institutions that protect it, there could be no copyleft. Venture communism requires that this same freedom be extended to material productive assets. The chief vehicle for asserting control over productive assets is the firm. Venture communism is therefore based on a corporate form: the venture commune. Employing a venture commune to share material property hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege, to instead protect a common stock of productive assets that is available for use by independent producers. Legally, a venture commune is a firm, much like the venture capital funds of the capitalist class. However, the venture commune has distinct properties that transform it into an effective vehicle for revolutionary workers’ struggle. The venture commune holds ownership of all productive assets that make up the common stock employed by a diverse and geographically distributed network of collective and independent peer producers. The venture commune does not coordinate production; a community of peer producers produce according to their own needs and desires. The role of the commune is only to manage the common stock, making property, such as the housing and tools they require, available to the peer producers. 24 The venture commune is the federation of workers’ collectives and individual workers, and is itself owned by each of them, with each member having only one share. In the case that workers are working in a collective or co-operative, ownership is held individually, by the separate people that make up the collective or co-operative. Ownership in a venture commune can only be acquired by contributions of labor, not property. Only by working is a share in the commune earned, not by contributing land, capital or even money; only labor. Property is always held in common by all the members of the commune, with the venture commune equally owned by all its members. Thus, each member may never accumulate a disproportionate share of the proceeds of property. Property can never be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. The function of the venture commune is to acquire material assets that members need for living and working, such as equipment and tools, and allocate them to its members. The commune acquires this property when requested to do so by a member of the commune. The members interested in having this property offer a rental agreement to the commune, giving the terms they wish to have for possession of this property. The commune issues a series of bonds to raise the funds required to acquire the property, which then becomes collateral forthe bondholders. The rental agreement is offered as a guarantee that the funds will be available to redeem the bonds. Should this guarantee not be met, the property can be liquidated with the proceeds going to the bondholders. This series of bonds are sold in a public auction setting. If the bond sale clears, the commune acquires the property, and the rental agreement is executed transferring possession to the renter. The property returns to the commune whenever those renting it no longer require it, or are unable to meet the agreed terms, at which point the commune offers it once again at auction to its members, who bid on new rental terms. If there is no more demand for the asset it is liquidated. After the bonds that were issued to acquire an asset are fully redeemed, it becomes fully owned by the commune. The remaining rental income the property earns is from then on divided up equally among all members of the commune and paid out to them. Proceeds from liquidated property are likewise divided. Because all the rent collected from property rental is divided up evenly among the members of the commune, those members who pay rent for property that is equal to the amount they would receive in return essentially get to use an equal share of the collectively owned property for free. What they pay in rent for the property is equal to the rent they receive back as a member of the commune. Members renting more than their per-capita share of the collective property will pay more, and presumably be choosing to pay because they are employing the property as a productive asset, and thus earning enough to pay. Conversely, members using less than their per-capita share receive more in payment than they pay in rent, thus being rewarded for not hoarding property. The main activities of the venture commune, managing bonds and rental agreements, do not impose a high level of coordination and, just like the computer networks that manage the allocation of immaterial goods, are activities that are well suited for computerized automation. Many venture communes could exist, and as they become interrelated, merge together forming larger, and more stable and sustainable communities of commons-based producers. Any change that can produce a more equitable society is dependent on a prior change in the mode of production that increases the share of wealth retained by the worker. The change in the mode of production must come first. This change cannot be achieved politically, not by vote, or by lobby, or by advocacy, or by revolutionary violence, not as long as the owners of property have more wealth to apply to prevent any change by funding their own candidates, 25 their own lobbyists, their own advocates, and ultimately, developing a greater capacity for counter-revolutionary violence. Society cannot be changed by a strike, not as long as owners of property have more accumulated wealth to sustain themselves during production interruptions. Not even collective bargaining can work, for so long as the owners of property own the product, they set the price of the product and thus any gains in wages are lost to rising prices. Venture communism should not be understood as a proposal for a new kind of society. It is an organizational form with which to engage in social struggle. Venture communes are not intended to replace labor unions, political parties, NGOs and other potential vehicles of class conflict, but to compliment them, to tilt the economic balance of power in favor of the representatives of workers’ class interest. Without venture communism, these other organized forms are always forced to work against opposition with much deeper pockets, and are thus doomed to endless co-option, failure and retreat. The only way is to stop applying our labor to property owned by non-producers and instead form a common stock of productive assets. Venture communism is taking control of our own productive process, retaining the entire product of our labor, forming our own capital, and expanding until we have collectively accumulated enough wealth to achieve a greater social influence than those that defend exploitation. This new economic balance allows for change that is far greater than the modest goals of venture communism. A truly free society would have no need for copyleft, or venture communism; these are only practices around which workers can unite towards the realization of their historic role of building a classless society, a society of equals.

#### “But I’m not guilty,” said K. “there’s been a mistake. How is it even possible for someone to be guilty? We’re all human beings here, one like the other.” “That is true” said the priest “but that is how the guilty speak”[[7]](#footnote-7)

## Core

### Wark

#### Capital is Dead

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Introduction)//gideon

Which punk rock goddess are you? I’m Kim Gordon. Or I was. Not happy with that answer, I took the online quiz a few more times, until I got Patti Smith. I don’t know what company made that quiz, but I agreed to give them access to a whole bunch of information in exchange for the privilege of playing it, in order to learn what I already know, that I’m more of a Patti Smith type than a Kim Gordon type. The quiz held my attention for long enough to escape boredom, and it gave me something to post on social media, presumably to snag other people’s attention. Some people get rather freaked out about algorithms that seem to know so much about us, although I always thought of privacy as a bourgeois concept.1 What is dystopian here may be less the sharing of information than the asymmetry of the sharing. If you are getting your media for free, this usually means that you are the product. If the information is not being sold to you, then it is you who are being sold. This is something that those of us in media studies have been teaching our students and telling the public since the broadcast era.2 Back in the broadcast era, it was pretty simple. You listened to free radio or watched free television. In between the shows or the songs would be advertising. You were the product that was being sold, by the broadcaster, to advertisers. Or rather, what they sold was your attention.3 In a time in which the quantity of information was rising and its cost plummeting, what was still rare and valuable was (and is) your attention. In the broadcast era it was hard to even know whose attention a show gathered and whether any particular advertising worked. The ad industry guru David Ogilvy reported one of his clients claiming that half of his advertising worked and half of it failed, but he did not know which half was which.4 A good deal of snake oil still goes into persuading ad buyers that advertisers have magical means of persuasion that will galvanize people’s attention, lodge the brand in memory, and mobilize people’s desire toward actually buying the product or—same thing really—voting for the candidate. The evil genius of the postbroadcast-era media is that it not only holds our attention, it also records it. A lot more information can be extracted as to who we are, what we like, and which punk rock goddess we want to be. A lot of media consumers end up being quite shocked at just how much information about themselves they are giving away, and for free.5 They had been gulled into treating postbroadcast media as if it were some sort of free public service, an illusion certain companies are quite happy to perpetuate to their users but certainly not to their investors. To their investors they tell a different story: that by giving away what looks like a free service, they can extract more information than they give and that they can monetize this asymmetry of information.6 The old culture industries had figured out how to commodify leisure.7 The organized labor movement had struggled hard for free time for working people. Capital was forced to compromise, but it found a way to commodify leisure time as well as work time. The old culture industries at least had to make products that held our attention. In the postbroadcast era, the culture industries are superseded by the vulture industries. They don’t even bother to provide any entertainment. We have to entertain each other, while they collect the rent, and they collect it on all social media time, public or private, work or leisure, and (if you keep your FitBit on) even when you sleep.8 Which gives new meaning to a slogan invented by the Belgian surrealists: “Remember, you are sleeping for the boss!”9 Not just our labor, not just our leisure—**something else is being commodified** here: our sociability, our common and ordinary life together, what you might even call **our communism**.10 Sure, it’s not a utopian version of communism. It’s a very banal and everyday one, it’s our love of sharing our thoughts and feelings with each other and having connections to other people. But still, most people seem rather alarmed that their desire to share and be with each other, to reach out to friends, to pass on cat pictures, even their desire to have ferocious arguments with strangers, is making someone else very, very rich. That people who use the Internet are tracked and monitored and turned into information is not even the half of it. If you think your social media is spying on you, just imagine what kind of information your bank has on you. There’s a whole political economy that runs on asymmetries of information as a form of control.11 It may even amount to a new kind of class relation. Sure, there is still a landlord class that owns the land under our feet and a capitalist class that owns the factories, but maybe now there’s another kind of ruling class as well—one that owns neither of those things but instead **owns the vector along which information is gathered and used**.12 These days, not just everyone but everything is tracked and monitored and **turned into information**. If you order a package from an online website, you can follow the delivery of the item through its stages on its way to you. It’s a consumer grade version of tracking the movement of everything: animal, mineral, and vegetable. For these purposes, even though you think you fall in the animal category, you are also being tracked as if you were a rock. The mineral sandwich in your pocket, your cellphone, is generating information about all of its movements. Out of all of this information about the habits and movements of people and things, you can g**enerate predictions about future movements.** Well, you can’t do that: while you produce this information, it all ends up privately owned by some information-centric company. You make the information, but like some kind of info-prole, you don’t own the information you produce or the means of realizing its value. You **don’t get to benefit from its predictive power,** although you will likely **suffer the downside when those predictions prove spurious**. Because this vast, wonky information commons that we are all producing is privatized, it can be very hard to know how accurate or useful any of that information actually is.13 Bullshit in = bullshit out. It becomes depressingly familiar to learn that **algorithms have been primed with racist and sexist assumptions** about the people it is supposed to neutrally observe.14 This is annoying at the level of consumer profiling, but another thing entirely in the form of algorithmic policing.15 However, it’s a conversation frequently sidetracked into the demand for a fairer algorithm, **as if there could still be a neutral third party** above our differences, from which to pray for not much more than an equal right to be exploited by asymmetries of information. These discriminatory aspects of the information political economy need to be criticized and struggled over, but let’s not lose sight of the bigger picture. That bigger picture is the information political economy as a whole. Before focusing on what the corporations who own and control information are doing to us, let’s pause to look at the peculiarities of the information itself.16 Information is a rather strange thing. Contrary to the popular understanding, there’s **nothing ideal or immaterial about it**.17 Information only exists when there’s a **material substrate of matter and energy to store, transmit, and process it**. Information is part of a material world. But it’s a strange part. The word information is hardly new, but the science of information is very new; it is a postwar creation.18 Information is now such a pervasive organizing force that it has seeped into our worldview. 19 What we think of as “technology” these days very often means technologies that instrumentalize information. These are specific kinds of apparatus that gather, sort, manage, and process information so that it can then be used to control other things in the world. Information technology is a sort of meta-technology, designed to observe, measure, record, control, and predict what things, people, or indeed other information can or will or should do. These technologies made information very, very cheap and very, very abundant. They gave rise to a strange kind of political economy, one based not only on a scarcity of things but also on an excess of information. This generated quite novel kinds of problems for those who had (or aspired to) power: **how to maintain forms of class inequality, oppression, domination, and exploitation, based on something that in principle is now ridiculously abundant.** My proposition in this book is that resolving this contradiction called into being a new mode of production. This is not capitalism anymore; it is something worse. The dominant ruling class of our time no longer maintains its rule through the ownership of the means of production as capitalists do. Nor through the ownership of land as landlords do. **The dominant ruling class** of our time **owns and controls information**.

#### Capital is Dead. The myth of history must be disenchanted as critical theories fall into reproduced sameness – we can’t go to the archive and call it truth. Increasing abstraction of commodification of information has produced a new class relation – the vectoralist and hacker classes are a layer-on-top, a piece of information that must be considered to avoid total environmental collapse. Make some Noise and generate a new form of thought for our times.

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Introduction)//gideon

Why is there so much resistance to even thinking about whether all this is a component of a new mode of production? I start in Chapter 1 with why **we want to believe this is capitalism even if we hate it**. If you take a step back, this really does seem a bit odd. Even its opponents have started to imagine that Capital is eternal. Perhaps it’s time to ask whether the concept of Capital has ended up being rather more of a **theological** production than Marx would have intended. Hence Capital is Dead proceeds along two lines at once. It makes a minimally plausible case that the thesis of a new mode of production is worth investigating, and at the same time it is a critical account of how we got stuck trying to explain all emerging phenomena as if they were always expressions of the same eternal essence of Capital. Most **Marxists** like to think they have separated themselves from religion but have **made a religion of** this **separation**.35 If Capital is to function as a historical concept, then the question of how and when it ends has to be an open one. Where we seem to have ended up is with a not very logical but still emotionally compelling way of thinking: since communism has not prevailed, this must still be capitalism. The reality and the language of the present are anchored in an imaginary future. The challenge is to disenchant this myth of history without losing the ability to think of historical time as having other possibilities.36 Critical theories of the culture industry tend to stop short of thinking through the extent to which **the production of critical theory itself is now a minor genre within the culture industry**. 37 It has some of the characteristic hallmarks: a repetition of received ideas, narrative forms that resolve in predictable ways, a culture of exegesis that reproduces sameness. **Critical theory becomes hypocritical theory**. And so in Chapter 1, I try to combine the critical impetus of Marx with approaches to writing drawn from the historic avant-gardes that attempt to break from such habits, which treat writing as a more open-ended material practice. Perhaps the writing of critical theory texts is part of the same information political economy as everything else. Perhaps the distinctive property form of the information commodity saturates such objects as it does so many other things. Perhaps treating the archive of such texts as the archive of private property is part of the problem. In Chapter 1, I advocate another relation to the archive, to writing, one advanced by the situationists: détournment. It works and plays as if writing were a practice of a literary communism.38 After looking at habits of belief and practices of writing, Chapter 2 elaborates on the thought experiment that this may not be capitalism any more, but something worse. Here I restate in condensed form an argument I first made in A Hacker Manifesto (2004), updated to take account of the further unfolding of the tendencies of this peculiar mode of production.39 Here I assign its features some temporary names: I call the emerging ruling class the vectoralist class, because their class power derives from ownership and control of the vector of information. The vector of information includes the capacity to transmit, store, and process information. It is the material means for assembling so-called big data and realizing its predictive potential. The vectoralist class owns and controls patents, which preserve monopolies on these technologies. It owns or controls the brands and celebrities that galvanize attention. It owns the logistics and supply chains that keep information in its proprietary stacks. One thing that is distinctive about an information political economy is the way it instrumentalizes difference rather than sameness. The farmer and worker produce units of commodities that are equivalent within their kind. What I call the hacker class has to produce difference out of sameness. It has to make information that has enough novelty to be recognizable as intellectual property, a problem that landed property or commercial property does not have. By hacker class I mean everyone who produces new information out of old information, and not just people who code for a living. Part of the struggle of our time is to see a **common class interest** in all kinds of information making, whether in the sciences, technology, media, culture, or art. What we all have in common is producing new information but not owning the means to realize its value. And yet the way we go about this is not quite the same thing as labor, just as being a worker is not quite the same thing as being a farmer. As is much clearer from Marx’s political writings than from Capital, there are always many subordinate classes, just as there can be more than one ruling class.40 Modes of production are multiple and overlapping. Chapter 3 asks whether developments in the forces of production changed the relations of production and threw up a new kind of ruling class with different interests. But this is not a story where the forces of production are outside of historical struggle and simply develop on their own. On the contrary, the forces of production take a form determined by a series of class struggles as well. Who are the agents to that struggle? What role do scientists and engineers play? Could things have turned out otherwise? To even ask this involves questions about the selective tradition within which we think about the twentieth century. 41 What we imagine happened, and who we imagine are the committed writers who struggled in and against it, is a picture mutilated by the Cold War. 42 The scientific left was stripped from the picture. They were Communists or fellow travelers. Their legacy has been suppressed, even on the left. Here I present the current state of the forces of production not as some supposedly inevitable outcome of the metaphysics of technics but as the result of a lost struggle over the form of technology and the labor of creating new information in **scientific and technical fields**. The first time something like a transnational farmer, worker, and hacker alliance was even posited was in the thirties. It was subsumed into the global struggle against fascism and into Soviet realpolitik, and it was defeated (on both sides) by the Cold War. One of the consequences of defeat is the **unchecked acceleration** of more and more **abstract forms of commodification**, reaching from land to labor to information. The instrumentalization of information enables all of the earth to appear as a resource to be mobilized under the control of information, but where that control is based on information that treats everything, including information itself, as a commodity. This might not be the commodity in its classical form, as Marx thought it in the middle of the nineteenth century. 43 The commodity form is not eternal. Commodification now means not the appearance of a world of things but the appearance of a world of information about things, including information about every possible future state of those things that can be extrapolated from a quantitative modeling of information extracted from the flux of the state of things, more or less in real time.44 A commodity today appears as nothing but a vector, as a potential fulfilled through the interface of your phone or tablet or computer. Looking closely at the forces of production is not quite the same thing as the study of technology. The difference is that the former asks questions about agency, and in particular class agency. 45 Chapter 4 brings us to a broader consideration of questions of class. Here, we look at what distinguishes Marxist approaches to class from other sociological theories. Once we have a means of analyzing class not just as a category but as forms of antagonism, we can ask whether new kinds of class relations may be emerging. A class antagonism may arise out of relations of property, authority, or expertise.46 If we combine thinking about emerging forces of production with attention to class, we can ask whether the production of information as a force of production also **modifies class relations**. The information vector is clearly connected to new kinds of property, authority, and expertise. While based in patent and copyright, intellectual property as a suite of near private property rights in all kinds of novel information is a relatively new development.47 The evolution of these legal forms both responds to and further enables changes in the forces of production. Information also gave rise to new kinds of authority. We just don’t live in Foucault’s Panopticon. It’s far worse. Whole new fields of expertise have emerged quite recently, reshaping the university and turning the university itself into a site for managing risk in the production of intellectual property. 48 Chapter 4 is a slice through the social formation, showing its workings in cross section. Chapter 5 is a speculation on its genesis. It always seems strange to me that people who imagine they are thinking like Marxists offer a strictly idealist view of recent history: everything has changed because of ideas, and those ideas are “neoliberal.” These then become policy and law through the agency of political actors.49 This seems to me to betray every last principle of a materialist view of history. The irony is that in order to think a materialist history in a really quite “orthodox” way, one is forced to think in a heretical manner in relation to received ideas on the intellectual left. The very same forces of production that enable this unprecedented mobilization of the world in the service of control through information also enable a science of the earth which shows conclusively that continuing to misvalue the whole of the world can’t go on. Sooner or later (but probably sooner), **it will crash the whole climate system of the planet**.50 Chapter 6 looks for ways to think about how the transformation of Capital beyond itself, into Vector, comes in contact with the very thing it lacks the means to properly know: the earth as the home from which it has expelled us. There are two classic ways to think about capitalism being superseded by another mode of production. Either capitalism accelerates its movement to the point of qualitative transformation; or the proletariat that it produces as its own antagonist negates it from within.51 The problem is that both of these are merely social theories, or at best, social-technical theories. Neither puts history back in the context of natural history, and in the era of the Anthropocene, of climate disruption and much else, that is the information that must be included in our thinking if it is to be at all timely. 52 Chapter 6 adds two other kinds of historical narration into the mix. The first extrapolates from natural history, looking for ways we can learn about forms of organization of matter, energy, and information that are adaptable and enduring. Extrapolation is not reductionist, its key proposition is that very different kinds of form are possible at different scales of organization. Extrapolation opens the door to creative and speculative ways of producing collaborative knowledge across very different fields and assembling corresponding social movements. It’s a way for the hacker class to think and act as a class, producing not only collaborative knowledge but also experimental prototypes of another way of life. The counterpoint to this is what I call inertia. How is it that despite all the evidence that it is on a suicide mission, **the current mode of production keeps accelerating toward failure**? **Why won’t it change course**? Where extrapolation stresses the possible connections between natural history and social history, inertia stresses the difference. We act in and against a world that remains other to us. Reduced to **nothing but users,** and our actions forced into the commodity form, our collective work and play produces a world over and against us, one that massively persists in its own habits of functioning.53 Worse, collective human labor made a world for a ruling class that keeps making not only itself but us in its image. Extrapolation opens exciting possibilities for thinking and acting collaboratively to build another civilization, here in the ruins of this one. Inertia is a sobering reminder of how hard that is going to be. I conclude Capital is Dead with a commentary on Raoul Peck’s film The Young Karl Marx (2017). What I stress there is how Marx and his closest comrades changed the language and style of the progressive movements of their time. They freed themselves from received ideas, from selective tradition, even from radical selective tradition. In vulgar terms: they were punks. **Radicals can be the most conservative of people when it comes to textology, or faith in the exegesis of the written word from the archive as a form of knowledge**.54 We have to produce and defend knowledge in the face of a dominant ideology that insists that those texts are either useless or dangerous. (That it is an ideology is clear from its insistence in these incompatible faults). Wanting to **move on from those cherished texts** is assumed to be an attack on what they stood for. Sometimes the moment comes to summon your inner punk rock goddess and **do things differently**. **Make some noise**. **Our knowledge-production methods might have become a bit too genteel for the times**. It may at least be a better way to channel one’s rage than ordering Patti Smith albums on Amazon. Chapter 7 defends vulgar Marxism for its closeness to the everyday and to emerging technics of cultural and critical production. Here I look at four kinds of vulgar thinking, two from (or about) the twenties and two from the sixties. These are vulgarians who know something about how developments in the forces of production change the space of possibility for daily life and daily struggle. Unlike more genteel kinds of critical theory, they detect mutations in historical forms because they are not bound to residual and archaic forms of cultural work. They are already multiple and diverse, in terms of race, sex, sexuality, as the vulgar includes all of those excluded or marginalized within genteel institutions. For years I was one of what the so-called alt-right calls a “cultural Marxist,” interested mostly in what happens in the political and cultural superstructures of modern society, rather than in the technical and economic base. However, trying to understand culture will lead you to understanding media, which will lead you to try to figure out some things about technology. Then it turns out that the genteel forms of **Western Marxist thinking** taught in universities for several generations now are **not good at understanding how the forces of production actually work**.55 That requires some actual technical knowledge and experience, or at least a willingness to concede that others may know about such things and to learn from them. The production of counterhegemonic knowledge can really only be comradely and collaborative.56 We have to start from the tensions apparent in the present and freely adapt the textual resources from the past to that situation. This might work better than starting with fidelity to the texts or events of the past and ignoring anything in the present that does not conform to them.57 I read Peck’s film as celebrating a will to transform even this closely cherished radical language in the interests of comprehending a present historical time in terms that enable it to appear as actionable, transformable. In that sense, it’s a work of art that should give us courage to not just repeat the received ideas, even those of dear old Karl, but to embark on the collaborative production of a knowledge of the present that might help lead us out if it.

#### The technocratic elite don’t own the means of production anymore – they own the vectors of information which we interact with every day, allowing for the constant extraction of surplus information from ‘free labor’.

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Introduction)//gideon

It is not just tech companies, however. As an example, let’s look at a company that is hardly thought of as a tech sector marvel, but which happens to be the largest private employer in the United States: Walmart.24 It’s a company most would think of as a retailer. Walmart became famous both for selling very cheap consumer products and also for its ruthless exploitation of its workers and suppliers. On closer examination it is more of a logistics company, which succeeded also through using information to organize the flows of goods and labor through its distribution system. It was an early adopter among retailers of computerization. It even bought its own satellite to more efficiently manage its own data. Early on, founder Sam Walton found likely locations for stores by scouting from his own private plane, but this soon gave way to a “data-driven” approach.25 Walmart’s infrastructure has a hub and spoke form, with box stores clustered around distribution centers. What is less well known is that it has almost **as many data centers as physical distribution centers**, and they are about as large. The parts that the consumer sees—the big box stores, the endless trucks on the road—are a **physical expression of a computerized logistical system that determines where they will be and what they will do**. It takes about as much infrastructure to organize the information as it does to organize the distribution of the physical stuff that ends up on the shelves, and with good reason: those data centers have to analyze all of the products and labor in motion and predict, out of every possible combination, what disposition of goods and labor should come next, and at every moment. Those who shop there generate a fair amount of the information that drives the company. It is an **asymmetrical exchange**. You get a cheap pack of twelve toilet rolls. Walmart gets to add information about your actions into a predictive model that governs its business decisions. Those who work for Walmart are exploited labor. So too are those all the way down the supply chain to the factories and farms. And yet **on top of that is something else**: the extraction not just of physical labor from the bodies of workers, but **the extraction of information** from shoppers that Walmart does not even pay in exchange. It is this additional process—this information extraction process —that interests me. It turns out not to be unique to “tech,” but rather an increasingly common “business model,” and one not all that well described by classical models of capitalism. Maybe there are new forms of exploitation, inequality, and asymmetry as a layer **on top of** the old ones we’re more used to. Let’s take a look at the second largest private employer in the United States: Amazon. It sells a product called Echo, which you put in your home somewhere so it can spy on you with its seven directional microphones. Some people are rather suspicious of this, but somehow the Amazon brand convinces many that this is okay. The Echo connects you to Alexa, an artificial intelligence whose objective is to learn your habits, needs, and desires—and service them. Over time it will get better at servicing you with information and products, and it will add what it learns from you to the matrix of what it knows about everybody. Your job, for which you are not getting paid, is to train a machine to know what the “human” is when seen entirely from the perspective of consuming.26 Echo and Alexa also hide from you everything that mediates between your enunciation of a desire and Amazon’s fulfillment of it. Echo is the **top layer of** what Benjamin Bratton calls **the stack**.27 Your desire has to be parsed into a form a machine can understand; that’s the job of this interface layer. 28 The interface also positions you in relation to it, and to the rest of the stack, as a particular kind of subject: you are a user. Let’s say you are a user who wants a book. You say: “Alexa, order me a copy of Capital by Karl Marx.” Once you confirm that this is what you really want, this information will pass as if it were a vector, a particular kind of line, through a whole other series of layers of stack infrastructure, which will return this product to you, either immediately (if it is an e-book) or in a day or two (if it is a physical object). Each such expressed desire becomes a unique vector through a layered space that can fulfill an almost infinite number of desires, so long as they all take the form of a user asking an interface to satisfy a demand with a commodity. It does not really let you want or be much else.29 Your desire becomes a vector that will pass through many more layers of the stack. Bratton calls these the address, city, cloud, and earth layers. The address layer knows where you are, and it knows where the book that you want is, and it can calculate the optimal return vector to get one to the other to fulfill this desire. The city layer is where the physical part of the infrastructure resides. There is a warehouse, somewhere.30 There is a server farm, somewhere; there are Amazon offices that design and manage and sell all this stuff—somewhere. The cloud layer connects all these sites and many others together and performs the operations on the information gathered from all of them not only to fulfill orders and manage every vector, but also to learn from the aggregate of all of these actions and predict how else to extract information from them.31 The earth layer is that from which the resources and energy to make and run this whole vast edifice to the digitized commodity are extracted.32 Those resources are fed into sites of production that will make that book you ordered, or the t-shirt, or the sex toy, or whatever. These sites of production too can be anywhere. A sophisticated logistics tracks and manages the flows of energy, labor, resources, and finished products through them.33 The sites are usually where labor is cheap, exploitable, and held captive by borders and where there are few environmental regulations, but where there is a functional infrastructure of transport and shipping to move the resources and labor to the factory and the products out to some gated community nation in the overdeveloped part of the world where people get to order books or phones or Echos from Amazon. Container loads of those products sit, probably not for very long, in a warehouse where workers known as pickers dash about retrieving the products to meet the orders without even the time to stop for a toilet break, as all of their movements are tracked and measured in real time.34 Certainly, a lot of what just happened here could be called capitalism. Labor was corralled into factories and made to work long hours to make stuff. Other labor drove trucks or sat in call centers answering calls from irate users whose stuff did not arrive. But maybe there is something else here as well. Not just the exploitation of labor through the owning and controlling of the forces of production, but also the extraction of what you might call surplus information, out of individual workers and consumers, in order to build predictive models which further subordinate all activity to the same information political economy. One where you are nothing but a user, and everything you do within hearing range of Echo, or every movement you make with your cellphone, or everything you do on your laptop, or everything recorded of you or about you as you go about your daily life, is captured by a vector and fed into computation to figure out how better to use you for the greater glory of Amazon, Google, Apple or some other company, owned and controlled by a new kind of ruling class, the vectoralist class. To the vector the spoils.

#### It's worse than capitalism – a self-consuming, ever accelerating system eats our brains instead of our bodies. Data asymmetry from internet searches, DNA lookups, banks, retail, and mapping software aggregates a vectoral power that is at the root of technological problems, financialization, neoliberalism, and biopolitics. This cannot be understood with genteel high theory – The 20th century is long gone

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 2: Capitalism—or Worse?)//gideon

So how is this worse than capitalism? The vectoral infrastructure throws all of t**he world into the engine of commodification**, meanwhile **modifying the commodity form itself**. There is nothing that can’t be tagged and captured through information about it and considered a variable in the simulations that drive resource extraction and processing.26 Quite simply, we have run out of world to commodify. And now commodification can only cannibalize its own means of existence, both natural and social. It’s like that Marx Brothers film where the train runs out of firewood, so the carriages themselves have to be hacked to pieces and fed to the fire to keep it moving, until nothing but the bare bogies are left.27 It is worse also in that rather than some acephalous multitude, they are complex class alliances and conflicts at play. 28 The trickiest part of it is the politics of the hacker class, which after all is the class most of us here reading and writing this stuff belong to. Yes, it appears as a “privileged” class, among those whom Bruce Robbins calls the beneficiaries of global relations of exploitation.29 And it is a class that has a very hard time thinking its common interests, because the kinds of new information its various subfractions produce are all so different. We have a hard time thinking what the writer and the scientist and artist and the engineer have in common. Well, the vectoral class does not have that problem. What all of us make is intellectual property, which from its point of view is as equivalent and as tradable as pink goo. The hacker class experiences extremes of a **winner-take-all** outcome of its efforts. On the one hand, fantastic careers and the spoils of some simulation of the old bourgeois lifestyle; on the other hand, precarious and part-time work, start-ups that go bust, and the making routine of our jobs by new algorithms—designed by others of our very own class. The hacker class was supposed to be a privileged one, shielded from proletarianization by its creativity and technical skill. But it too can be made casual and precarious. A controversial ad campaign for the website Fiverr embodied all these contradictions. It played on the desire to quit one’s lousy job and become a boss, by offering the pleasure of subjecting others to the tyranny one feels as a precarious creative or technical employee these days. The ads promise a way to hire versions of your old self who are “doers.” The most notorious ad showed a black and white picture of a hollow-cheeked, sad-eyed young woman staring directly at the viewer: “You eat a coffee for lunch. You follow through on your follow through. Sleep deprivation is your drug of choice,” it reads, concluding: “You might be a doer.” Another slogan was “Nothing like a safe, reliable paycheck to crush your soul.” And “How much did you make for your boss today?” The one I most often saw defaced read “White Collars Can Come With Leashes.” The slogans appear under pictures of a “diverse” workforce, of course: the algorithm is in theory very **tolerant about who it exploits**. The old dream of labor, that it could organize itself, is supposed to be dead. **There can be no dream of the hacker class to self-organize** in any way, whether like labor or in some other form. Such desires are unspeakable, even if they keep erupting in all sorts of interesting ways. Sanctioned desire is neatly summed up in the image and slogan of a cellphone company: “Boss Revolution.” The image is of a raised fist, with a cellphone in it, in red. **The only desire** permissible **is to become a boss**, like Don Draper. This has not stopped some interesting and promising signs of hacker self-organization in technical and creative industries, from the unionization of creatives at Vice Media to the Google walkout to refusal to work on border control or military projects across the tech industry. 30 Baby steps, to be sure; it is always a tough argument to propose common interests among subordinate classes. Counter-hegemony is hard. Hackers, like workers or farmers, are distracted by particular and local interests. As with other subordinate classes, class consciousness is rare among hackers. Most of us are rather reactionary, even in the nontechnical trades. But then class consciousness is always a rare and difficult thing. Unlike other identities, it has to be argued contrary to appearances. The feeling of belonging to a class rarely extends beyond appearances. It appears that one is a “creative” or working in “tech,” for example. There could be a myriad of such classes. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this self- understanding of class restricts itself to appearances and masks not an essence but a structural question as to how one’s efforts end up being commodified and who reaps most of the benefit of that. The received ideas within which one is asked to think about one’s identity don’t help when it comes to thinking how one is located within an information political economy, one where the hidden side of appearances is not eternal essence, just things one usually doesn’t see—the forces of production. To come into an awareness of class is to speak another language. It is to **refuse the terms that are given and seek other terms**, other concepts. This can be difficult. I can tell you from experience: the American college students that I meet cannot even pronounce bourgeoisie, let alone conceptualize it. Everything it once meant culturally has evaporated. The outward signs and styles of the ruling class don’t look bourgeois. Our newstyle overlords only wear suits when called before Congress; otherwise they wear discreetly expensive t-shirts. You don’t see them cutting ribbons at factory openings. They don’t preach hard work and thrift; they preach creativity, mindfulness, and ethical consumption. The bourgeois culture with which generations of Marxist aesthetics had a love—hate relationship is effectively extinct. The ruling class is not what it used to be. Maybe it needs another name. What is even harder is to name those whose location in the political economy of information is the making of new information. It isn’t exactly labor, as it’s not the same thing every day; it’s a different thing every day. Output is not quantifiable in increments, although that won’t stop the vectoralist class from trying. One popular attempt to describe them (us) was as the creative class?31 More radical approaches have called what we do immaterial labor or postfordist labor, and us the cognitariat?32 But there’s something a bit mystifying about the language of creativity, something a bit idealist about the immaterial, something backward looking about just adding a modifier, and something of a rationalist bias in the category of cognition, given that the management of feelings can be part of our job description, too.33 I opted to call us the hacker class. Twenty years ago, that was perhaps too romantic a term, on the border of legality, outside the logic of commodification.34 Now it has more exclusively criminal associations. If anything, **it’s an index of how much the vectoralist class has succeeded**. It is all but inconceivable now that there could be an open-ended, playful, experimental approach to making the new appear out of the old in techniques of information that would not be entirely contained with the commodification and control of the information vector. But just as the industrial working class retained a utopian feeling about what labor should be like from craft labor, so too it is possible to hold onto a feeling about what it’s like to make elegance appear that wasn’t there before with a technique for transforming information, and to do it on one’s own time, with one’s own goals and objectives.35 That is what it might mean to hack. Some of the more compelling scenes in both Mad Men and Halt and Catch Fire try to find a televisual language for these joyful moments, caught though they are, as the narrative arc reminds us, within the commodification of information. To think that one’s class is the hacker class might now be not unlike repurposing the word queer, or any of the other negatively charged terms that those so designated reclaim with pride—just as Marx and Engels reclaimed the word communist from its denouncers in the opening poetic gambit of the Manifesto. That was an artful bit of **détournement**. They refunctioned found language from the common store, deleted false meaning, pasted in fresh ones. **To clear a space for thought is to work in and against language, to put some pressure on it**. What if we took a more daring, modernist, defamiliarizing approach to writing theory? What if we asked of theory as a genre that it be as interesting, as strange, as poetically or narratively rich as we ask our other kinds of literature to be? What if we treated it **not as high theory**, with pretentions to legislate or interpret other genres, **but as low theory**, as something **vulgar, common**, even a bit rude —having no greater or lesser claim to speak of the world than any other?36 It might be more fun to read. It might tell us something strange about the world. It might, just might, enable us to act in the world otherwise. A world in which the old faith in History is no more, but where there are histories that still might be made— in a pinch. The end of the dominance of capitalism as a mode of production is not a subject that has received much useful attention. For its devotees, it has no end, as it is itself the end of History. 37 For its enemies, it can end only in Communism. If Communism—a state that exists mostly in the imaginal realm, always deferred into the future—has not prevailed, then this by definition must still be the reign of Capital. Let’s pause for a moment over the ideological freight attached to this poetic conceit and its consequences: **the present is defined** mostly **in terms of a hoped-for negation of it**. Some theology! If capitalism is to be of any use as a historical concept, then the question of its end has to remain an open one. The thought experiment as to whether it may already have been surpassed by another dominant mode ought at least to be one that can be posed. The concept of Capital is theological precisely to the extent that questions of its possible surpassing by other exploitative modes of production remain off limits. How then can a concept of capitalism be returned to its histories? By abandoning the duality of its essence and appearance. Theories of the eternal quality of Capital’s essence, its unity and identity through time, tend to focus on the analysis of the relations of production. One can extract from Marx’s Capital a quite remarkable theoretical armature that appears in the negative through the critique of the theological concepts of bourgeois political economy. This conceptual armature is so robust that there are few phenomena that resist interpretation as surface appearances of these concepts when posited as a hidden essence. Two things **slip from view** in this procedure. First, that **the bourgeois political economy** that Marx took as the object of critique i**s now itself a museum piece**.38 Second, that in this focus on the relations of production, **the forces of production receive very little attention**. We don’t spend enough time on how the brain-fryer is a different machine from the meat grinder. This is something of a problem, as surely the dynamism of those forces of production under capitalism was one of the salient points of the theory in the first place. But where **the relations of production can be understood theoretically**, **the forces of production cannot**. They don’t lend themselves to an abstract, conceptual overview by a master thinker within a genteel high theory. They can really only be known through the collaborative production of a critical theory sharing the experiences of many fields. That would include those with a **knowledge of information technology, artificial intelligence, supply chain management, material science, computational biology**, and much else besides. We’re way past the steam engines that Marx was sketching in his notebooks.39 Is it not possible, then, that there have been sufficient transformations in the forces of production to break out of the fetters of a strictly capitalist mode of production? There are two versions of this question. One is looking for a theological justification for this appearance of something new as finally putting an end to the more troubling aspects of capitalism for vectoralist class apologetics. But the more salient version of the question might be to ask whether what has emerged, in addition to and laminated on top of a capitalist mode of production, is something qualitatively different, but which generates new forms of class domination, new forms of the extraction of surplus, even new kinds of class formation. The emergence of information as a material force of production looked for a while like it might escape the confines of existing relations of production and that it could negate existing property forms. (I return to this topic in Chapter 4). It looked for a while as though the one thing that really could form the basis of the commons was information. It blew apart the old culture industry. Producers of information started to think not just about their craft or trade interests but about a class interest. Or so it looked early in the twenty-first century when I wrote A Hacker Manifesto. What I did not anticipate was the emergence of a whole other technique for the capture of creation. While there are still elements among the ruling class that want to confine creation within ever stricter forms of private property, some took the opposite tack. Rather than police or restrict free creation, this other strategy was to move its capture to a more abstract level. The production of information can be **outsourced** to free labor, to people who work but **need not** even **be paid**, and the aggregate value of their production of information can then be captured and treated as a resource that can be **monetized**.40 This new kind of ruling class does not appropriate a quantity of surplus value so much as **exploit an asymmetry of information**. **It gives**, sometimes even **as a gift**, **access to** the location of a piece of **information** for which you are searching.41 Or it lets you assemble your own social network. Or it lets you perform a particular financial transaction. Or it gives you coordinates on the planet and what can be found at that location. Or it will even tell you some things about your own DNA. Or it will provide a logistical infrastructure for your small business. But while you get that little piece of information, this ruling class gets all of that information in the aggregate. It exploits the asymmetry between the little you know and the aggregate it knows—an aggregate it collects based on information you were obliged to “volunteer.” In practice, this emergent ruling class of our time insists on the confinement of particular acts of creation within the property form and access to collective creative activity, from which to harvest information in the aggregate. This is the vectoralist class. If the capitalist class owns the means of production, **the vectoralist class owns the vectors of information**. They own the extensive vectors of **communication**, which **traverse space**. They own the intensive vectors of **computation**, which **accelerate time**. They own the **copyrights**, the **patents**, and the **trademarks** that **capture** attention or assign **ownership** to novel techniques. They own the logistic systems that manage and monitor the disposition and movement of any resource. They own the financial instruments that stand in for the value of every resource and that can be put out on markets to crowdsource the possible value of every possible future combination of those resources. They own the algorithms that rank and sort and assign particular information in particular circumstances. This **vectoralist class comes to dominate** not just subordinate classes, but **other ruling classes as well**. Just as capital came to dominate landed property, subsuming its control over land in a more abstract and fungible property form, so too the vectoralist class has **subsumed and outflanked capital** in a more abstract form. The capitalist class finds itself at a disadvantage. Owning the means of production, labor materialized into capital in the sense of plant and equipment, is a rigid and long-term investment. Owning and controlling the vector, the hack of new information materialized into patents, copyrights, brands, proprietary logistics. It is more abstract, flexible, adaptive. It is not more rational, but it is more abstract. The vectoralist class monopolizes the crossroads where information traffics, feeding like Michel Serres’s parasite on the buzz of information and noise at crucial junctures.42 The most obvious aspect of vectoral rule in everyday life is its monopoly of attention, although it is not reducible to this. As Yves Citton notes, in a world awash in digital data, what is rare is the attention paid to it.43 **Commanding attention** through the ownership and control of brands, celebrities and media “properties” is the public face, the **disintegrating spectacle,** of vectoral economy. 44 In part, this descends from what was formerly the culture industry. But it is no longer an industry apart, commodified leisure. It’s now integrated into the whole of production and consumption. This brief sketch of the supersession of capitalism as a dominant mode has the advantage of enabling many of the features of contemporary life that are often treated as separate to appear as aspects of the same historical development. The **rise of technology, financialization, neoliberalism, and biopolitics** appear as **effects of the same transformation** of the forces of production, putting pressure on the relations of production, to the point where what bursts forth is a new ruling class formation. In the usual historical narrative, by the end of the seventies, the forces of labor had fought capital to a standstill in the overdeveloped world.45 In this story, financialization and neoliberalism come to the rescue. **But how**? **What** material means **made financialization** even **possible**? What underlying social forces enabled neoliberal ideas to even appear plausible as policy instruments? Why does this **coincide with the** apparent **birth of “tech”** as an **industry** sector? In the thought experiment I am sketching, all of these developments fit together in a novel way. The capitalist class was searching for a way out of the impasse of confronting the demands of labor at a time when improvements of the old means of production no longer yielded much by way of a productivity increase. The capitalist class thought it found a way out by replacing labor with the vector and escaping along it. **Globalization, deindustrialization, and outsourcing** would enable it to be free from the power of labor to block **the flows of** production. The same information vector would enable not just a more abstract and flexible kind of production, but also of consumption, through the financialization of everyday life.46 Workers as producers found their jobs had moved elsewhere; workers as consumers found their purchasing power restored— at least temporarily. **Here’s the twist**: what at first appeared to assist capital to defeat labor in the overdeveloped world was also **a defeat for capital**. The novel forces of production that enabled this outflanking of labor became themselves the new dominant forces of production. Power over the value chain moves from the ownership and control of the means of production to ownership and control of the vectors of information. Whole new industries arose, as did whole new corporations—the so-called tech sector. But actually **all corporations** become increasingly **organized around** the ownership and control of **information**. Control over the value chain through ownership of the information vector extends even **into life itself**. This is not the least reason, incidentally, that it is no longer helpful to posit the vitalism of living labor against capital as dead labor. 47 Not capital but **the vector enters the flesh** and commands it, and not just as meat, but also **as information**, through **monitoring** its states, through **modifying** its functions with drugs that alter chemical signals, through **patenting** aspects of life as design.48 What is at stake is neither a bios nor a polis but a regime of property in information extending into the organism. The novel forces of production as they have emerged in our time are also forces of reproduction and forces of circulation. The power of the vectoralist class is not cognitive; nor is it a power over the general intellect.49 It thrives just as well on noise, on volatility, on bad information as it does on any kind of intelligence or reason.50 It reaches just as far into the corporeality and even sexuality of the human as it does into the intellect.51 The forms of **artificial computational order** it is creating are **not extensions or imitations of human cognition** but something else entirely. 52 One **cannot interpret** the strangeness of this mode of production **using** the received **hermeneutic conceptual categories**, derived as they are from a critique of the relations of production of nineteenth-century steam-powered capitalism. Indeed, one sees now how incomplete Marx’s critique was and remains. Even his critical understanding of capitalism is still thinking capitalism metaphorically as like a giant, dysfunctional steam engine, set to blow at any moment from unregulated internal pressures.53 **Marx is not able to think critically about information** in the contemporary sense of the concept because it is not one that the forces of production of his time have yet produced. Marx found what was absent in the theories of Capital in his time. He lifted the veil between exchange and production and found the exploited labor that makes it. He wrote the heresy that Capital is dead labor— congealed pink goo—and he went on to write from the point of view of the labor that capital exploits. So: let’s go looking for what is absent in theories of both Capital and information in our time. Let’s find that peculiar class who own and control information. Let’s find the exploited class or classes that make it and are subjected to it. In vulgar terms: the capitalist class eats our bodies, **the vectoralist class eats our brains**. Returning this thought experiment to the present, one might then be able to think the historical specificity of the contemporary moment. This, after all, was Marx’s great achievement. He thought his moment. His present did not look to him like his past. It had novel features that called into being concepts adequate to the situation. Which leaves us with the paradoxical and provocative thought that any theory in which **the present appears as** in essence the same as the past of **Marx’s time**, only different in a few matters of appearance, **can’t** really **be** a “**Marxist**” one, as such fidelity is necessarily a betrayal of his achievement. Debord: “And theories are made to die in the war of time.”54 Perhaps we can **leave** such **theological questions to the faithful**, who are in any case an embattled and diminished band. Instead, here is a research agenda: what are the **current forces of production**, and how can they be understood (in a preliminary way) under a modest set of concepts? How do those forces of production give rise to contemporary forms of class power, and how has that power in turn shaped the particular form those forces of production have taken? At what points might the subordinate classes, obliged to live within the world those forces of production make in the interests of those ruling class, be able to assert agency and autonomy? **What other world is still possible**, given the damage this general economy has done to the world, with the means that it has hitherto developed?55

#### The rationalization of information has created a new class relation – power comes from surveillance and quantification. We sit in desks and fill in excel documents for hours under the guise of ‘technical freedom’, our information commodified. As long as the vector is owned by the few, propped up by both sides who attempt to analyze and justify using the outdated language of marx, the system won’t change.

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 4: The Class Location Blues)//gideon \*[] = fixed typo

My question here would be: why would one think, if this has already given rise to more than one kind of rationalization of class antagonism that overlapped and interfered with each other, that it would not give rise to another? The farmer–landlord antagonism arose out of the antagonism between serfs and the nobility. 26 Serfs lost their lands by force or debt and fled to the cities, while a rationalization of agricultural production led to the expansion of a surplus that might feed urban populations, who would become urban workers, in an antagonistic relation to capitalists. And yet landlords and capitalists also had interests that contradicted each other. But did rationalization stop, with the creation of classes of farmer and worker? What happens when the **production**, not of food or products, but **of new information itself becomes rationalized**? Weber did not have a lot to say about labor, but where he did, it was in terms of work discipline. Employers are free to hire and fire. Workers lack ownership, but workers are responsible for their own social reproduction. These are the conditions under which indirect compulsion operates. But it raises the problem of how to get maximum labor effort. Wright: “running throughout Weber’s work is the view that rationalization has perverse effects that systematically threaten human dignity and welfare.”27 But Weber does not integrate interest in labor discipline and domination into the category of class. Here we need a bit of Marx, for whom, as Wright says, “exploitation infuses class analysis with a specific kind of normative concern.”28 Exploitation steers research to questions of class as relational in both exchange and production. “Weber’s treatment of work effort as primarily a problem of economic rationality directs class analysis towards a set of normative concerns centered above all on the interests of capitalists: efficiency and rationalization.”29 Wright’s synthesis of Marx and Weber makes exploitation fundamental even as it makes particular use of the idea of opportunity hoarding as that which defines the “middle class.” From there one could build up a picture of the United States as highly polarized by exploitation, a country where middle class opportunity hoarding is being eroded by what he calls neoliberalism and deindustrialization. I think this can be understood more clearly in terms of new forces of production that instrumentalize and rationalize information, giving rise to new property forms and hence new class relations, including an **antagonistic relation between a hacker class tasked with making novelty out of information** (the condition of it becoming property) **and a vectoralist class that owns or controls the vector of information control and domination itself**. The separation of the vectoralist–hacker class antagonism from the capitalist–worker antagonism emerges out of the development of the forces of production, which generated an extensive and intensive rationalization— or better yet, abstraction—of the production of information. As Adorno and Horkheimer pointed out in their own synthesis of Marx and Weber, the **rationalization of means serves irrational ends**, not least in treating nature as a mere thing to be exploited in the same manner as the working class is exploited, through the subordination of everything to the commodity form.30 Each successive form of class rule may be more abstract than those it subsumes, but it isn’t more rational. The antagonism internal to the vectoralist–hacker class relation has all three components of a class relation: property, authority, and expertise. It emerges in the first instance out of a **rationalization of** so-called **intellectual property law**, which increasingly encloses **information in** something close to **a private property right**. Vectoralist domination over all subordinate classes is sustained by the automation of relations of authority, which take the form of pervasive surveillance and quantification—a rationalization of all aspects of human activity. Domination through expertise turns out to be an interesting and subtle question. The rise of the vectoralist class changes the kinds of credentials that appear to have value for class power. These became increasingly technical in nature. Access to such qualifications appears to offer the possibility of class mobility. Here the perspectives of Weber and Durkheim are useful supplements. Opportunity hoarding through control of access to elite credentials sustains social closure and the exercise of occupational power through expertise. Since both men and women, not to mention women of color, sometimes have elite credentials in the formal sense, their exclusion ends up being enforced by more old-fashioned means of authority and domination, through the “toxic work environment.” A lot more could be said about that. Here I simply add the possibility of an additional axis of class antagonism, in addition to property, authority, and expertise. This is what we might call the technical dimension of class antagonism, where it is built into the form of the information vector itself. This has many aspects, from the design of algorithms determining credit to the development of object-oriented programming environments, which allow for the rationalization of the production of component parts of programming by a dispersed and disempowered hacker class while preserving central control of proprietary code. Rather than domination or exploitation, this form of class antagonism emerges out of asymmetries of information and protocols of selective access and control.31 Forms not only of class but also of **gendered and racialized discrimination** have migrated from relations of property, authority, and expertise and have been encoded as technical (or **algorithmic**) forms of **power**. 32 Thinking about class antagonism today might then require two steps. For the first, we are indebted to Wright: Durkheim’s interest in the moves of the game and Weber’s interest in the rules of the game can be folded into Marx’s larger perspective, on the changing of the game itself. But for the second step, we are on our own: in the absence of faith in the leap into a gamespace without domination and exploitation, we have to reimagine the possibilities of action for subordinate classes. Wright speaks in very measured terms of the normative aspect of Marx’s project. He does not name the trope toward which its heliotropism tends: Communism. But his analysis of class rests nonetheless on it as a “hidden god.”33 Wright maintains the faith in the absence rather than the presence of possibility in either its revolutionary or reformist forms. I think we might have to **reimagine** the normative goal itself, based on the combined experiences of the farmer, worker, and hacker as subordinate classes. What is the just means of making and distributing matter, energy, and information? That might then inform strategies and tactics for changing the vectoralist game. But in the meantime, we might have to make do with struggles over the rules of the existing gamespace and over the everyday lives of players, hustlers, and grinders making their moves, as the vulgar blues language of the times—from hip hop to trap—would have it.34 Besides reaching out to those indebted to more classical approaches of Durkheim and Weber, Wright addresses prominent contemporary social theorists who try to offer original perspectives. Here I’ll take sides with Wright against some of the most widely known alternative social theories— Thomas Piketty, Guy Standing, and Wolfgang Streek—while introducing their perspectives into the thought experiment that this is no longer capitalism but something worse. Thomas Piketty deserves credit for putting inequality back on the agenda as more than a mere problem of unequal opportunity. 35 His empirical work shows that the sharp rise in income of the top 10% is really that of the 1% or even the .1%. A fair bit of this came from the rise of **super salaries** rather than income on capital. The CEO “class” is setting its own pay. Here I would want to inquire as to how, in a political economy running on information, the capacity to control (but not exactly own) the means of production accrues to a class that presents itself as the celebrities of information control itself. **Commanding attention** becomes a form of **class power**. The technicalities of Piketty’s work centers on the capital:income ratio as a way of measuring the value of capital relative to total income of economy. As Wright says, “Piketty’s basic argument is that this ratio is the structural basis for the distribution of income between owners of capital and labor: all other things being equal, for a given return on capital, the higher this ratio, the higher the proportion of national income going to wealth holders.”36 As growth declines, the capital:income ratio rises. There’s a rise in the weight of inherited wealth, while concentrations of income also rise. It’s the worst of both worlds: a rentier “class” plus a CEO “class” of appearance-peddlers carving up the world between them at the expense of everyone else. Picketty starts out with a class analysis but loses it once he gets into the empirical work, where he treats CEO income as return on labor, as most income tables do. Wright: “In the modern corporation many of the powersof-capital are held by top executives…. They occupy what I have called contradictory locations within class relations … They exercise their capitalist-derived power within the class relations of the firm to appropriate part of the corporation’s profits for their personal accounts.”37 But is their power really “capitalist-derived,” or is it now something else? Something like a joint managing of appearances between those who represent a firm to the market and the market that is supposed to value it. But how to value a company when so much of its asset base takes the form of information? A corporation today is among other things a **brand**, a slew of **patents**, a **logistical process**, a corral of **expert hackers** turning out new **intellectual property**. How can **information** be **turned into value**, and an **opportunity** to be **hoarded**, when **there aren’t** really **private languages**, and **information is** in principle a **nonrivalrous good**?38 Piketty does not separate out real estate from capital, yet there might be good reasons to do so. Landlords and capitalists are already different kinds of ruling classes with overlapping but not identical interests. Ground rent and profit are not the same kinds of surplus extraction. Landlords, perversely, may benefit from the rise of the vector in ways Capital does not. As Matteo Pasquinelli says, today’s landlords (often with giant global property portfolios) increase their rents by extracting the information value that the presence of the hacker class produces.39 On the one hand, attracting so-called creatives or techies to a neighborhood drives out working class and non-white tenants. On the other hand, the new residents add layers of information to the place that can be recuperated as value to sell it to bankers and lawyers and drive out mere hacker class tenants in turn. **Gentrification is but a step to aristofication.** One could think further here about Ricardo’s ancient tension between ground rent and profit, but with the focus shifted from the rural to the urban and the monopoly rents to be extracted from urban locations.40 Guy Standing is the name most associated with the now widely discussed idea of the precariat as a class rather than just a bad life chance.41 He offers a three-dimensional definition of class, as structured by relations of production, relations of distribution, and (interestingly) relations to the state. He identifies seven classes: plutocracy, salariat, proficians (professional + technician), working class, precariat, unemployed, and lumpen-precariat. The precariat have insecure jobs. Their sources of income other than wages are disappearing. They become less citizens of the state and more like mere denizens. Not only are their jobs precarious, they are vulnerable within relations of distribution and marginal to the state. The precariat includes people bumped out of working class communities and families who experience a relative deprivation in relation to a real or imagined past. It also includes migrants and asylum seekers for whom the present is absent. The precariat increasingly includes people falling out of an educated middle class—think academic adjunct labor—who lack a future. For Standing this makes a potentially “dangerous class.” Marxists might think of the precariat as workers who (in Weberian terms) experienced poor life chances. Standing thinks there are antagonisms between the precariat and the working class. But do the precariat and workers have distinct interests? Maybe not.42 Maybe they can share an interest in changing the game (although one might want to say more here about how workers and the precariat might have different interests about the rules and moves of the game). Unionization, for example, can secure some sort of steady work for the workers in the union, but whether it benefits those outside of it is an open question. Wolfgang Streeck argues, in a Durkheimian vein, that capitalism works better when there are constraints on rational, self-interested action, based on trust, legitimacy, and responsibility. 43 The wrinkle Wright introduces is to argue that the level of **constraint on self-interest** that is **optimal for capitalists** is **below** that which is **optimal for workers**. Capital seeks to **remove constraints to augment its power** even **past the point where these are economically inefficient**. Wright: “The zeal to dismantle the regulatory machinery of capitalism since the early 1980s was driven by a desire to **undermine the conditions for empowerment** of interests opposed to those of capitalists—**even if doing so meant under-regulating capitalism** from the point of view of **long-term needs of capital accumulation.**”44 One could see this a bit differently by separating out the interests of the capitalist and vectoralist class. The regulatory regime emerging in the last quarter century **favors the mobility of information**, and not just finance, as a means of coordinating economic activity transnationally, at the expense not just of workers but of those forms of capitalist enterprise tied to physical plant and infrastructure, and thus with an interest in local, regional, or national relations of trust, legitimacy, and responsibility. We can read Wright’s conclusion against the grain: “**Enlightenment of the capitalist class to their long-term interests** in a strong civic culture of obligation and trust **is not enough**; **the balance of power** also **needs to be changed**. And since this shift in balance of power will be costly to those in privileged positions, it will only occur through a process of mobilization and struggle.”45 What if those capitalists tied to actually producing things in a particular place already know this, but they have lost power to a quite different kind of ruling class, which operates at a **higher level of abstraction**, or in Weberian terms, at a new stage of rationalization? They own or control the information about things, rather than the things themselves. This is not inherently more rational, but it is more abstract, and hence more powerful. To imagine new kinds of class compromise might require a rethink about which classes could compromise. Since there appears to be no way to change the game, Wright looks to those who wanted to change the rules within the game, such as Walter Korpi and Gøsta Esping-Anderson, Scandinavian social democratic inheritors of Ernst Wigforss.46 But one has to ask if it’s possible to revive social democratic strategies from the era of the great national manufacturing industries in an era where the information vector greatly lowers the cost of geographic dispersal and puts the old capitalist manufacturing firms and regions in direct competition with each other on a global scale. Wright advocates for some salutary counterhegemonic strategies, based in geographic rootedness, local public goods, and worker’s cooperatives. But one has to wonder **whether such things are** all that **viable** (at least as traditionally conceived), given that the forces of production drive increasingly abstract relations of production, which appear then as **transnational legal and treaty forms protecting information as private property**. Trebor Scholz proposes a form of platform cooperativism as a more contemporary approach.47 The vectoralist stack needs to be countered with a **counterstack on the infrastructural level**. Wright: “Changes in technology may make the anchoring of capitalist production in locally rooted, high productivity small and medium size enterprises more feasible.”48 One might call this the Brooklyn-effect, after the boom in small business, even manufacturing, there.49 But while the actual products have some connection to locality, such **localism relies on an** information infrastructure or vector stack owned and controlled by the vectoralist class: **Google, Amazon, Paypal**, and so forth all **get their cut**. Their power may take the form of a **vectoral infrastructure** that enables them to **extract information asymmetries** from **both capital and** from **subordinate classes** and to **accumulate asymmetric information** about all of these activities now **subordinated to the vector**. Thus, where Wright says, “I assume that an exit from capitalism is not an option in the present historical period,”50 I think we have to question that assumption, but not in a good way. Maybe this is already not capitalism, but something worse. It’s not just a rentier bubble of speculation spooling out of the “real economy.”51 One **could no longer know** in advance **which part of it is real** at all—and perhaps one never could. This is an era not just of socalled neoliberalism’s “aggressive affirmation and enforcement of private property rights”52 but of the creation of **new** forms of **private property** and **new antagonistic relations** over it, particularly in the form of **intellectual property**. There’s a lot to be said for the way Wright subsumes rival social theories as collaborators within the larger frame of a fairly traditional Marxist sociology. But perhaps that in turn has to be put back in contact with a more **vulgar attention to the transformation of the forces of production**, and in particular how **information emerges** as both a **technical and social force**. One could then, as a further step, bring this perspective together with the study of the metabolic rift, wherein the instrumentalizing of information mobilizes the whole planet as a **rationalized sphere of resource extraction** under the sign of exchange value.53 To the point where this **abstraction of the vector becomes** completely **irrational, threatening to take** the whole planet down with it**.** Maybe we need an asocial science that rethinks whether one can even conceive of the social as a separate domain of analysis at all. On the one side, the social meshes seamlessly with information technology; on the other, it depends on planetary scale resource mobilization causing catastrophic metabolic rifts. One might be in need of an even “bigger” conceptual framework within which to rest Wright’s partial synthesis as a component part (a question I’ll return to in Chapter 6). One might think again also about the kinds of **social forms and tactics of class existenc**e. Particular groups of workers and hackers now have to negotiate a far more temporary sense of **employment existence**. The vector is nothing if not a platform for making all human activity **interchangeable and replaceable**. Here Wright’s signature concept of contradictory class locations can be thought on both its intended structural level and as a good guide to understanding everyday experience. An example, as Angela McRobbie has observed, is working class women who will try to work in the fashion industry despite low pay, long hours, and precarious employment because they don’t want jobs, they want to be creative.54 They **want to be hackers, not workers**. Whole industries now function on the promise of creative activity and effect a **bait and switch**. The real job is **labor**, often even manual work, and for women in particular often affective labor, where the job is really just keeping clients happy. Something similar happens in the tech industry in so-called **start-up culture**. It employs hackers in the narrower, more Durkheimian sense of the word, people who code. (Even here, a lot of it may turn out to be labor in the sense of repetition and the filling-in of software-generated forms already created and designed and indeed owned by someone else.) The promise, however, is that the hacker can become the owner. The bait and switch is **the lure of becoming part of the ruling class**. The **risks** of enterprise are disproportionately **shifted onto the hacker** while the **rewards** disproportionately **return to that** fraction of the **vectoralist class** known as venture capital. Some parts of the hacker class are offered a possible escape into the vectoralist class at the price of increased precarity that rarely comes to pass. Most find themselves constrained by routines that turn them more into wage labor. People working in fields that are “creative” or “tech” live with Durkheimian senses of “class” as a constant. Everything is about groups defining collective identities in all sorts of slippery ways. A less common topic is a Weberian one about opportunity hoarding. There are constant eruptions of anger and attention to inequalities derived from access to credentials, for example. Or we could attend to how **sexual harassment** drives women off the path in particular workplaces, or how certain industries **systematically exclude people of color**. These are important conversations and indeed issues to fight.55 What’s less common is to think this **within a larger concept of class**. Class has Wright’s three dimension (property, authority, expertise) and now a fourth: the power of information asymmetry. Race and gender oppression now connect to all four dimensions of class. The immediate problem is that the other ways of thinking class categorize people into clusters. They are indeed things that the vector of information technology can track and manage. It can tell you **how many women earn how much money**, or **how many employees** report being something other than **white**. Class in the Marxist sense is harder to make palpable. First, class means **class antagonism**. It’s **not a category, it’s a relation**. One that sometimes connects not individuals but what Gerald Raunig and others call dividuals, units of being smaller than an individual.56 It turns out that individuals can indeed be further divided. One could think of class locations as including contradictory ones if one thinks of the people located by class as individuals. Or you could think of classes as quite neatly creating locations for dividuals, which don’t always correspond to the individuals of which they are parts. In this manner, the tension people feel about parts of their existence, as worker and hacker, or hacker and aspirational vectoralist (and so on), can be made sense of another way. Second, if class locates dividuals rather than individuals, it’s no surprise that the way people think about their experience of class i[s] often conflicted. What I would call **vectoral culture** encourages everyone to imagine that they are **entrepreneurs of the self**, playing the stakes of their own animal spirits in the great casino of life.57 Twenty years of hip-hop lyrics have articulated a sophisticated range of thoughts and feeling about what that’s like. One’s public self is supposed to be **a hard-charging boss**. As Cardi B. raps, “I’m a boss you a worker bitch.”58 What it means to be a **boss** is now **modeled on the vectorialist** rather than the capitalist class. It’s about **accumulating asymmetric relations of information**. It is about **commanding and monopolizing attention**. It’s about **monetizing appearances**. The thing to **aspire to own** is **a brand**, starting with **the branded self** and branching out from there. If this is the public face the subaltern has to adopt, whether worker or hacker, the private feelings it masks may be something else altogether. Failure to live up to your own personal brand is understood through languages that are medical, therapeutic, or “spiritual.”59 This is a **world of boredom, anxiety, depression, lack of focus, lack of will**. It can take a lot of pharmaceutical management—legal and illegal—to produce the public face of today. 60 To the extent that there is a language about power that can address these experiences, it negotiates perspectives from critical race theory and feminism, as it should, but often **stops short of a language of class**. That language, against which these others struggled to find room, has atrophied as vectoral power has **subsumed capitalist power** as its subordinate form. The language of class analysis (in the Marxist sense) appears outdated, because it is. It **no longer includes all the** **classes in contention**. If we think synchronically about a matrix of antagonistic classes that includes emerging ones, then **capitalism can be returned to historical thought from its holiday in eternity.**

#### The vector consumes all – intellectual property allows the extraction of value from the hacker class by commodifying creativity and controlling freedom, pushing the world to extinction.

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 5: A Time Machine Theory of History)//gideon

It is a strange thing, this mode of production. What Bernal and Richta called the scientific and technological revolution really did happen, and in the West, not the East. But it was the product of a weird kind of “socialism.” It came out of a **wartime socialization of scientific and technical power**. Scientists and engineers, in academic and corporate laboratories, **cooperated** with each other. Their **innovations weren’t immediately patented, they were shared**. That laid the groundwork for postwar developments in the forces of production. To some extent this “socialism” continued, under the auspices of the Pentagon’s Advanced Projects Research Agency, which among other things funded key work in computation.52 If there was a key innovation that came out of this strange western statesocialist military—industrial complex, it was **the technics of information**. It took a while for the pieces to come together. By the early twenty-first century, the odd thing is that the state-socialist sponsored scientific and technical effort, made first to defeat the Axis powers and then to defeat the Soviets, ended up being a way to compete with Japanese industry abroad and to defeat the working classes at home. A basically **socialized research program** became **the means to build** an infrastructure—what Benjamin Bratton calls the stack, what I call the vector—for a systematic and global privatization of objects, subjects, and the information in between them.53 That this was not an inevitable destiny of science and technology was masked by the **suppression of critical and dissenting voices** among scientists themselves. Bernalism, or the Social Relations of Science movement more broadly, was **shut down in** the **red scare politics** of the Cold War. In the relative absence of that strand of thinking, the available stories for accounting for this historical period have lacked a sense of the class conflicts internal to these new forces of production and the extent to which they were likely to transform capitalism, such as it was in the late twentieth century, into something else. The story that is best known about science and technology during the war is the Manhattan project and the atom bomb. But perhaps it was not the only piece of the puzzle that mattered. The war in the Pacific was probably the biggest logistical operation ever conducted up until that time. Robert McNamara, who would later run the Ford Motor Company and then the Pentagon, was an apprentice logistics expert during the war. These were pioneering efforts to control the movement and combination of incredibly complex arrays of resources across vast territories using communication and computation.54 What started out as the means to beat the Axis powers, and then contain the Soviets, and then to compete with Japanese industry, was in the end the means to **globalize production**, **exploit** the newly available **cheap labor of** the People’s Republic of **China**, and **destroy** the power of **organized labor** within Italy, the United States, and throughout much of the overdeveloped world. But there’s a paradox attendant to this. Capital thought it was using some new kinds of communication and computational power in its struggle with labor, but in the end the **capitalist class** too ended up being **subsumed under that power**. The capitalist class became a subsidiary ruling class to the vectoralist class. **Capital is dead; the Vector lives**. A capitalist class owns the means of production, the means of organizing labor. **A** vectoralist class owns the means of organizing the means of production. The vector has a double form: the form of vector along which information is to be routed (**the extensive vector**), and the form of the vector along which information can be stored and computed (**the intensive vector**). A vectoralist class also owns and **controls the production process** through patents, copyrights, brands, trademarks, proprietary logistical processes, and the like. It is curious that if one looks at the world’s biggest corporations these days, a lot of their power and property is in vectoral form. Many of them **don’t** actually **make the things they sell**. They control **the** production **process by owning and controlling the information**. Even when they do still make the stuff, a quite remarkable amount of the valuation of the company comes from portfolios of intellectual property, or proprietarydata about their customers, and so on. Capital was subsumed under a more abstract form of technical power. When considering the vectoralist class, then, three further points suggest themselves. First, it seems to be able to extract value not just from labor but from what Tiziana Terranova calls free labor. 55 Even when you just stroll down the street, the phone in your purse or pocket is reporting data back to some vectoralist entity. The vectoralist class seems to be able to extract revenue out of qualitative information in much the same way as banks extract it out of quantitative information. Perhaps the exercise of power through control of quantitative and qualitative information is characteristic of the same ruling class. Second, the vectoralist class subordinates the old kind of ruling class, a capitalist class, in the same way that capitalists subordinated the old landlord class that subjected rural production to commodi-fication through ground rent. In that sense, the rise of a vectoralist class is a similar and subsequent development within intra-ruling class dynamics. The vectoralist class still sits atop a pyramid of exploited labor, but it depends also on extracting a surplus out of another, fairly privileged but still subordinate class. I call it the **hacker class**. Bernal already had an inkling of this development when he tried to articulate the interests of scientific workers in and against capitalism, but this was not quite the hacker class yet. That had to wait for the development of sophisticated forms of intellectual property, which are in turn embedded in the design of the interface for the **creative process**. This transforms the qualitative work of producing new forms of information in the world into property that can be rendered equivalent in the market. In short, a new class dynamic, between vectoralist and hacker, was added to an already complex pattern of relations between dominant and subordinate classes. Third, the political economy of the former West rather than the former East was the one that was able to develop the implications of the scientific and technical revolution, in the form of the rise of the vectoralist class. But it was **the state form of the former East that has prevailed in the former West.** **The vector** is not just a means of transforming production. It is also a way of **transforming state power**. 56 Data can be collected for the purposes of a logistics of **economic control**; data can also be collected **to run the surveillance and security apparatus of the state**. The western states too had their surveillance apparatus, but it was never as total as those of the East. The new model worldwide uses the vector to **realize the dreams of the KGB** of old, an information state. This is what Guy Debord called the stage of the integrated spectacle, **combining the worst of the former East and West**.57 The West is now **the former West**. Its economy became something else. It isn’t capitalism any more—it’s worse. It takes even more control away from work life and everyday life. It expands the exploitation of nature to possible extinction. It is certainly not the wonderful dream of a “postindustrial society,” still less Bernal and Richta’s accelerationist socialism. It is a relatively new and more elaborate form of class domination, one in more or less “peaceful coexistence” with the Russian former East, whose global significance is reduced to that of predatory oligarchy monopolizing a resource export economy. 58 The Soviet Union paid a high price for not figuring out the role of information and reaching a modus vivendi with its scientific workers.

#### We advocate for Détournment and strategizing, the return of subversive qualities to congealed and analyzed texts; labor cannot become ideological. We must generate novel revolutionary strategies for our time

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 1: The Sublime Language of My Century)//gideon

All of this takes as a given the transmission of Marx common to nonMarxist and even post-Marxist philosophers and other humanities or social science scholars and the not very different approach of rather scholastic party functionaries of Marxism’s “classical” period.48 There are other readers of Marx, and some of them are poets, or who read as poets do. Modern poets, less interested in the meaning of the texts (the always deferred signified) than in the signs themselves (the materiality of the signifier).49 One that has been of particular use to me is something that is much less a method of reading and more a procedure for writing: what Guy Debord called détournement.50 The word includes the sense of the detour, the turning aside, a hijacking but also a seduction. Debord: “The device of détournement **restores** all their **subversive qualities to past critical judgments that have congealed into respectable truths** … The defining characteristic of this use of détournement is the necessity for distance to be maintained toward whatever has been turned into an official verity … Ideas improve. The meaning of words has a part in this improvement. Plagiarism is necessary, progress implies it. Staying close to an author’s phrasing, plagiarism exploits his expressions, erases false ideas, replaces them with correct ideas … Détournement is the antithesis of quotation, of a theoretical authority invariably tainted if only because it has become quotable, because it is now a fragment torn away from its context, from its own movement … Détournement is, by contrast, the fluid language of anti-ideology … Détournement founds its cause on nothing but its own truth as critique at work in the present.”51 Debord’s writing itself is a brilliant détournement of Marx and Lautréamont (and much else), one that generated a style (and some fresh concepts) for understanding the historical moment of the mid-twentieth century. Marx: “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities …” Debord: “The whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles.”52 And so, once more, comrades, if we would become critics of our times! Let’s try some more détournement to **produce** some different language out of that which comes down to us, **rather than trying to interpret the eternal essence of the text as if we could reproduce it as more of the same**. To practice the style of negation today requires the negation of some old styles. But how do we broach the question of style in Marx? For Keston Sutherland Capital needs readers rather than “curators of concepts.”53 Capital is written in clashing styles, aimed at a readership Marx knew to be divided by class. To the bourgeois reader, aping genteel sensibilities, Marx addresses himself as a satirist, writing at the expense of the myths the bourgeois lives by. For instance, Sutherland claims that Marx’s famous overture on the fetish character of the commodities has been “influentially mistranslated” in accounts that try to master the text by extracting its concepts.54 Commodity fetishism is not a misapprehension of the commodity. 55 Marx is saying something about the making of the commodity itself. Human labor is not just abstracted into a homogenous quantity in the commodity form. Labor gets minced and boiled into Gallerte: aspic, meat jelly. Or in today’s terms into something like what appears in those truly disgusting online videos that show the extrusion from some machine of that major ingredient of hamburgers: pink goo. Sutherland: “The living hands, muscles and nerves of the wage laborer are mere ‘animal substances,’ ingredients for the feast of the capitalist.”56 Marx’s image of what happens to labor is not a genteel conceptual abstraction but a vulgar image from industrial butchery. “The object of Marx’s satire on abstract human labor is not the worker reduced to a condiment but the bourgeois consumer who eats him for breakfast.”57 Capital is “a work of sustained, aggressively satirical détournement in which the risks and failures of style are arguments in themselves, irreducible to theoretical proposition.”58 Elsewhere, Marx détourns phrases from Dante, Goethe, and Shakespeare, erasing false ideas, replacing them with correct ones. The fetish character of commodities is a détournement of a work of racist ethnography by Charles De Brosse.59 In the De Brosse source text, the genteel and enlightened reader is first astonished that stupid “savages” worship fetishes, but disciplines this astonishment into knowledge. In Marx it is the reverse. The commodity appears at first as something rational and known to the genteel sensibility, but on closer inspection is quite astonishing. It is we, gentle reader, who are stupid before the fetish. There is no reconciliation to this strange thing. It has to be abolished. To write after Marx is not to claim a genteel mastery of concepts alone. Where I would press on (which Sutherland very likely wouldn’t) is to suggest that one way to restore a certain vulgar energy to writing might be to take Marx’s tactics of détournement and apply them to the concepts of eternal Capital that have been extracted from Capital itself in certain genteel readings and perpetuated as a kind of myth. The truth of the matter is that Marxist writing itself became ideological. Its acquiescence to the sense of capitalism being eternal is one sure sign of this. **Hence the necessity of the gesture, the thought experiment, of declaring**: Capital is dead. It is dead like God before it, and as with that discovery**, to announce this is treated in the “marketplace of ideas” as madness**. The corpus of Marx is read within a textology of transmission, using scholastic protocols of quotation, exegesis, and interpretation descended from those developed for religious texts.60 And so not surprisingly **Marxism became a minor form of (protestant!) religion**—one of the boring ones, with long sermons and much commentary on scripture. **To interrupt these habits** requires not another reading of Marx**,** promising to peel away the false and reveal the true essence. Rather, it takes another style of writing. Détournement does not care about the self-identity of the textual corpus or the eternal spirit hidden within. It takes what it finds useful or amusing for composing the textual expression of **the present situation**. Judged **in relation to the sacred scriptures it will** of course **appear as heretical, mad, wrong, or vulgar.** This is a poetics that intends to differ from the material it appropriates. Détournement is no respecter of private property or public propriety. It has no interest in those who claim Marx (or for that matter Debord) as their patrimony, as the field they alone are warranted or patented to cultivate and trade. Our task, in the thought experiments gathered here, is to appropriate from the Marxist tradition for the composition of frankly Frankensteinian monster-texts whose only interest is in being anti-ideological tactics, in pointing from within the combinatory of terms to the **limits of** what Flaubert called **received ideas**.61 There’s not much choice but to work with received ideas, but there’s more than one way to select from tradition. So let’s think about the present on these terms: what if, rather than start at the beginning, one started at the end? The **capitalism story always starts in the past**, with the birth of capitalism, **and imagines a** destiny, a **teleology**, **wherein the present must be some continuum from that past**.62 This must be some modification of the essence of the thing. Let’s do it the other way around. **Let’s first describe the present, then** secondarily **figure out where it came from**. This may even, in the end, involve modifying our understanding of capitalism’s pasts. Any attempt to describe the present in its own language is more than likely to end up reproducing the language of its ruling class at best, or at worst the left-over language of obsolete ruling classes. Hence the method of détournement, appropriating received ideas, but also erasing and correcting. Let’s pick a Marx text to détourn. Rather than start where Marx more or less ended, with Capital, let’s start where his “mature” work began, with the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 63 Let’s **start not with capitalism**, as if we could just assume that is what this still is. Let’s **start with** Marx’s sketch of **how to think about modes of production**. I have only modified it slightly. In the social-technical production of their existence, humans inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their desires, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production (and reproduction). **The totality of** these **relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society**, the infrastructure, **on which arises a legal, political and cultural superstructure.** The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and cultural life. It is not the ideologies of humans that determine their social-technical existence, but their **social-technical existence** that **determines their ideologies**. Accidents happen in the course of historical development. The forces of production come into conflict with the existing relations of production or— this just says the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms for the development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of transformation of the superstructures. The changes in the forms of social-technical metabolism lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations, it is always hard to distinguish between the material transformation of the conditions of production, which can be determined with the methods of a social science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic—in short, the mythic or ideological forms in which humans sense and feel this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by a Facebook profile, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its myths. On the contrary, these myths must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social-technical forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and more abstract relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Social-technical forms of organization thus usually set themselves only such tasks as they are able to solve, since closer examination will always show that **the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present** or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the ancient, feudal, despotic, capitalist, and vectoralist modes of production may be designated as **epochs** marking the extension of the exploitation of nature by social-technical forms of **increasing abstraction.** The capitalist mode of production was imagined to be **the last antagonistic form of the social process of production**. **Marx** thought that “the prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.”64 On that, he **was mistaken**.

#### We advocate for Vulgar Marxism: a renegade language; a decentralized stack that avoids the drive to accumulate information asymmetries; the every-day life of Andrey Platonov, the blues of Angela Davis, the cinema of Pier Paolo Pasolini, and the art of Asger Jorn – the aesthetics of vulgar reality

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 7: Four Cheers for Vulgarity!!!!)//gideon

As a way of counterprogramming against genteel Marxism, I want to look at some peculiar instances of the vulgar kind: two about the twenties, two from the sixties. Andrey Platonov (who was that rare thing, the great modernist writer with proletarian origins) wrote a masterpiece, Chevengur, which can be read as many things.22 My attention here is to its vulgar Marxist side. It’s an allegorical counter-history of the Soviet Union from the October Revolution through the civil war until the New Economic Policy, but seen from the points of view of characters who are not even proletarian. They are orphans. This is not history from below but history from below the below. Chevengur does not present the October Revolution from the point of view of the edicts issued from the center, but from their noisy, incoherent reception in the provinces. Platonov’s characters perform their own détournement of Soviet Marx-speak. Far from revolution as the figurative locomotive of history, actual locomotives collide head-on due to confused signaling. This world is not in transition between modes of production as there is hardly any production at all. There is hardly a working class in Platonov, but there are comrades. The comrades are those who face the same dangers, the same exposure to the relentless, disorganizing inertia of exposure to the world.23 Humans and machines, plants and animals can all be comrades. All wear away into nothingness in time. The revolution is supposed to harness all these energies, organize them, inform them, and in the process render them productive. But the tension in Platonov is that hardship and poverty first make comrades. Safety and surplus feed the soul and stimulate private demands. The problem is to restore comradeship beyond the minimal threshold of survival and scarcity. There can be no end of history in Platonov’s world, because nature never lets up, is never conquered, is never providence. Time wears everything away. **Communism is** always and **only a horizon**, a minimal line between a blank sky and an empty land. Platonov’s characters live on through **secondary ideas**, which can be made actual in the here and now. 24 They work on **food security** or on **irrigation**, as Platonov did himself during the famine years of the civil war. Platonov sticks close to the point of view of those whose work it is to hoe the fields, to run the railways, those who find their own ways to be comrades. Platonov’s vulgar Marxism is neither total revolutionary leap nor social democratic gradualism. It’s **a practice of everyday life.** The movement between genteel and vulgar Marxism plays out strongly in the work of Angela Davis. She studied philosophy with Herbert Marcuse in the sixties but was also a militant in the Black Liberation Movement. Davis: “If I still retained any of the elitism which almost inevitably insinuates itself into the minds of college students, I lost it all in the course of the [Black Panther Party] political education sessions.”25 I want to focus on her study of Black women blues singers of the twenties.26 What she hears in the recordings of Ma Rainey and Bessie Smith is a **Black working class sensibility**, appearing through fissures within patriarchal language. Black working class culture had little access to writing and publishing, but through its blues singers it did find a way to leave a recorded trace of its oral language, even if at the time few heard it outside of Black proletarian culture. Davis: “As music entered its age of mechanical reproduction, blues were deemed reproducible only within the cultural borders of their site of origin.”27 Slave society had controlled sexual relations between Black people. The abolition of slavery revolutionized Black personal relationships. Questions of Black sexuality could not be addressed through musical forms of the slavery era. Its spirituals invoked a possible world of collective redemption, at once otherworldly and temporal. It was sacred universe, all-embracing, an imagined community of hope. It was less religion as the opium of the people, and more the heart of a heartless world, to give two of Marx’s alternate formulations (the first a détournement from Heine).28 Out of the frustrated hopes of emancipation came a more exclusively upward-looking redemption in the form of gospel music and a lowly, earthy one, in the blues. God and the Devil found their separate forms, with the Devil having dominion over matters of love and sex. It was not the secular nature of the blues that drew church ire, but their sacred quality. **Blues** women created a space to **preach about sexuality outside of male-dominated** church **culture**. In the blues, love is not idealized. Freely chosen sexual love is a mediation between emancipation from slavery and new forms of class oppression. Very little in the blues is about marriage and domesticity. Blues women were disinterested in the cult of motherhood and **deal frankly** with **abuse and abandonment**. They announce female desire, and it crosses the public–private distinction. They affirm an emotional community and Black humanity. They are frank about **lesbian and gay existence**. The blues are not a politics, but for Davis they are a **cultural preparation for the political movement** to which her own lifelong activism belongs. They anticipate the feminist principle that the personal is political. They counsel financial independence for women and prefer men who work to parasitic ones. And if all else fails, move on. They touch on natural disasters, such as floods, and what that experience means for oppressed and invisible communities. The blues are also frank about sex work and the risks of prosecution and prison. They are the music of those among the subordinate classes who experience the repressive state apparatus as often as the ideological one. Davis: “Women’s blues contested black bourgeois notions of ‘high’ culture that belittled working class popular music.”29 Upwardly mobile and urban Black culture distanced itself from blues culture. Billie Holiday, the study of whom concludes Davis’s book, brought the blues sensibility into her interpretations of the white popular song that displaced the blues. Holiday’s work is a détournement of white culture industry material to her purposes. Davis does the same for critical theory. She appropriates from her teacher Herbert Marcuse the concept of the aesthetic dimension but makes it more vulgar. 30 Here it is the low art of the blues where aesthetics creates the form in which the overcoming of everyday experience can become palpable. The world made over in the form of art can be recognized as an aspect of reality distorted by reality. Blues songs are **collective property**, the commons.31 Davis **makes the aesthetic dimension collective and vulgar** and connects it to the African practice of the naming of things as a kind of power. **Art** (and one might add theory) does not achieve greatness by transcending its milieu, but rather is at its best when it opens a dimension within it, **brings people to solidarity with each other** and the world, **while refusing the happy ending**—as Holiday does with “Strange Fruit.” For Angela Davis, her sustained encounter with the vulgar took the form of her long involvement with the politics of prison abolition, particularly for and with working class Black women within the prison industrial complex.32 For Pier Paolo Pasolini, it was more a matter of sexual taste that led him to spend his nights with the raggazi di vita, the lively lads, of subproletarian Rome.33 If for Adorno it was high culture that could preserve a moment before capitalist commodification, for Pasolini it was low—not the remnants of a genteel world, but a peasant one. Pasolini—poet, novelist, and journalist—was a militant worker in the written language. One of his many interests was the vulgar tongue. Then he moved into cinema and rethought his whole practice. It’s his writings on cinema that are my focus here.34 These took as their starting point the linguistic and semiotic theory popular at the time and made their own vulgar sense out of it. He started by making a distinction between what he calls **spoken-written** language **and spoken-only language**. **Spoken-written** Italian is an **artifact of the superstructures**, of **education**, literature, **administration**. **Spoken-only** language in the Italy of the sixties still included its numerous dialects. These remain from **premodern** forms of social production. Spoken-only language is the language of **the base.** Its American equivalents might include the spoken-only Black English that emerged out of slavery and that for Davis is incorporated into the recorded sound of the blues. Spoken-only language **mediates between labor and nature**. The rise of what Pasolini calls neo-capitalism changes this. From it comes a series of new technical languages of the base. They don’t come from the ideological apparatuses of school, church, literature, and so forth. It’s the factories that become the unifiers of language. Their form of communication is not necessarily rational, but it is more abstract and more efficient. These new languages of the base replace spoken-only languages with ones derived not from the ideological superstructures but from **audiovisual technology**. They emerge out of the forces of production. What drives neo-capitalism, and hence its modifications of language, is an **internal revolution**. The external revolution, the **negation of capitalism by the subordinate classes, did not come to pass**. Pasolini grasps a key point here: that the working class failed to transform capitalism **does not mean that nobody else did**. Among the effects of this internal revolution is a **transformation of languages** from the base up, which **succeeded**. The attempt by the external revolution to **occupy the ideological apparatuses** and **build a counterhegemonic culture** from the superstructures down had already been superseded. Genteel Marxism is **marooned in outmoded superstructures**. The new hegemonic language was actually that of what Pasolini calls a neo-bourgeoisie, owners of the forces of production out of which these languages emerge. **Technical languages** replace obsolete spoken-only ones as the language **of production**. They also displace the literary and administrative languages of the national-cultural superstructure. A new kind of vulgar tongue displaces both an old one and an obsolete form of genteel language. Pasolini changed his tactics to meet this situation. His essays on language are written in the new technical language of semiotics—how advertising copy writers will henceforth be trained—rather than in the old rhetorical forms. But his main response is cinema. He sees **cinema** **as a technical language that is not dependent on the national-cultural preoccupations of the superstructure**. Cinema is the common dream of technocrat and technical worker (although he was perhaps not attentive to the internal contradiction between those two kinds of emerging class subject).35 His intervention in cinema is to make, from the base up and using technical language, **a replacement for spoken-only language**. He made mythic films, in and against neo-capitalism, using its own techniques. One thing that is distinctive about neo-capitalism is that it mass produces subjects in much the same way as it mass produces objects.36 It makes consumers to go with its products, and in doing so will more and more bypass the old superstructures in the role of subject formation. Pasolini’s project is to work in and against the new modes of the production of such subjects. **To the genteel** Marxist **everything becomes textual**; **to Pasolini** **everything becomes cinematic**. **Reality has its own language**, and it is that of **cinema**. **Human perception is** like a **short cut from the language of the real** itself. **Cinema is** the written **language** and **reality is** a “**spoken**” language. Both human **perception** **and** individual **films are** orderings, **cut from the real**. Collective **human action is a cinema** already, **of the real**, and an individual **life is a film**. In neo-**capitalism**, mechanical reproduction **becomes the** common form of “**spoken**” **everyday life**. Action until now had been spoken only, cinema makes it written. Reality is a cinema of nature. Everyday life is a continuous sequence shot that ends with a cut, with death. Cinema is a way to write these shots, edit them, and combine their points of view. The possibility of an objective “take” on the real is between the shots. The objective extends beyond the subjective point of view, in art as well as science. Editing does for film what death does for life. Both introduce the possibility of **meaning**. Cinema, which wants to be false, can’t help being real. But the real is a nonhuman mystery, and is inescapable. All **communication is sacred, giving meaning to the real**. Cinema cuts into the continuous time of the real, giving it meaning. Films, like lives, are mortal. But **cinema is immortal** and sacred. Cinema is **bound to life**. Pasolini was **queer for** time, for **the raw, vulgar, sacred time of the world**. Only the genteel make a fetish of language and make **language itself sacred**. This is Pasolini’s vulgar Marxist heretical empiricism, his distance from both genteel Marxism and from the (for him equally genteel) avant-garde.37 As with the genteel Marxisms, Pasolini extracts his worldview from his own labor process. At least in his case, working in cinema and mass media gave him insight into an emerging moment in the development of capitalism, one where perhaps it was starting to become something else, driven by an internal revolution among its ruling classes, the external challenge to its power by labor having failed. He struggled in and against the audiovisual forces of cultural production of his time and tried to open a vulgar, common, aesthetic dimension within it that looked back to premodern, precommodified forms of everyday life. But this recourse to the archaic did not make him a subtle reader of emerging class antagonisms and alliances, and for that I want to turn to our fourth vulgarian, his contemporary Asger Jorn. Jorn’s Marxism is not that of either the working class or the genteel writer. He was an artist. His was a socialism that is neither utopian nor scientific, but experimental. Jorn thought the sources of aesthetic creation were popular and was in his own way quite content to call himself a vulgar Marxist.38 He developed a novel vulgar Marxism as a critique of some of the more prevalent kinds of vulgar Marxism that I examined earlier. He thought that (vulgar) Marxists left something out of the equation of labor with value. Jorn restored a role for nature, for materiality, and also for producers of form, for what he jokingly called a creative elite. The term is ironic. **Artists** are the opposite of a power elite.39 In a commodity economy, they **have no power**. Art is supposed to give form to the social practices of life, but in a commodity economy, **art is cut off from life and becomes a special** kind of **commodity** instead. Where Pasolini was disturbed by the expansion of wealth under neocapitalism, Jorn saw no expansion of wealth at all. What has value in Jorn is difference, whereas commodity production just makes more and more sameness. **Capital has impoverished the world**. Far from being a critique, Marx’s scientific socialism reduces the complexity and difference of form to a rational essence. Marx lacks a sense of the materiality of forms (or one might add, information: the form of materiality is information). Marxism is all too often reduced to a dialectic of form and essence. The essence of value is labor. But for Jorn, form is not a container for a content or essence. Bourgeois thought sees only exchange, and Marx lifts the veil and shows how value is produced before it is exchanged. Jorn lifts another veil, revealing not those who fill the form with content, but those who change those forms and produce difference itself. **Capital** **alienated labor from creation**, separating the production of content from the differentiation of forms. Actually existing socialist economies did not solve the problem, with their obsession with increasing quantities of production alone. Rather than the party (or its philosophers) bringing class consciousness from without, Jorn wants a **horizontal relation between artist and worker**. Jorn drew a distinction between the materialist worldview and the materialist attitude to life.40 He thought Marx had the former but not the latter. A Marxism in rude health needs both. A materialist attitude to life would be **open-ended and experimental**, but also **collective and practical**. While he generally through artists had been cut off from the role of form giver, the blues as Davis presents it might be the kind of materialist attitude to life that is also form giving. But where for Davis, such a form negates everyday experience and opens the possibility of a politics, for Jorn form can also affirm everyday experience and give a new shape to it. His conception of historical change has a directly aesthetic dimension. Drawing together all four of our instances of the vulgar, what I suggest is this: first, **an orientation toward the intractable** difficulties of organizing the world through labor (Platonov); second, **a feeling for the** sources of social change **directly in the mediated** experience of the most marginalized and oppressed (Davis); third, a practice **of working in and against the technical forms of the time** (Pasolini); and fourth, **thinking one’s own** everyday creative experience**, when it involves the** production of novel forms**, as not that of labor, but as that of another kind of subordinate class** (Jorn). This (affirmative, experimental, collaborative) vulgar Marxist approach then reveals genteel Marxism as formed by its own habits of work. Genteel Marxism was mostly a product of forms of textual study, in traditional fields such as philosophy, history, and literature. It projects the norms of that labor as metaphors onto the world. **Written language is not a good medium in which to grasp the intractability of the world**, the practico-inert. Nor is it good on the subtle **affective dimension** of everyday culture and is in particular not a good place from which to understand how traditional textual forms were superseded by the development of media technics itself. Genteel Marxism **withdrew into the superstructures.** It found itself overvaluing traditional forms, in a pastoral husbanding of bourgeois styles. It found itself favoring notions of the political or the cultural that the internal revolution of commodity production had rendered residual. And not least, genteel Marxism locks onto the received idea that this is in essence still capitalism, with capitalism’s temporary relations of class domination erected into an absolute. Two things remain rather hastily elided, even if they are sore points that keep coming up. One is the relation of genteel Marxists, trained in the writerly techniques (be they of literature, philosophy, or law), with others trained in practices of creating and verifying information that are not writerly. How is the writerly connected (or not) to the technical fields or to competence in media other than the written and spoken word? In what way is writing as a competence a mark of a certain kind of gentility itself? The Man of Letters leaves it to somebody else to type them and post them.41 His inheritors can’t even put up their own blog posts in WordPress. The other elided problem is the writerly intellectual’s relation to the working class. Being in the party of the working class or a fellow traveler of it appears to solve this problem, for genteel Marxists as different as Lukács, Sartre, and Althusser. Another solution, derived from Lukács, is to be **the custodian of** the **totality**. The genteel Marxist becomes the spokesman for History itself. One can also find this solution in Jameson, Karatani, or Žižek, and in a particularly elegant form in Paolo Virno.42 A frequent gesture is to make the connection between the genteel authority of the writerly, particularly as that authority is shaped by the university or by a high literary culture, and the authentic mission of labor at the expense of other kinds of information production practice. The philosophical or the literary is then the guarantee of some critical acumen that the genteel bestows upon labor as a kind of noblesse oblige. But the key thing for our purposes is that this has a double effect. The first is this cathecting onto the destiny of labor of something foreign to it, a genteel learnedness. The second is the reciprocal use of this imaginary connection to labor to claim to possess something that other kinds of intellectual labor lack. The genteel Marxist claims to know and negate bourgeois culture and then to represent it metaphorically to the working class. By identifying metaphorically with labor as a whole, Marxist intellectuals evade the question of their own class location and the extent to which it may be shared with others whose immediate labor processes are otherwise quite different. The metaphoric inversion impedes the possibility of thinking metonymically, that they are just a part of some other subaltern class. Thus, it is often **hard to forge links between the** literary or philosophical **Marxist intellectual and progressive movements** in fields that are technical or scientific—that other and (in many ways more important) fraction of the hacker class. This may be particularly detrimental at a time when all fractions of the hacker class face similar problems. Our work is made routine, is deskilled, becomes precarious and casualized. It is **absorbed into** the same logics of **vectoral power**. We can’t practice solidarity among our own class. We are deduced to belonging to little (Durkheimian) groups, hoarding our (Weberian) opportunities. This is particularly worrying at a time when both the humanities and the sciences are under attack by new kinds of **irrationalism** fostered and funded by regressive sections of the ruling class such as the fossil fuel industry. At the same time, they (we) find our **creative and productive activities** more and more **subordinated to** forms of **information management** and control, which may indeed be more abstract ways of organizing hacker activity but are by no means more rational. It has also made it difficult to keep abreast of developments in the forces of production. It takes actual technical knowledge or situated experience to understand how these things work. That knowledge tends to be specialized. It takes a whole practice of **collaborative intellectual labor** to pool such knowledge and understand the shape of the forces of production as they emerge, in terms other than those favored by the ruling class. This is a major front in the politics of knowledge of today. And so: four cheers for vulgar Marxism!!!! Four rather than three, as the vulgar is always a little excessive.43 Four cheers for these four vulgar Marxist writers, although they are also much more than that. Opening up the **vulgar wing of the archive** again might open some more plural pathways through which to think from past to present, **to inhabitable futures**. Marxism needs to be vulgar again, but perhaps in a different way. The leading edge of development of the forces of production is not the industrial system any more.44 They develop now across a wide range of science and engineering fields. The development of new forces of production has for some time now not been left to chance, but is itself organized in a whole parallel regime of commodification. Put simply, **the worker is subsumed into the manufacture of sameness; the hacker is subsumed into the production of difference**. It turns out that genteel Marxists belonged to a minor branch of the latter, as a subculture.

### Kleiner

#### The intent to protect “Intellectual knowledge” was a byproduct of the birth of liberal that pits the academy against itself, setting up the invisible octagon for the capitalist watch the fight to death for knowledge.

Kleiner 10

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The existence of ‘copy rights’ predates 18th century notions of the author’s right to ownership.26 From the 16th to the 17th century royal licenses gave exclusive rights to certain publishers to print particular texts. In 1557, an exclusive printing monopoly was granted through a Royal Charter to a London guild of printers, the Stationers’ Company, because it assured Crown control over which books were published or banned. The first copyrights were publisher’s rights to print copies, emerging out of the ideological needs of absolutist monarchies to control knowledge and censor dissent. After the Licensing Act expired in 1694, the monopoly of the Stationers’ Company was threatened by provincial booksellers, the so-called ‘pirates’ from Ireland and Scotland. 29 The Stationers’ Company petitioned Parliament for a new bill to extend their copyright monopoly. But this was a different England from 1557, different from the Parliament that had executed King Charles I in 1649, abolished the monarchy and installed a republic under Cromwell,restored the monarchy with Charles II, overthrew James II in the Revolution of 1688, and, in 1689, passed the first decree of modern constitutional sovereignty, the Bill of Rights. This was now John Locke’s England. The philosopher John Locke was among the chief architects of the liberal state and the ideology of private property. To Locke, property was an extension of one’s ownership of oneself. Since you own yourself, you therefore own what you produce. The right to property is created by labor. The English Parliament now took a view consistent with this outlook, and The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1709 by Parliament, proved to be a hard blow against the Stationers’ Company. The Statute declared authors, not publishers, to be owners of their works and limited the copyright term to 14 years for new books and 21 years for existing copyrights. The Statute, which was subtitled ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned’, created a marketplace for knowledge through competition. The Statute’s aim was not to create an author’s copyright, but to break the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly. The principal players, in what the press hailed as the great cause of literary property, were not authors. Publishers sued each otherin the courts, invoking the author’s rights as a pretextin their battle for economic power. The notion ofthe author as an originator, with a naturalright to own theirideas, may have been invented by artists and philosophers, but it was publishers who profited. Laws are not made by poets but by states, and states exist to enforce economic privilege, adopting whatever legitimizing philosophical framework they find convenient at any given time. The Statute of Anne codified the capitalist form of the author-publisher relationship. Authors had a right to own the products of their labor in theory, but since they created immaterial ideas and lacked the technological means to produce books, they had to sell their rights to another party with enough capital to exploit them. In essence, it was no different than any other sale of labor. The exploitation of the author was embedded in the intellectual property regime from its inception. There are important differences between intellectual property and physical property. Physical property is scarce and finite, while intellectual property can be copied, often costs almost nothing to reproduce, and can be used simultaneously by anyone with a copy. It is exactly this characteristic of unlimited reproducibility that requires the copyright regime to make information into property. In the long term, the exchange value of any reproducible good is driven towards its reproduction cost by competition. Since there are few barriers to reproducing an information asset, it can have no exchange value beyond the labor and resources required to reproduce it. In other words, information has no long-term exchange value of its own. Thus, owners of this property (again, not to be confused with the producers) need laws to prevent this reproduction. Only by making it illegal for others to reproduce the information can owners extract rent for the right to copy. Intellectual property, including copyright, is an extension of the structure of property to immaterial assets and information. Copyright is a legal construction that tries to make certain kinds of immaterial wealth behave like material wealth so that they can be owned, controlled, and traded. In any system of property, musicians can no more retain ownership ofthe product oftheir labor than can workers at a textile sweatshop. The system of private control of the means of publication, distribution, promotion and media production ensures that artists and 30 all other creative workers can earn no more than their subsistence. Whether you are a biochemist, a musician, a software engineer, or a filmmaker, you have signed over all your copyrights to property owners before these rights have any real financial value, for no more than the reproduction costs of your work. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, nineteenth century French socialist and the first person to call himself an ‘anarchist’, famously argued that property is theft. According to this logic, if property is theft, than intellectual property is fraud. Property is theft not in a strictly legal sense, since the laws of the liberal capitalist state are the foundations of property. Property is theft in the philosophical sense, as in the Lockean concept of property as an extension of self-ownership, meaning that it is intrinsically unjust to take what you have not produced. Proudhon, like Thompson and Hodgskin before him, argues that the owner of property has no legitimate claim to the product of those who put their property to productive use.27 Without recourse to force, property owners could not extract any more than the reproduction costs of the instruments they contribute to the productive process. A capitalist class, then, could not exist without denying workers independent access to the means of production. In the words of American Individualist Anarchist Benjamin Tucker, ‘the lender of capital is entitled to its return intact, and nothing more’.28 Since common lands were previously not property, when the peasants of the pre-industrial age were denied access to common land by new enclosures, it can be said that their land was stolen. Furthermore, because they were forced into wage labor as a result of this expropriation, the institution of property itself is an institution of theft. But if physical property can be stolen, can intelligence orideas be stolen? If yourland is stolen, you cannot use it anymore, except on the conditions set by its new private owner. If ownership of an idea is analogous to the ownership of material property, it should be subject to the same conditions of economic exchange, forfeiture, and seizure. And if seized, it would then cease to be the property of its owner. But if your idea is used by others, you have not lost your ability to use it, so what is really stolen? The traditional notion of property, as something that can be possessed to the exclusion of others, is irreconcilable with something as intangible as an idea. Unlike a material object, which can exist in only one place at a given time, ideas are infinite and non-exclusive. A poem is no less a poet’s poem, despite its existence in the memories of a thousand others. Every expression is an extension of a previous perception. Ideas are not original, they are built upon layers of knowledge accumulated throughout history. Out ofthese common layers artists create works that have their unmistakable specificities and innovations. All creative works reassemble ideas, words, and images from history and their contemporary context. Before the 18th century, poets quoted their ancestors and sources of inspiration without formal acknowledgement, and playwrights freely borrowed plots and dialogue from previous sources without attribution. Homer based the ‘Iliad’ and the ‘Odyssey’ on oral traditions that dated back centuries. Virgil’s ‘Aeneid’ is lifted heavily from Homer. Shakespeare borrowed many of his narrative plots and dialogue from Holinshed. This is not to say that the concept of plagiarism didn’t exist before the 18th century, but its definition shifted radically. The term plagiarist (literally, kidnapper) was first used by Martial in the 1st century to describe someone who kidnapped his poems by copying them whole and circulating them under the copier’s name. Plagiarism was a false assumption of another’s work. But if a new work had similar passages or identical expressions to earlier ones, it was not considered such a false assumption, as long as the new work had its own aesthetic merits. After the invention of the creative genius ,practices of collaboration, ap- 31 appropriation and transmission were actively forgotten. The accusations of plagiarism directed at Coleridge, Stendhall, Wilde and T.S.Eliot for including expressions from their predecessors in their works reflected a modern redefinition of the term in accordance with modern notions of authorship and exclusive property. Ideas are viral. They couple with other ideas, change shape, and migrate into unfamiliar territories. Regimes of intellectual property restrict the promiscuity of ideas and trap them in artificial enclosures, extracting exclusive benefits from their ownership and control. Intellectual property is fraud, a legal privilege to falsely represent oneself as the sole ‘owner’ of an idea, expression or technique and to charge a tax to all who want to perceive, express or apply this ‘property’ in their own productive practice. It is not plagiarism that dispossesses an ‘owner’ of using an idea, it is intellectual property, backed by the invasive violence of a state that dispossesses everyone from the use of their common culture. The basis for this dispossession is the legal fiction of the author as a sovereign individual who creates original works out of the wellspring of his imagination and thus has a natural and exclusive right to ownership. Foucault unmasked authorship as a functional principle that impedes the free circulation, manipulation, composition, decomposition, and recomposition of knowledge.29 The author-function represents a form of despotism over the proliferation of ideas. The effect of this despotism, and of the system of intellectual property that it shelters and preserves, is that it robs us of our cultural memory, censors our words, and chains our imagination to the law. And yet artists continue to be flattered by their association with the myth of the creative genius, turning a blind eye to how it is used to justify their exploitation and expand the privilege of the property-owning elite. Copyright pits author against author in a war of competition for originality. Its effects are not just economic; copyright also naturalizes a certain process of knowledge production, de-legitimizes the notion of a common culture, and cripples social relations. Artists are not encouraged to share their thoughts, expressions and works, or to contribute to a common pool of creativity. Instead, they are compelled to jealously guard their ‘property’ from others who they view as potential competitors, spies and thieves lying in wait to snatch and defile their original ideas. This is a vision of the art world created in capitalism’s own image, a capitalism that seeks to appropriate the alienated products of its intellectual and creative workers. Joost Smiers, Professor Emeritus of Political Science ofthe Arts atthe Utrecht School of the Arts, is among those who insist on the abolition of copyright. He argues that copyright centralizes media ownership by giving large media conglomerates an anti-competitive advantage that damages the position of artists. Artists would gain more from a level playing field consisting of a larger number of publishers competing for their services, than from the exclusivity of copyright.30 Professor Smiers has a valid point regarding the market inefficiency of copyright. Copyright should be abolished. However, there is no reason to believe it will be abolished. Copyright is far from the only market inefficiency in the contemporary capitalist market. Without market inefficiencies, capital would be unable to capture any more than its own reproduction cost in any branch of industry. The elimination of competition is central to the logic of capitalism. Without unfair advantages, a capitalist class of owners could not accumulate wealth and there could be no capitalism. Smiers is correct in his criticism of copyright, he is also correct when he goes further and denounces copyright as a form of censorship. However as with all political ideas, the abolition of copyright can only be implemented when those who support it can overcome the wealth of those who oppose it. This is not currently the case. 32 The private ownership of ideas over the last two centuries has not managed to eradicate the memory of a common culture, or the recognition that knowledge flourishes when ideas, words, sounds and images are free for everyone to use. Ever since the birth of the proprietary author, different individuals and groups have challenged the intellectual property regime and the ‘right’ it gave to some private individuals to ‘own’ creative works while preventing others from using and re-interpreting them. In his 1870 ‘Poesies’, a pair of texts discovered and revered by Surrealists Louis Aragon and André Breton, Uruguayan-born French poet Comte de Lautreamont called for a return of impersonal poetry, a poetry written by all. ‘Plagiarism is necessary’, Lautreamont stated, ‘progress depends on it. It sticks close to an author’s phrase, uses his expressions, deletes a false idea, replaces it with a true one’.31 His definition subverted the myth of individual creativity used to justify property relations, in the name of progress, where the myth ofindividual creativity in factimpeded progress through the privatization of culture. The natural response was to re-appropriate culture as a sphere of collective production without acknowledging artificial enclosures of authorship. Lautremont’s phrase became a benchmark for the 20th century avant-gardes. Dada rejected originality and portrayed all artistic production as recycling and reassembling, from Duchamp’s ready-mades to Tzara’s rule for making poems from cut-up newspapers, to the photomontages of Höch, Hausmann and Heartfield. Dada also challenged the idea of the artist as solitary genius, and of art as a separate sphere, by working collectively to not only produce art objects and texts, but also media hoaxes, interventions at political gatherings and demonstrations on the street. Its assault on artistic values was a revolt against the capitalist foundations that created them. The ideas of Dadaism were systematically developed into a theory by the Situationist International (SI). The SI acknowledged that the practice of detournement, putting existing artworks, films, advertisements and comic strips through a detour, or recoding their dominant meanings, was indebted to Dadaist practices, but with a difference. They saw Dada as a negative critique of dominant images (one that depended on the easy recognition of the image being negated) and defined detournement as a positive reuse of existing fragments simply as elements in the production of a new work. Detournement was not primarily an antagonism to tradition;rather, it emphasized the reinvention of a new world from the scraps of the old. And implicitly, revolution was not primarily an insurrection against the past but a way of learning to live in a different way by creating new practices and forms of behavior. These forms of behavior included collective writings, which were often unsigned, and an explicit refusal of the copyright regime by attaching the labels ‘no copyright’ or ‘anticopyright’ to their works, along with the directions for use, such as: any of the texts in this book may be freely reproduced, translated or adapted even without mentioning the source. Digitalization has proven to be much more of a threat to conventional notions of authorship and intellectual property than the plagiarism practiced by radical artists, or critiques ofthe author by poststructuralisttheorists. The computer dissolves the boundaries essential for the modern fiction of the author as a solitary creator of unique and original works. Ownership presupposes a separation between texts, and between the author and reader. The artificiality of this separation is becoming more apparent. On mailing lists, newsgroups and open publishing sites, the transition from reader to writer is natural, and the difference between original texts vanishes as readers contribute commentary and incorporate fragments of the original in their response without the use of quotations. Attempts to copyright online writing appear increasingly absurd, as such, texts are often col- 33 electively produced and immediately multiplied. As online information circulates without regard for the conventions of copyright, the concept of the proprietary author really seems to have become a ghost of the past. Perhaps the most important effect of digitalization is that it threatens the traditional benefactors of intellectual property since monopolistic control by book publishers, music labels and the film industry is no longer necessary as

#### To bring forth the new age of knowledge, that is both realistic and practical, we must commit ourselves to a radical transformation of both epistemology and culture within existing institutions

Kleiner 10

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Despite copyleft’s beneficial role in forming a valuable common stock of software, it remains problematic when the model is retrofitted back to the domains of art and culture from which dissent against intellectual property sprung. Cultural works, unlike software, are a consumer good, not a tool for use in production, or a producer’s good. Producer’s goods, as mentioned earlier, are the assets used in production, such as the tools and equipment required to produce consumer goods sold for profit. Capital demand is distinct from consumer demand. Capital demand is the demand for producer’s goods; consumer demand is the demand for consumer goods. Capitalism doesn’t require that a profit be made on the production of capital goods because profits are made through the control of the circulation of consumer goods. Anything that decreases the cost of capital consequently increases the potential profit that can be captured through the sale of the goods. Failure to understand the difference between capital demand and consumer demand propagates the myth that the success of free software can be a template for free culture. Under capitalism, only capital can be free. That’s why software can be free, but culture cannot be free without more fundamental shifts in society. Art is not, in most cases, a common input to production as software is. Thus, the demand for it is consumer demand, not capital demand. There are certainly cases in which art works could be considered productive inputs, such as sound effects, clip art, music clips, and the like, and the tradition of artists drawing on the work of their predecessors has been discussed at length above; however, when we discuss the economics of content-based works, like poems, novels, films, or music, as well as entertainment-oriented software titles such as games, we are not talking about producer’s goods, but consumer’s goods. Capitalist publishing firms and entertainment industry giants will support the creation of copyleft software in order to employ it in production. However, in most cases, they will not support the creation of copyleft art. Why would they, as art is a consumer good, and the industry is not in the business of giving away consumer goods for free. They are in the business, however, of earning profits by controlling the distribution of consumer goods. Like all copyable, reproducible information, content-based works have no direct exchange value, and, unlike software, they rarely have use value in production either. Use value exists only among the fans of these works, and, if owners of property cannot charge these fans money for the right to copy, why would they fund the production? And if owners of property will not support copyleft art, which is freely distributed, who will? The answer is unclear. In some cases, institutions such as private and state cultural funds will, but these can only support a very small number of artists, and only then by employing dubious and ultimately somewhat arbitrary selection criteria in deciding who does, and who does not, receive such funding. The problem is obvious when attempting to translate copyleft to cultural works. If someone releases a novel under a copyleft license, and Random House prints it and makes a profit off the author’s work, Random House has not violated copyleft as long as the copyleft is passed down. To be ‘free’ means to be open to commercial appropriation, since freedom, in the terms of copyleft, is defined as the non-restrictive circulation of 41 information rather than as freedom from exploitation. It comes as no surprise that the major revision in applying copyleft to the production of artworks, music, and texts has been to permit copying, modifying, and redistributing as long as it is non-commercial. Wu Ming, a group of anti-intellectual property authors from Italy, claim it is necessary to place a restriction on commercial use, or use for profit, to prohibit the parasitic exploitation of cultural workers. They justify this restriction, and its divergence from the General Public License version of copyleft, on the grounds that the struggle against exploitation and the fight for a fair remuneration of labor is the cornerstone of the history of the left. Other content providers and book publishers, for example Verso, have expanded this restriction by claiming that copying, modifying, and redistributing should not only be nonprofit, but also in the spirit of the original, without explaining what this ‘spirit’ means. Indymedia Romania revised its copyleft definition to make the meaning of ‘in the spirit of the original’ clearer after repeated problems with the neo-fascist site Alter media Romania, whose ‘pranks’ ranged from hijacking the indymedia.ro domain to copying texts from Indymedia and lying about names and sources. Indymedia Romania’s restrictions include, not modifying the original name or source because it goes against the desire for transparency, not reproducing the material for profit because it abuses the spirit of generosity, and not reproducing the material in a context that violates the rights of individuals or groups by discriminating against them based on nationality, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality because that contravenes its commitment to equality. Other versions of copyleft have tried to add further restrictions based on a stronger interpretation of the ‘left’ in copyleft, based not on a negative freedom from restrictions but on positive principles, like valuing social co-operation above profit, non-hierarchical participation, and non-discrimination. The more restrictive definitions of copyleft attempt to find an information common that is not just about the free flow of information but sees itself as part of a larger social movement that bases its commonality on shared leftist principles. In its various mutations, copyleft represents a pragmatic, rational approach that recognizes the limits of freedom as implying reciprocal rights and responsibilities. These different restrictions represent divergent interpretations about what these rights and responsibilities should be. Yet, given the poor economic conditions of most artists who reserve full copyright, the prospect of non-commercial mutations of copyleft improving the economic conditions of artists seems remote. The chief advantage of reserving commercial rights as an artist is the ability to license work to the entertainment industry under other terms; as it is commercial, it doesn’t qualify for free access under the terms of a non-commercial license. However, artists lack the resources to manufacture and distribute on a commercial scale. Thus, they are in fact reliant on those who have the capital to do so, and cannot bargain for anything more than their subsistence. In essence, selling their ideas is like other workers selling their labor. This is illustrated in ‘Music Artists’ Earnings and Digitisation: A Review of Empirical Data from Britain and Germany’ by Martin Kretschmer, Professor of Information Jurisprudence at Bournemouth University, where he concludes that ‘the creator has little to gain from exclusivity’.41 Similarly, in his 2006 study ‘Empirical Evidence On Copyright Earnings’, Kretschmer states: ‘Earnings from non copyright, and even non-artistic activities, are an important source of income for most creators’.42 This study includes many startling figures. For example,the median payment distributed by the Performing Right Society (UK) in 1994 to its copyright holders was £84.43 While non-commercial terms may provide a way to integrate artists who produce free culture into an otherwise proprietary entertainment industry, they do not challenge that proprietary entertainment industry or address the embedded exploitation in it. Non-commercial 42 terms are very problematic for those in the socialist left who advocate for workers’ self-organized production, as these terms restrict the ability of non-capitalist enterprises to reproduce such works. Thus, such licenses are detrimental not only to the interests of artists but to all workers, as they are not compatible with the general objective of the socialist left: the creation of a worker-controlled economy. In order for copyleft to mutate into a revolutionary instrument in the domain of cultural production, it must become ‘copy-far-left’. It must insist on workers’ ownership of the means of production. The works themselves must be a part of the common stock, and available for productive use by other commons-based producers. So long as authors reserve the right to make money with their works and prevent other commons-based producers from doing so, their work cannot be considered to be in the commons at all and remains a private work. A copyfarleft license must not restrict commercial usage, but rather usage that is not based in the commons. Specifically, copyfarleft must have one set of rules for those who are working within the context of workers’ communal ownership, and another for those who employ private property and wage labor in production. A copyfarleft license should make it possible for producers to share freely and to also retain the value of their labor product. In other words, it must be possible for workers to earn remuneration by applying their own labor to mutual property, but impossible for owners of private property to make profit using wage labor. Thus, under a copyfarleft license, a worker-owned printing co-operative could be free to reproduce, distribute, and modify the common stock as they like, but a privately owned publishing company would be prevented from having free access. In this way, copyfarleft remains free in the same sense as copyleft, despite restrictions on proprietary redistribution. Copyfarleft only prohibits subtraction from the commons, not contributions to it. A copyfarleft license would allow commons-based commercial use while denying the ability to profit by exploiting wage labor. The copyleft non-commercial approach does neither, it prevents commons-based commerce, while not effectively restricting wage exploitation which requires a change in the distribution of wealth. Copyleft provides a solid foundation for software in commons-based productions. Copyfarleft could potentially provide a workable foundation for cultural works to also become part of the common stock employed by independent producers. Only the promotion of a workers’ economy, not simply the prevention of commercial use, can change the distribution of wealth. However, for copyfarleft to have an impact, it would need to be employed within the context of a nascent workers’ economy that includes various forms of production, such as cultural and material (art as well as food, etc.). In the absence of such an environment, copyleft and its various mutations have little advantage for the majority of artists, for whom the prospects of gaining financially by way of commercial licensing are negligible. For these artists, anticopyright retains its strong appeal. Anticopyright is a gesture of being radical that refuses pragmatic compromises and seeks to abolish intellectual property in its entirety. Anticopyright affirms a freedom that is absolute and recognizes no limits to its desire. While some mutations of copyleft have multiplied restrictions, others have rejected any restriction at all, including the single restriction imposed by the initial copyleft. It is the movement around peer-to-peer file sharing that comes closest to the gesture of anticopyright. The best example is the Copyriot blog by Rasmus Fleischer of Piratbyrån (Bureau of Piracy), an anti-intellectual property think tank, and the one-time founders of Pirate Bay, the best-known Bittorent site in the P2P community. The motto of Copyriot 43 is ‘No copyright. No license’. But there is a difference from the older anticopyright tradition. Fleischer claims that copyright has become absurd in the age of digital technology because it has to resort to all sorts of fictions, like distinctions between uploading and downloading or between producer and consumer, which don’t actually exist in horizontal peer-to-peer communication. Piratbyrån rejects copyright in its entirety, not because it was flawed in its inception, but because it was invented to regulate an expensive, one-way machine like the printing press, and no longer corresponds to the practices that have been made possible by current technologies of reproduction. However, despite the absurdity of the fictions on which copyright rests, the broader political context suggests that copyleft-inspired models also have an important role to play. The outright rejection of the legal environment is not always possible when practical considerations are considered. Building alternative ways of producing and sharing, ‘building the new society within the shell of the old’, requires us to operate within the capitalist legal system where the logic of capture and exploitation is embedded. While space for defiant gestures exist, we must also get on with the business of finding the forms and structures required to build and expand the commons. It seems clear that restrictions such as those of copyleft and copyfarleft serve to protect the commons and keep it free. So long as copyright continues to exist, copyleftinspired licenses continue to beneeded in orderto allow forintellectual freedom within the copyrightregime. Only when workers have achieved their historical role of creating a society without classes, can we create a truly free culture without restrictions.

#### We advocate for venture communism , a platform where material wealth can be shared and allocated to build free networks and free societies.

Kleiner 10

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Venture communism provides a structure for independent producers to share a common stock of productive assets, allowing forms of production formerly associated exclusively with the creation of immaterial value, such as free software, to be extended to the material sphere. Part of the apparatus that allowed the free software community to grow and spread was the creation of copyleft, a type of license that allows for the re-use of the software it covers, so long as the derived works are also licensed under compatible terms. By releasing software under such licenses, the work becomes a collective stock for all free software developers. The core innovation of copyleft was to turn the copyright system against itself. The chief vehicle of asserting control under copyright is the license a work is released under, which establishes the terms under which others are permitted to use the copyrighted material. Copyleft effectively hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege over intellectual assets, using the authority granted by the copyright license to guarantee access for all, and require that this freedom is passed on. This is consistent with copyright laws, and dependent on them, because without copyright and the institutions that protect it, there could be no copyleft. Venture communism requires that this same freedom be extended to material productive assets. The chief vehicle for asserting control over productive assets is the firm. Venture communism is therefore based on a corporate form: the venture commune. Employing a venture commune to share material property hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege, to instead protect a common stock of productive assets that is available for use by independent producers. Legally, a venture commune is a firm, much like the venture capital funds of the capitalist class. However, the venture commune has distinct properties that transform it into an effective vehicle for revolutionary workers’ struggle. The venture commune holds ownership of all productive assets that make up the common stock employed by a diverse and geographically distributed network of collective and independent peer producers. The venture commune does not coordinate production; a community of peer producers produce according to their own needs and desires. The role of the commune is only to manage the common stock, making property, such as the housing and tools they require, available to the peer producers. 24 The venture commune is the federation of workers’ collectives and individual workers, and is itself owned by each of them, with each member having only one share. In the case that workers are working in a collective or co-operative, ownership is held individually, by the separate people that make up the collective or co-operative. Ownership in a venture commune can only be acquired by contributions of labor, not property. Only by working is a share in the commune earned, not by contributing land, capital or even money; only labor. Property is always held in common by all the members of the commune, with the venture commune equally owned by all its members. Thus, each member may never accumulate a disproportionate share of the proceeds of property. Property can never be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. The function of the venture commune is to acquire material assets that members need for living and working, such as equipment and tools, and allocate them to its members. The commune acquires this property when requested to do so by a member of the commune. The members interested in having this property offer a rental agreement to the commune, giving the terms they wish to have for possession of this property. The commune issues a series of bonds to raise the funds required to acquire the property, which then becomes collateral forthe bondholders. The rental agreement is offered as a guarantee that the funds will be available to redeem the bonds. Should this guarantee not be met, the property can be liquidated with the proceeds going to the bondholders. This series of bonds are sold in a public auction setting. If the bond sale clears, the commune acquires the property, and the rental agreement is executed transferring possession to the renter. The property returns to the commune whenever those renting it no longer require it, or are unable to meet the agreed terms, at which point the commune offers it once again at auction to its members, who bid on new rental terms. If there is no more demand for the asset it is liquidated. After the bonds that were issued to acquire an asset are fully redeemed, it becomes fully owned by the commune. The remaining rental income the property earns is from then on divided up equally among all members of the commune and paid out to them. Proceeds from liquidated property are likewise divided. Because all the rent collected from property rental is divided up evenly among the members of the commune, those members who pay rent for property that is equal to the amount they would receive in return essentially get to use an equal share of the collectively owned property for free. What they pay in rent for the property is equal to the rent they receive back as a member of the commune. Members renting more than their per-capita share of the collective property will pay more, and presumably be choosing to pay because they are employing the property as a productive asset, and thus earning enough to pay. Conversely, members using less than their per-capita share receive more in payment than they pay in rent, thus being rewarded for not hoarding property. The main activities of the venture commune, managing bonds and rental agreements, do not impose a high level of coordination and, just like the computer networks that manage the allocation of immaterial goods, are activities that are well suited for computerized automation. Many venture communes could exist, and as they become interrelated, merge together forming larger, and more stable and sustainable communities of commons-based producers. Any change that can produce a more equitable society is dependent on a prior change in the mode of production that increases the share of wealth retained by the worker. The change in the mode of production must come first. This change cannot be achieved politically, not by vote, or by lobby, or by advocacy, or by revolutionary violence, not as long as the owners of property have more wealth to apply to prevent any change by funding their own candidates, 25 their own lobbyists, their own advocates, and ultimately, developing a greater capacity for counter-revolutionary violence. Society cannot be changed by a strike, not as long as owners of property have more accumulated wealth to sustain themselves during production interruptions. Not even collective bargaining can work, for so long as the owners of property own the product, they set the price of the product and thus any gains in wages are lost to rising prices. Venture communism should not be understood as a proposal for a new kind of society. It is an organizational form with which to engage in social struggle. Venture communes are not intended to replace labor unions, political parties, NGOs and other potential vehicles of class conflict, but to compliment them, to tilt the economic balance of power in favor of the representatives of workers’ class interest. Without venture communism, these other organized forms are always forced to work against opposition with much deeper pockets, and are thus doomed to endless co-option, failure and retreat. The only way is to stop applying our labor to property owned by non-producers and instead form a common stock of productive assets. Venture communism is taking control of our own productive process, retaining the entire product of our labor, forming our own capital, and expanding until we have collectively accumulated enough wealth to achieve a greater social influence than those that defend exploitation. This new economic balance allows for change that is far greater than the modest goals of venture communism. A truly free society would have no need for copyleft, or venture communism; these are only practices around which workers can unite towards the realization of their historic role of building a classless society, a society of equals.

### Foster

#### The Cybernetic thought is instrumental in the construction of the new surveillance capitalism that reduces humans to digits and categories. Along with the cooperation with the military industrial complex.

Foster and McChesney 14

[(FOSTER, JOHN BELLAMY](javascript:__doLinkPostBack('','ss~~AU%20%22FOSTER%2C%20JOHN%20BELLAMY%22%7C%7Csl~~rl','');)  is an American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review. ; [MCCHESNEY, ROBERT W.](javascript:__doLinkPostBack('','ss~~AU%20%22MCCHESNEY%2C%20ROBERT%20W.%22%7C%7Csl~~rl','');)  is an American professor notable in the history and political economy of communications, and the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies. He is the Gutgsell Endowed Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. , 07-01-2014, "Surveillance Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age," https://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/surveillance-capitalism/, DOA July 21 22)

Financialization was spectacularly enhanced by high-speed computer networks, which became critical mechanisms for the newly created speculative markets, and no small amount of financial chicanery.47 But financialization’s encouragement of surveillance capitalism went far deeper. Like advertising and national security, it had an insatiable need for data. Its profitable expansion relied heavily on the securitization of household mortgages; a vast extension of credit-card usage; and the growth of health insurance and pension funds, student loans, and other elements of personal finance. Every aspect of household income, spending, and credit was incorporated into massive data banks and evaluated in terms of markets and risk. Between 1982 and 1990 the average debt load of individuals in the United States increased by 30 percent and with 18 MONTHLY RE V I E W / July- A ugust 2014 it the commercial penetration into personal lives. As Christian Parenti wrote in his 1991 book, The Soft Cage, “the records produced by credit cards, bankcards, discount cards, Internet accounts, online shopping, travel receipts and health insurance all map our lives by creating digital files in corporate databases.”48 By 2000, as Michael Dawson reported in The Consumer Trap, nearly all major corporations in the United States were building huge databases, and were linked to data mining enterprises. “Symmetrical Research was advertising services such as its Advanced Analytic Solutions, which promised corporate clients ‘the power of one of the world’s most advanced marketing data analytics teams, with proprietary tools enabling the statistical analysis of…[data of the size of] the 35 terabyte Mastercard data set.’ A terabyte…is one trillion units of computerized information.”49 The largest data broker in the United States today, the marketing giant Acxiom has 23,000 computer servers processing in excess of 50 trillion data transactions annually. It keeps on average some 1,500 data points on more than 200 million Americans, in the form of “digital dossiers” on each individual, attaching to each person a thirteen-digit code that allows them to be followed wherever they go, combining online and offline data on individuals. Much of the data is now gleaned from social media, such as Facebook. Acxiom organizes this information into “premium proprietary behavioral insights.” Each person is also placed in one of seventy lifestyle clusters, focusing particularly on class, spending habits, and geographical location. Acxiom sells this data (giving varying access to its data banks) to its customers, which include twelve of the top fifteen credit-card issuing companies; seven of the top ten retail banks; five of the top ten insurance companies; six of the top ten brokerage firms; eight of the top ten media/telecommunication companies; seven of the top ten retailers; eleven of the top fourteen global automakers; and three of the top ten pharmaceutical firms. Its clients include about half of the largest one-hundred corporations in the United States. Since September 2001 Acxiom has worked closely at sharing data with the FBI, the Pentagon, and Homeland Security. In 2001, Acxiom appointed General Wesley Clark, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in the Kosovo War and a future U.S. presidential candidate, to its board of directors. The company paid Clark over $800,000 as a lobbyist, primarily in relation to the Department of Defense and Homeland Security. Through Clark, Acxiom began working with Poindexter’s DARPA-based TIA, helping set up the technological systems for total surveillance of the U.S. and global population.50 Ov e r vi e w 19 CBS’s 60 Minutes reported in March 2014 that clicking on the New York Times website can mean that more than a dozen third parties are “on the page that are essentially tracking your movements.” Most of the 50 million people who downloaded the “Brightest Flashlight Free” app on to their smartphone did not recognize that “the companies that gave them to you for free were using the apps to track your every movement and pass it along to other companies.” The iPhone app “Path Social,” which was ostensibly designed to help people share photos and memories with their friends, tapped into user’s digital address books and contact lists, taking all of that information. The data broker firm Epsilon has a marketing database containing more than 8 billion consumer transactions. The data broker firm Choicepoint, now part of the data giant Elsevier, maintains 17 billion records on businesses and individuals, which it has sold to around 100,000 clients, including numerous government agencies.51 Financial institutions themselves sell such data. Forbes magazine wrote in 2013 that “in most aspects of our lives, companies and marketers can freely collect details about us and sell to whomever they like without restriction.” However, financial institutions, it pointed out, were legally prohibited in most cases from directly selling such information. Nevertheless, Forbes explained that many financial institutions do market their data in various ways, and some 27 percent violate all aspects of the legal regulations.52 Financialization—or the long-term growth of speculation on financial assets relative to GDP—meant the intrusion of finance into all aspects of life, requiring new extensions of surveillance and information control as forms of financial risk management. As the economy became more financialized, it became increasingly vulnerable to financial meltdowns, increasing risk perceptions on the part of investors and the perceived need for risk management, encryption of data, and security.

Aaron Swartz story seems like the government punishing a kid who was trying to download books. But instead, it was but the US government making a case, against all those who dare to challenge the data supremacy, and the finical surveillance. It is a warning to those all. And thus. We must destroy it.

#### Cyberthreats of today, are but fears stemming from the vulnerability of the surveillance capitalism

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Today the fears of cyberwar aimed at financial institutions, the entire financial system, and the military system, is at the top of national security concerns. McConnell, who had left his job at Booz Allen to become director of national intelligence in 2007 under George W. Bush, informed the president that, “If the 9/11 perpetrators had focused on a single U.S. bank through cyberattack, and it had been successful, it would have had an order of magnitude greater impact on the U.S. economy than the physical attack.” Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs, agreed. Bush was so alarmed that within a short time the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (2008) was in place, which greatly expanded the NSA’s authority to carry out surveillance 20 MONTHLY RE V I E W / July- A ugust 2014 on the Internet domestically, leading to the construction of its $1.5 billion data center in Utah.53 Leon Panetta, U.S. defense secretary under Obama, warned that a cyberattack on the U.S. financial system might be the “next Pearl Harbor.” In July 2011 Barack Obama signed an executive order declaring that the infiltration of financial markets by transnational criminal organizations constituted a national emergency. Symantec, a cybersecurity firm, estimated in 2010 that three-quarters of “phishing” attacks designed to get people to give up financial data were not aimed at individuals but were directed at the financial sector.54 In addition to hackers breaking into databases, large scale attacks on entire security systems are feared. The sudden drop in the stock market on May 6, 2010, attributed to high speed algorithmic trading, was thought to prefigure a new possible form of cyberwar aimed at dragging reeling markets down further using short-selling, options, and swaps—a kind of “force multiplier” in military-speak. Hackers using malicious codes to crash or jam whole networks can mobilize Botnets or robotic networks of hundreds of thousands of machines. According to Mortimer Zuckerman, chairman and editor-in-chief of U.S. News and World Report, writing in the Wall Street Journal, digitalized systems are extraordinarily vulnerable to attack: “the average [offensive] malware has about 175 lines of code, which can attack defense software using between 5 million and 10 million lines of code.” The U.S./Israeli-developed “Stutnex” worm aimed at Iran, which reportedly infiltrated the computers controlling Iranian nuclear centrifuge facilities, is seen as an indication of the scale and precision with which cyberattacks can now demobilize whole systems.55

#### Emerging tech and NATO operations are closely intertwined with the digital and surveillance capitalism to facilitate more control

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To the contrary, the U.S. government is little short of a private army for the Internet giants as they pursue their global ambitions.60 The major means of wealth generation on the Internet and through proprietary platforms such as apps is the surveillance of the population, 22 MONTHLY RE V I E W / July- A ugust 2014 allowing for a handful of firms to reap the lion’s share of the gains from the enormous sales effort in the U.S. economy. The digitalization of surveillance has radically changed the nature of advertising. The old system of advertisers purchasing ad space or time in media with the hope of getting the media user to notice the advertisement while she sought out news or entertainment is becoming passé. Advertisers no longer need to subsidize journalism or media content production to reach their target audiences. Instead, they can pinpoint their desired audience to a person and locate them wherever they are online (and often where they are in physical space) due to ubiquitous surveillance. The premise of the system is that there is no effective privacy. The consequences are that the commercial system of media content production, especially journalism, is in collapse, with nothing in the wings to replace it. These monopolistic corporate entities readily cooperate with the repressive arm of the state in the form of its military, intelligence, and police functions. The result is to enhance enormously the secret national security state, relative to the government as a whole. Edward Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s Prism program, together with other leaks, have shown a pattern of a tight interweaving of the military with giant computer-Internet corporations, creating what has been called a “military-digital complex.”61 Indeed, Beatrice Edwards, the executive director of the Government Accountability Project, argues that what has emerged is a “government-corporate surveillance complex.”62 This extends beyond the vast private contractor network to “secret collaboration” with the main Internet and telecom companies.63 Notable examples of partly cooperative, partly legally coerced sharing of data include: • A 2009 report by the NSA’s inspector general leaked by Snowden stated that the NSA has built collaborative relationships with over “100 companies.”64 • Microsoft provided the NSA with pre-encryption “back door” access to its popular Outlook.com email portal, to its Skype Internet phone calls and chat (with its 663 million global users), and to SkyDrive, Microsoft’s cloud storage system (which has 250 million users). The Snowden files show that Microsoft actively collaborated with the NSA. Glenn Greenwald writes: “Microsoft spent ‘many months’ working to provide the government easy access to that [the SkyDrive] data.” The same was the case for Skype, while in the case of Outlook. com it took only a few months for the Microsoft and the NSA working together to ensure the NSA’s complete access.65 Ov e r vi e w 23 • The NSA paid $10 million to the computer security company RSA to promote a back door to encryption products. The NSA devised a flawed formula for generating random numbers for encryption with RSA inserting it into its software tool Bsafe, which had been designed to enhance security in personal computers and other digital products.66 • AT&T voluntarily sold metadata on phone calls to the CIA for over $10 million a year in connection with the latter’s counterterrorism investigations.67 • Verizon (and likely AT&T and Sprint as well) provided the NSA with metadata on all calls in its (their) systems, both within the United States and between the United States and other countries. Such metadata has been supplied to the NSA under both the Bush and Obama administrations.68 • Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, and Facebook turned over the data from tens of thousands of their accounts on individuals every six months to the NSA and other intelligence agencies, with a rapid rise in the number of accounts turned over to the secret government.69 In 2012 DARPA Director Regina Dugan left her position to join Google. During her period as director, DARPA had been at the forefront of drone research, presenting the first prototype demonstrations in the early 1990s. However, the outgrowth of this in the deployment of General Atomic Aeronautical System’s Predator drones in warfare did not occur until the late 1990s in the Kosovo War, with Clark as the Supreme Allied Commander. The first use of such drones for global, extra-territorial assassination, outside a field of war—now a staple of Obama’s “anti-terrorism” strategy—took place in 2002.70 In the opening years of this century DARPA extended its research to developing drones that could be used for mobile wi-fi capabilities. Dugan’s switch to Google in the private sector—at a time when she was under governmental investigation for giving hefty DARPA contracts to RedX, a bomb-detection corporation that she had co-founded and partly owned—was connected to Google’s interest in developing high-altitude drones with wi-fi delivering capabilities. In 2014 Google announced that it was buying Titan Aerospace, a U.S.-based start-up company for building drones which cruise at the very edge of the atmosphere. Facebook meanwhile bought the UK corporation, Ascenta, which specializes in making high-altitude solar drones. Such drones would allow the spread of the Internet to new areas. The goal was to capitalize on a new military technology and create larger global Internet monopolies, while expanding the military-digital complex.71 24 MONTHLY RE V I E W / July- A ugust 2014 By 2005–2007 broad estimates suggested that U.S. marketing expenditures (defined fairly narrowly) were running at about $1 trillion a year; real (both acknowledged and unacknowledged) military expenditures at about $1 trillion annually; and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) expenditures at approximately $2.5 trillion.72 In the digital age, these three sectors of the political economy, each of which arose parasitically on the production base of the economy, were increasingly connected in a web of technology and data sharing. As the most advanced technologies (usually military developed) went private, many of those involved in the warfare economy, such as DARPA’s Dugan, were in a position to exploit the knowledge and connections that they had accumulated by shifting to the private sector, crossing fairly easily from one system of security and surveillance to another. A kind of linguistic convergence mirrored the centralized structure of monopoly-finance capital in the age of digital surveillance with “securitization” increasingly standing simultaneously for a world dominated by: (1) financial derivatives trading, (2) a network of public and private surveillance, (3) the militarization of security-control systems, and (4) the removal of judicial processes from effective civilian control.

### Stories

#### Human Zoo

“The world might, in fact, be transformed into a human zoo, a zoo so intelligently managed that its inhabitants are not aware that they are there merely for the purposes of observation and experiment”

- J.D. Bernard

#### Biotariat

“We, the Biotariat, hold no human truths to be self-evident, acknowledging rather that all humans are mutually dependent on unacknowledged life forms, that they are endowed by their genealogy with certain heavy responsibilities, that among these are the Biosphere, the Solar Commune and the mutual furtherance of Peaceful Symbiosis. That to secure these responsibilities, alliances are assembled among humans, deriving their lasting vitality not just from human wills but from the continuation of all species. That whenever any form of Corporation becomes destructive of these ends, it is the duty of the people to alter or to liquidate it, and to institute new formations and alliances, laying its prospects on such principles and organizing its powers in such forms as to the best of their Scientific Understanding shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Sustainability, indeed, requires that Corporations long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that humans are more disposed to suffer, while Global Warming appears inevitable, than to take up arms against the forces to which they are accustomed. But when a long slick of Industrial Pollution and Technological Innovation, pursuing invariably the same Profit Motif, evinces a design to bring them unto species extinction, it is their responsibility, it is their duty, to throw off such Corporations, and to provide new regulative frameworks for future Symbiosis.”

- Drew Milne

#### Cambridge Analytica

Christopher Wylie, a former employee of Cambridge Analytica, revealed that the company used unauthorized personal information to build a program that could profile voters to target them through political advertising. Wylie testified before congress on May 16th, describing how CA would harvest profiles from Facebook to identify the most persuadable voters and send them targeted messages to move them to action. Getting access to this data was far too easy. 300,000 users were breached, resulting in 50 million accounts having their information scraped. Wylie concluded, to “change politics, you need to change culture”.

#### Stanley Parable

This is the story of a man named Stanley. Stanley worked for a company in a big building where he was Employee #427. Employee #427's job was simple: he sat at his desk in Room 427 and he pushed buttons on a keyboard. Orders came to him through a monitor on his desk telling him what buttons to push, how long to push them, and in what order. This is what Employee #427 did every day of every month of every year, and although others may have considered it soul rending, Stanley relished every moment that the orders came in, as though he had been made exactly for this job. And Stanley was happy.

[Continued Later]

Stanley waited. Hours passed. Then days. Had years gone by? He no longer had the ability to tell. But the one thing he knew, for sure, beyond any doubt, was that if he waited long enough, the answers would come. Eventually, some day, they would arrive. Soon, Very soon now, this will end. He will be spoken to. He will be told what to do. Now it's just a little bit closer. Now it's even closer. Here it comes…

[Read a Card]

[Continued Later]

But there is something we can do. Something we can do together, you and I, that will right this terrible wrong. Let Stanley die.

[Continues]

- The Stanley Parable

#### Edward Snowden

Edward Joseph Snowden is an American former computer intelligence consultant who leaked highly classified information from the National Security Agency when he was an employee and subcontractor. His disclosures revealed numerous illegal global surveillance programs, many run by the NSA and the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance with the cooperation of telecommunication companies and European governments.

Snowden gradually became disillusioned with the programs with which he was involved, and tried to raise his ethical concerns through internal channels but was ignored. On May 20, 2013, Snowden flew to Hong Kong after leaving his job at an NSA facility in Hawaii, and in early June he revealed thousands of classified NSA documents to journalists.

On June 21, 2013, the United States Department of Justice unsealed charges against Snowden of two counts of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and theft of government property, following which the Department of State revoked his passport. Russia later granted Snowden the right of asylum.

Snowden has been variously called a traitor, a hero, a whistleblower, a dissident, a coward, and a patriot. U.S. officials condemned his actions as having done "grave damage" to the U.S. intelligence capabilities. Snowden has defended his leaks as an effort "to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them." His disclosures have fueled debates over mass surveillance, government secrecy, and the balance between national security and information privacy.

On September 2, 2020, a U.S. federal court ruled in United States v. Moalin that the U.S. intelligence's mass surveillance program exposed by Snowden was illegal and possibly unconstitutional. The name of the program – PRISM.

#### Snowden Tweet

竹帛烟销帝业虚，

关河空锁祖龙居。

坑灰未冷山东乱，

刘项原来不读书。

^ for explanation, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/epnxqw/snowden-chinese-poem-tweet>

#### Aaron Schwartz is the martyr that represents the relentless efforts by the US to exert informational supremacy

Segal 13

David Segal is executive director of Demand Progress, a civil liberties and government reform activist group with more than 1.5 million members. He was previously a city councilman, state representative, and congressional candidate in Rhode Island, 8-28-2013, "What killed Aaron Swartz?," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/what-killed-aaron-swartz-095979

It seems as though the rest of the world came to know Aaron Swartz — whether before or after his tragic passing last winter — for his computer chops and concern about Internet freedom and transparency. He probably first cared about those causes for their own sakes, but his work on them provided a window into politics that made it impossible to ignore broader systemic concerns. So it was foremost as a political activist that I got to know this slight, sweet young man — somebody whose driving concerns, when I first met him in 2010, were to mitigate crony capitalism and promote economic justice. Aaron’s impetus was to stand up for and empower the little guy, which, in retrospect, is a useful way of framing the purpose of his major programming efforts: helping develop the RSS feed to make more voices easily heard and working to create a platform like reddit to democratize media content curation. With his vision and his talents, Aaron could easily have been a Silicon Valley tycoon, living in a palace in Mountainview or a swank condo in San Francisco’s Mission District. But rather than enriching himself, he chose to employ his intellectual prowess and the modest fortune he achieved upon the sale of reddit to make the world a better place, for everybody. I’ve been fumbling for the precise words since his death, but he once told me something like, “Segal, I might seem a little cynical or misanthropic sometimes, but don’t worry: Whenever I encounter a problem, I always try to identify the utility-optimizing solution to it.” He’d taken to calling himself an “applied sociologist.” And — always wearing a white hat — he was trying to hack the whole world for the better. Online grass-roots rabble-rousing is the foundation for two organizations Aaron helped start — first, the Progressive Change Campaign Committee and, later, Demand Progress. So when prosecutors leveled trumped-up charges against him two years ago for allegedly using the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s computer network to download too many academic articles from the cataloguing service JSTOR — and as they wielded the threat of decades in prison as a cudgel to try to beat a plea out of him — there was nothing surprising about how Aaron responded. With my help, he started an Internet petition in support of the little guy — this time, himself. And according to the [report](https://www.textise.net/showText.aspx?strURL=http%3A%2F%2Fswartz-report.mit.edu%2Fdocs%2Freport-to-the-president.pdf) MIT recently released about its role in the prosecution, that petition, as it met the authoritarianism and petty vindictiveness of U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz and her deputies, might have effectively cost Aaron his life. The report reads: “The prosecutor said that the straw that broke the camel’s back was that when he indicted the case, and allowed Swartz to come to the courthouse as opposed to being arrested, Swartz used the time to post a ‘wild Internet campaign’ in an effort to drum up support. This was a ‘foolish’ move that moved the case ‘from a human one-on-one level to an institutional level.’ The lead prosecutor said that on the institutional level cases are harder to manage both internally and externally.” House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa has already written a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder demanding another briefing on the case in light of this stunning finding from MIT’s report. As he wrote, “The suggestions that prosecutors did in fact seek to make an example out of Aaron Swartz because Demand Progress exercised its First Amendment rights in publicly supporting him raises new questions about the Department’s handling of the case.” And that is but one of many elements of the case that should raise eyebrows. Aaron’s defense team has already accused prosecutors of withholding key evidence during the course of the pretrial proceedings. We suspect there’s more to come, as a protective order covering the bulk of the evidence is set to be lifted in coming weeks, and the Secret Service has begun to release a trickle of [documents](https://www.textise.net/showText.aspx?strURL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wired.com%2Fthreatlevel%2F2013%2F08%2Fswartz-foia-release%2F) that illuminate that agency’s involvement in the investigation (which the Secret Service took over shortly after Aaron’s arrest). Our interest in what they might reveal is only heightened by various attempts by MIT and the DOJ to slow the release of and compel redactions to those documents. In addition to the House oversight committee, other offices are also closely tracking the case, with Sens. John Cornyn and Al Franken having secured a briefing on the case in the spring. Ever with a heavy heart, we look forward to working with them to achieve a fuller accounting of the prosecution after Congress returns from break. Aaron’s legacy deserves no less.

#### Kafka – The Trial

“They're talking about things of which they don't have the slightest understanding, anyway. It's only because of their stupidity that they're able to be so sure of themselves.”

“But I’m not guilty,” said K. “there’s been a mistake. How is it even possible for someone to be guilty? We’re all human beings here, one like the other.” “That is true” said the priest “but that is how the guilty speak”

[H]e realized at once that he shouldn't have spoken aloud, and that by doing so he had, in a sense, acknowledged the stranger's right to oversee his actions (1.1)

[T]here can be no doubt that behind all the pronouncements of this court, and in my case, behind the arrest and today's inquiry, there exists an extensive organization […] And the purpose of this extensive organization, gentlemen? It consists of arresting innocent people and introducing senseless proceedings against them, which for the most part, as in my case, go nowhere. Given the senselessness of the whole affair, how could the bureaucracy avoid becoming entirely corrupt? (3.27)

After all, our department, as far as I know, and I know only the lowest level, doesn't seek out guilt among the general population, but, as the Law states, is attracted by guilt and has to send us guards out. That's the Law. What mistake could there be? (1.1)

[Y]ou've misunderstood me; you're under arrest, certainly, but that's not meant to keep you from carrying on your profession. Nor are you to be hindered in the course of your ordinary life. (1.8)

[I]t's in the nature of this judicial system that one is condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance. (4.1)

“[Y]ou can't defend yourself against this court, all you can do is confess. Confess the first chance you get. That's the only chance you have to escape, the only one. However, even that is impossible without help from others, but you needn't worry about that, I'll help you myself." (6.3)2

Progress had always been made, but the nature of this progress could never be specified. (7.2)

And you should talk less in general; almost everything you've said up to now could have been inferred from your behavior, even if you'd said only a few words, and it wasn't terribly favorable to you in any case. (1.7)

One such superstition, for example, is that many people believe they can predict the outcome of the trial from the face of the defendant, and in particular from the lines of his lips. Now these people claimed that according to your lips, you were certain to be convicted soon. (8.4)

Just don't attract attention! Keep calm, no matter how much it seems counter to good sense. (7.2)

[I]f I'd behaved sensibly, nothing more would have happened, everything else would have been nipped in the bud. (2.5)

[I]t was not impossible that he might receive some form of decisive and acceptable advice from [the prison chaplain], something that might show him, for example, not how to influence the trial, but how to break out of it, how to get around it, how to live outside the trial. (9.13)

"You mustn't pay too much attention to opinions. The text is immutable, and the opinions are often only an expression of despair over it." (9.16)

"No," said the priest, "you don't have to consider everything true, you just have to consider it necessary." "A depressing opinion," said K. "Lies are made into a universal system." (9.16)

Logic is no doubt unshakable, but it can't withstand a person who wants to live. (10.9)

Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.” At the moment the gate to the law stands open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: “If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I can’t endure even one glimpse of the third.” The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar’s beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he wears the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they are indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself with many things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that you do not think you have failed to do anything.” During the many years the man observes the gatekeeper almost continuously. He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this one seems to him the only obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the unlucky circumstance, in the first years thoughtlessly and out loud, later, as he grows old, he still mumbles to himself. He becomes childish and, since in the long years studying the gatekeeper he has come to know the fleas in his fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him persuade the gatekeeper. Finally his eyesight grows weak, and he does not know whether things are really darker around him or whether his eyes are merely deceiving him. But he recognizes now in the darkness an illumination which breaks inextinguishably out of the gateway to the law. Now he no longer has much time to live. Before his death he gathers in his head all his experiences of the entire time up into one question which he has not yet put to the gatekeeper. He waves to him, since he can no longer lift up his stiffening body. The gatekeeper has to bend way down to him, for the great difference has changed things to the disadvantage of the man. “What do you still want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.” “Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is that in these many years no one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying and, in order to reach his diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one else can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to close it.

[Continued Later]

The man has come to the law for the first time and the doorkeeper is already there. He's been given his position by the law, to doubt his worth would be to doubt the law." "I can't say I'm in complete agreement with this view," said K. shaking his head, "as if you accept it you'll have to accept that everything said by the doorkeeper is true. But you've already explained very fully that that's not possible." "No," said the priest, "you don't need to accept everything as true, you only have to accept it as necessary." "Depressing view," said K. "The lie made into the rule of the world."

Who was that? A friend? A good person? Somebody who was taking part? Somebody who wanted to help? Was he alone? Was it everyone? Would anyone help? Were there objections that had been forgotten? There must have been some. The logic cannot be refuted, but someone who wants to live will not resist it. Where was the judge he'd never seen? Where was the high court he had never reached? He raised both hands and spread out all his fingers.

But how can I be under arrest? And how come it's like this?" "Now you're starting again," said the policeman, dipping a piece of buttered bread in the honeypot. "We don't answer questions like that." "You will have to answer them," said K. "Here are my identification papers, now show me yours and I certainly want to see the arrest warrant." "Oh, my God!" said the policeman. "In a position like yours, and you think you can start giving orders, do you. It won't do you any good to get us on the wrong side, even if you think it will—we're probably more on your side that anyone else you know!" "That's true, you know, you'd better believe it," said Franz, holding a cup of coffee in his hand which he did not lift to his mouth but looked at K. in a way that was probably meant to be full of meaning but could not actually be understood. K. found himself, without intending it, in a mute dialogue with Franz, but then slapped his hand down on his papers and said, "Here are my identity documents." "And what do you want us to do about it?" replied the big policeman, loudly. "The way you're carrying on, it's worse than a child. What is it you want? Do you want to get this great, bloody trial of yours over with quickly by talking about ID and arrest warrants with us? We're just coppers, that's all we are. Junior officers like us hardly know one end of an ID card from another, all we've got to do with you is keep an eye on you for ten hours a day and get paid for it. That's all we are. Mind you, what we can do is make sure that the high officials we work for find out just what sort of person it is they're going to arrest, and why he should be arrested, before they issue the warrant. There's no mistake there. Our authorities as far as I know, and I only know the lowest grades, don't go out looking for guilt among the public; it's the guilt that draws them out, like it says in the law, and they have to send us police officers out. That's the law. Where d'you think there'd be any mistake there?" "I don't know this law," said K. "So much the worse for you, then," said the policeman. "It's probably exists only in your heads," said K., he wanted, in some way, to insinuate his way into the thoughts of the policemen, to re-shape those thoughts to his benefit or to make himself at home there. But the policeman just said dismissively, "You'll find out when it affects you." Franz joined in, and said, "Look at this, Willem, he admits he doesn't know the law and at the same time insists he's innocent." "You're quite right, but we can't get him to understand a thing," said the other.

**TW – violence / suicide (not gory)**

“It would have been so pointless to kill himself that, even if he had wanted to, the pointlessness would have made him unable.”

K. knew clearly now that it was his duty to seize the knife as it floated from hand to hand above him and plunge it into itself. But he didn't do so […] He could not rise entirely to the occasion, he could not relieve the authorities of all their work; the responsibility for this final failure lay with whoever had denied him the remnant of strength necessary to do so. (10.9)

But the hands of one of the gentleman were laid on K.'s throat, while the other pushed the knife deep into his heart and twisted it there, twice. As his eyesight failed, K. saw the two gentlemen cheek by cheek, close in front of his face, watching the result. "Like a dog!" he said, it was as if the shame of it should outlive him.

## AT: FW

### Fiat K

#### The discourse of crisis justifies the extension of governance – the future is invented to structure the present, but the present cannot define the future. There is No Future – envisioning one as truth is an act of hegemonic domination that controls us for profit.

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The idea of “policing the future” has today become such a central feature of the cultural unconscious of western governance that we are scarcely even aware of it. Where did this idea come from? What is its genealogy? In the following article, Ceci Nelson re-reads the history of cybernetics through the entanglement of time and governance. As social turbulence and ecological collapse intensified across the 20th century, the **projection of the future** played an increasingly central role in the **reproduction of the existing order**, by allowing **technocratic overseers** to **predict and navigate** the dynamics of **social fragmentation** over which they themselves preside. In this context, Nelson argues, the management of time became a central feature of how **power attempts to legitimize, sustain, and extend** contemporary forms of **governance, hegemony, and domination**.

Crisis as Permanent Condition

Crisis **constitutes the** prevailing discourse of modernity. We are repeatedly warned of the **economy’s destabilization** and the **collapse of** the **financial markets**; **democracy and liberalism are in crisis**, we’re told; the **E**uropean **U**nion is **fucked** by Brexit, they say; we fear the **destruction of the environment;** sport events are regularly drowned-out by warnings of **terrorism**; politicians again and again exclaim the “**refugee crisis**”; all the while, new **emergency laws** transform this state of crisis into a perpetual and normalized state of being. We get used to the increased, **reactive national security**. The West is **submerged in crisis**, as if it were living through an unending apocalypse. The **prophecy of crisis** implies, however, that we expect or hope for a different social condition to come afterwards, whether it be punishing destruction or redemptive happiness.

Crises are always inherently bound to **visions of the future**, and tend to change our **perception of time**: they make us **believe that the future can be controlled** and directed from its current position into a different direction. We hope that decisions made in the present will **guarantee a better future**. Yet in contrast to what seems evident, the future does not emerge from the present**—the present is deduced from the future**. That is to say that the **present** is **retrospectively construed** **from** projections about **the future**; the **future is invented to structure the present** accordingly. Still, a vision of the future is **not** the **real** future, but merely one possible or desired future. In this sense, the future is an **abstraction of the world** as it presently exists—it is an **ideal to be realized**. Even though time goes by, we **never arrive** at the future; we merely step from one present to the next. What does this imply for the relationship between crisis and temporality? This insight leads us to our central hypothesis: There is no future! Envisioned futures are created solely for **the sake of justifying decisions** made **in the present**, and thereby legitimizing the defense of the existing order. **Political visions arise** in order to **rule the present**, just as economic utopias are pronounced in order to make us tighten our belts. The **coming collapse** of the system is **discussed** publicly **merely** in order **to sustain it**; with reference to the urgency of measures to be taken to curtail a crisis, opposing and counter-hegemonic envisioned futures are blocked and suppressed. The **crisis** is declared **permanent** in order to maintain a stable course of events and **prevent** deeper and **more radical changes**; the repetition of such declarations **justifies** technocratic regulation and increased repression and surveillance—after all, it is easier and more legitimate to reduce people’s freedom to act when they are in a state of constant panic. In short, the repeatedly **proclaimed states of emergency ar**e part of **a strategy to** govern time**.**

It is for this reason that we must abandon the idea of the apocalypse. Our resistance must interrupt the flow of events conjugated by the utopias of those in power. We must **pierce** through **the state of emergency** and **expose the apocalypse** as the **perpetual reproduction of the existing order** that it is. The fact is, these discourses—crisis, the state of emergency, and our unending apocalypse—are part of the same strategy: we are not governed in crisis, **we are** governed by means of crisis. Only when it is declared as such does a crisis properly become a crisis; and only once a problem is understood as omnipresent and pervasive does it truly become a crisis. Not only does the repetitive cry of “emergency” **desensitize** people, it also obscures which of all the various ongoing catastrophes might require changes that **run against the grain of existing global power structures**. The situation in Syria, for example, has become a perpetuum mobile of destruction for the preservation of power, a perpetual recurrence of chaos. We must ask: who profits from crisis? **Why do we live in the never-ending state of emergency? And how does this influence our perception of the future**?

#### Projections of the future represent a western expansionism that suppresses real problems for fake crises – that’s what caused genocide in the Americas. Technology inherently interferes with the current of time through defuturization

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The Genealogy of Time Management as a Dominant Mode of Governance

The cultural unconscious of the West is marked by an absence of any openness to the future. The future is not taken as it comes, but is formed and planned. This planning is of course uneven, and what is lauded as a utopian ideal by some is lived as a dystopian nightmare for others. How has it come to be that humans believe themselves able to influence and determine the future? When one retraces the cultural history of the West, from the early modern era into our present one, two things stand out: first, that the **concept of the future** has been constitutive for the **development and expansion of the Western world**; second, that this concept underwent a historical shift in the modern era, such that **the future now takes precedence over the present.**

The idea that the future as we envision it acts recursively on the order and development of the present came into prominence in the early modern period. In 1516, Thomas More’s Utopia was published at the same time as **conquerors** were being driven to **imagine** possible future **utopias** **through** the **expansion of their territorial dominion**. The **conquerors of “the New World”** were not merely technically superior to the conquered “Indians,” but also in regards to their ability to **imagine something different** than that which was given, well-tried, and passed on. By conquering Central America, Cortes took the liberty to freely dispose over these peoples’ concept of time. He prepared himself for the transformation of a world, in which no calendars predicted this event. The Aztecs did not expect this attack, and ignored all warnings. This conquest was not simply a sign that an existing utopia was being pursued at all costs, but also that a **transformative hegemonic culture** had developed, one no longer content to adapt to the world, but which was seeking instead to change the world according to their ideals. In the 16th century, the possible and **imagined** thus began to **dominate the given** and the real. If the expansion of Occidental culture served to differentiate the Old and the New, this was also because the climate of colonized regions near the equator rhythmically deviated from the four seasons that had structured human activities on the Old Continent in Europe. As the cyclical began to lose its power, the future was no longer seen as an act of providence. Western culture twisted free of the recurrence of events, as humans began to conceptualize themselves as the **masters of their own future**.

A map of a city

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

Thereafter, our understanding of **time was** repeatedly re-conceptualized and “**corrected**.” For example, the concept “before Christ” became generally accepted only in the 18th century. Time began to lose its fixed starting point, and now seemed to extend backwards and forwards into eternity. With time understood as unified and standardized, the future was now transformed into an open and unlimited continuum. The next important break in time was the concept of the modern era itself: by focusing on the contemporary, this term creates a clear line demarcating our “enlightened” present from the “backwardness” of the past. As the linear notion of time came to the fore, the cyclical understanding of time was rendered increasingly obsolete. Technological innovations enabled time to be measured and structured differently, as happened when factory lights suppressed the dichotomy between night and day. Because they usurp the control over time from the forces of nature, technology always interferes in the current of time.

As a consequence of industrialization, mechanization, colonial expansion and the fight for world domination, 19th century Western culture was marked by an atmosphere of constant transformation, which would eventually sediment into a deep conviction that **human progress was** something **akin to a natural law**. The **future** was no longer understood as a cyclical iteration of what had already been, but rather as a **temporal object** of intention and desire, in which the **promises of progress could be realized**. This view was held, among others, by Karl Marx. Classical modernity equated time with chronology, as if a single path connected the past to the present, and would lead us into the future. Enlightenment rationality propagated the illusion of a “better society” that could be reached by following this linear path. The transformation of the fabric of time was an intervention that made the **future synonymous with progress**. **Modernization** became a **normative force**—or as the futurist and advocate of postindustrial society Daniel Bell explains, “one of the hallmarks of modernity is the awareness of change, and the struggle to control its direction and pace.”

In order to control the problems resulting from this constant impulse towards innovation and perpetual competition, a new science was developed: that of social engineering. Social engineering was designed to stabilize social relationships, while warding-off opposition and conflicts between the poor and the rich. The aim was to integrate and “normalize” all agents through behavioral training and punishment. Social engineering was closely related to the Taylorism that emerged out of the effort to theorize the rationalization of the work processes, and which was associated with the principle of “saving time” by fragmenting, measuring-out, and optimizing actions, and which continues to this day. Following the temporal needs of production, technology is used to **speed up** both **work** processes **and time** in order to **produce greater profits** for capitalists. Michael Ende published a book in 1973 on the consequences of this historical development, entitled Momo, or the strange story of the time-thieves and the child who brought the stolen time back to the people. Its story depicts how humans are tricked into believing that time can be gained by increasing output efficiency. Ende describes how a bureaucratic apparatus is created to manage society’s organization of time. Yet because this apparatus always demands more time from the people in order to save even more, the level of stress continuously increases. The people don’t even notice that the time they supposedly saved or originally intended to gain had evaporated into thin air. The moral of the story is simple: the management of time is a method to rule over people.

The birth of nihilism originates out of the death of the past. With World War II, the West lost its historical awareness. A new philosophy was developed out of the ashes which affirmed that “an aftermath is a beginning, not an ending.” Since it is the tendency of war to destroy the economy while revolutionizing technology, their conclusion is often accompanied by an acceleration of time. The chaos of 1945 was seen by many as a moment of opportunity, and provoked a glut of new concepts promising to manage policy by simplification and structuring. The theoretical frameworks of Game Theory, Cybernetics, Rational Choice Theory, Operations Research and Systems Analysis were tested in wartime situations before later being applied to civil society. The promise offered by these concepts was related to the dominant Western utopia in the postwar period: the desire to build a new society, to regulate and control humanity, and to balance global powers by transforming social institutions and the world into a **rational and efficient machine**. What unified these frameworks was the attempt both to rationalize politics and to control, plan and shape the future through decisions in the present.

World War II led to the greatest crisis of governance in the 20th century. It fueled the West’s deep conviction that a desired, envisioned future can be brought about through decisions and actions in the present. A change within the meaning of time was central to the installation of this idea: the relation between present and future was inverted. **For the future to be governed, its openness is reduced to a scenario that can be controlled** in the here and **now**. This process is called **defuturization**, which forms the dominant conceptualization of time in the present era. To grasp how defuturization was created, we first analyze the reciprocal relationship between prediction and course correction. After doing so, we consider why the future is so often conceptualized as a threat.

#### NATO is a project of decentralized domination – imagining the future is an autopoietic continuation of crisis and capital

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Extending the Present with “Limits”

Filled with excitement for technology, the 1960s were characterized by reciprocal accusations of evil between the East and the West. Newspapers, science and sci-fi pushed the image of a calculable future: North America worked on a space station from which it hoped to survey the entire world, while the Soviet Union let a dog fly around the planet to test whether or not it was possible to survive in the extraterrestrial universe. Such widespread optimism was based on benefits like regular wage increases, full employment, on innovations like lasers, computers and antibiotics, private indications of happiness such as the purchase of cars and refrigerators, and on achievements like the automation of factories. The positive worldview was thus based on the understanding that progress and prosperity would be beneficial to all, that anyone could start as a dishwasher and end up a millionaire. However, by end of the decade, the satisfaction and economic security of the people had turned to recalcitrance, as people no longer accepted everything the government had to offer them, nor their explanation for the past; the revolts had begun.

In 1968, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) held a debate on long-term changes affecting political and economic stability. The debate took place against a backdrop of a shift in popular sentiment that had become increasingly skeptical of unlimited economic growth, job security and the welfare state. The modern optimism regarding progress had long since begun to break down. The conception of time was now once again drastically transformed: as the future lost much of its appeal, the present was further extended. The nation states lost authority and yielded to the governance of supranational and globally-networked technocratic corporations.

In our epoch, **governance no longer lies in the government**: there is no more centralized power. Instead, **domination** has **spread** itself **out**, the world has consolidated itself into a “**network society**” that integrates every last inch of the planet and tethers the peripheries. Today, the role of the state is solely to support and defend this “network.” The fear of instability and the wish to plan the future provoked by World War II led to the formation of supranational organizations like NATO, UNO, the IMF, World Bank and OECD, who sought to **reconstruct the Western order** and establish a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. However, these institutions only became influential in a real sense after the political and economic turmoil of the 1970s. Since then, domination has not only globalized, it has also gradually hybridized and became informal: the **votes of experts** were **a new way for decision-makers to justify their actions**. The Club of Rome, the World Economic Forum, or the Mont Pèlerin Society all strive to obtain a panoptic view of the economy and politics that would allow their stakeholders to take a proactive role in governing the globe. The origin of their **power lies in the notion that one needs elite thinkers to oversee the minions**.



With the empowerment of this decentralized infrastructure the question of “democratic” legitimacy arose and became crucial, but could be left unresolved due to the priority of arguments concerning urgent practical needs. The end of monetary fixation initiated by the Breton Woods agreement combined with the oil crisis that same year represented the beginning of a new epoch, a change of circumstances: firstly, a challenge to Western and Soviet dominance arose in the middle east; and secondly, since public attention had shifted away from technological innovation towards raw materials, the oil crisis became associated with the beginning of the debate on resource scarcity. Here we find one more illustration of how crisis is used as a mechanism to discipline the population: humans were declared to be consumers responsible for helping to regulate the crisis. Saving energy became everybody’s duty, even if the fact that resource consumption still increases represented an obvious contradiction.

What effects did this political and economic instability—as well as the changes in the mode of governance it provoked—have on the conception of time? The criticism of the idea of linearity represents a turning point: the idea of growth had been questioned, and the need for limits had been put forth; the peril presented by the possibility of a future troubled by resource scarcity led to an extension of the present. The future was over.

Consequently, defuturization meant drawing out, protracting, and elongating the present in order to ward off the apocalypse. Western governance had begun to fear its own destruction. While the impact of technologically oriented utopias had made themselves felt by the middle of the century, by the onset of the 1970s we have lived in a continual revival of the apocalypse. In the Christian tradition the apocalypse is the end of time. Yet as a prediction that never takes place, it serves solely as an instrument to discipline the mind. Today, its function has been replaced by an **endless governmental reproduction of disaster scenarios**. In order to keep the apocalypse at bay, the **present** is **frozen** in a **self-preserving, self-regulating system.**

But a system is a form and not a conception of time. A system is composed of individual components that are hardly negligible on their own, components that interact with each other. A system stabilizes itself through the reaction between its parts. To become more powerful, it must integrate more components, control the infrastructure and the information flow, and reduce the reaction time between its parts. These decentralized and informal modes of governance were theoretically anticipated by a second generation of cyberneticians: Humberto Maturana and Heinz von Foerster. These theorists drew upon the idea of “dynamic systems”. We are familiar with the cliché that, because “everything is connected and interacts with everything else”, a butterfly flapping its wings in China might cause a hurricane in the United States. The idea is that dynamic systems are determined by rules, however their chronological development is not foreseeable, since they have neither end nor beginning. As a steering or “piloting” paradigm, cybernetics was flexible enough to integrate the system approach. Cybernetics theorizes systems as fundamentally self-preservative or autopoietic. An autopoietic system is not based on a linearity between past, present, and future; rather, the process of self-regulation lasts from the moment the system is unbalanced to the moment it finds equilibrium. John von Neumann illustrates the cybernetic interpretation of the problem concerning nonlinear systems by the maxim, “all stable processes we shall predict; all unstable processes we shall control.” The theory of self-regulated systems no longer aims to determine the course of action and eliminate possibilities for change. Instead, these possibilities are included in the system itself, and only technocratic authorities on a higher level are able (or “legitimized”) to observe and regulate them.

The relation between this reformation of cybernetics and the shift in our perspective on time becomes apparent from the jargon of the Club of Rome, a futurist association founded in 1968. Its founding members, who were at the same time officials of the OECD, were frustrated by the long-winded debates required by government bureaucracies. Presciently anticipating the post-growth debates to come in the 1970s, the Club of Rome pushed for an immediate change of course in global politics. Its leading visionary, Hasan Özbekhan, argued that rather than being left to take shape randomly, the world’s development should be planned rationally. Institutions should be created which would take over the control function for all efforts aimed at the future, which he called the “look-out.” These superordinate and farseeing institutions would not only define what possible futures there are, they would also propose paths towards their realization. Özbekhan criticized the fact that the existing international organizations neither met these requirements, nor did they have the political legitimacy to make the necessary decisions. He proposed a network of independent experts who would have the rights and freedoms to forge links and to enter into relations with all sectors of society. Seen in retrospect, Özbekhan’s proposals preceded those of the Club of Rome, which aimed to become a private body in the aforementioned sense—namely, a loose alliance of futurists, but with a different interpretation of time than the futurists before: they extended the present.

The Club of Rome’s publication, “Limits to Growth”, adapted Özbekhan’s idea of a world in balance. Here again, mathematical simulations legitimize these forecasts. Even though their rhetoric originated in the same fear of a contingent future that had to be controlled, the Club of Rome reconceptualized the idea of defuturization: in 1972, “Limits” implied a transition from growth to equilibrium, the latter being understood as a state of balance and equality between opposing forces. The report recommends that this equilibrium be achieved by balancing positive and negative feedback loops. In their conclusion, and in accord with the emphasis on the timeless state of self-regulative autopoiesis, the Club of Rome suggested “a controlled, orderly transition from growth to global equilibrium.” The prophesied **transition never happened**—nevertheless, the futurists’ ambitions to control the future proved **integral to** forging the idea of **self-regulating neoliberal ideology** informing the regime of governance under which we currently exist. The long recession in the 1970s made the authority of a specialized class of experts socially acceptable, as well as the previously unpopular idea of an autopoietic system which “we’re all a part of”. The permanent revival of “the crisis” in which we are submerged today has its origins in the 1970s: ever since this fearful turn, we have found ourselves in a **permanent and self-preserving crisis**. **Neoliberalism** not only **generates** itself from **out of crisis**, it **grows alongside it**. Crisis is fundamental to the self-preservation of capitalism. Capitalism as a mode of governance is a historical given, and that’s why we call it “a system”.

#### Their claim to empirics, statistics, and quals is offense – their epistemology is bankrupt at its core assumptions of predicting and changing the future

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
“Defuturization”, or the Relevance of the Present

During the first industrial revolution, amidst the rampant enthusiasm for progress, public focus was drawn away from the present. Work was said to serve the flourishing of civilization in a far, far away future somewhere beyond the grey horizon. The bourgeoisie’s focus on progress and modernity glorified the future, and the present was seen as a transient and uninteresting threshold. After belief in the final triumph of reason was abandoned following World War I, and considering the possibility of the world’s complete destruction by nuclear war after World War II, the originally positive connotations of the future were destroyed. What became of the future after this disenchantment? By facing the fact that nuclear war could gravely affect society for generations, and possibly even wipe out the existence of humans completely, the meaning of time began to change. Gradually, the sense of time began to differ from that of classical modernity, when people in the West had been governed by hope. Before Hiroshima, the future could be seen as a positive horizon towards which humanity was progressing. With the advent of nuclear wars and their destructive potential, it became absolutely necessary to **rule out certain outcomes from future possibilities**. As Günther Anders notes, this human-made scenario risked turning the future into a game of Russian roulette, and “because the effects of what we do today will remain, we already reach the future; the future is already present in a pragmatic sense.”

With the darkening nuclear fate of humankind on the horizon, the future receded behind a veil of uncertainty, leaving the present to take on an increasingly crucial relevance. In place of the Enlightenment ideal of the perfectibility of human beings, the sciences now concern themselves with the attempt to **control** a menacing and essentially open-ended **future**. Despite the **evident failures of** the **linear** conception of **time**, rather than calling our teleological beliefs into question, postwar epistemology spliced and shortened the duration of time into apparently measurable steps. In order to plan and decide, **diversity and complexity** had to be **reduced** to factors that could be controlled here and now; the focus consequently shifted away from reason, towards **regulation** and feedback control. The war created new opportunities for those aspiring to actively reshape society. Scientists and engineers volunteered to help by reducing uncertainties, effectively policing the future through a technique the German systems theorist Niklas Luhmann would refer to as defuturization.

Since Antiquity, Western philosophy and theology had confronted the limits of human logic to account for possible future events. According to Luhmann’s reading, although modern society had become inordinately complex, it was still possible to reduce all possible futures through a procedure of defuturization. Since the future is characterized by a lack of knowledge and by contingency, defuturization can systematically decrease this openness by applying a binary code; thus, a future event becomes seen as either possible or not. As Luhmann concluded, “the theory of time has to transform its vague idea that ‘everything is possible in the long run’, one based on a chronological conception of time, into a concept of temporal structures with limited possibilities of change.” The perspective of defuturization relies neither on knowledge based in experience, wherein we trust in the recurrence of events, nor on an experiment-based approach that constructs universal “natural” laws from observation—both of which had constituted the methodological foundations of epistemology between the 17th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century, **prognosis and forecasting** instead crept to the forefront, approaches that were made possible by advances in mathematics and statistics.

As the priority shifted to predicting an uncertain future, a new group of people began to take charge. Authority at the drawing board suddenly fell to young scientists and managers rather than to aging war veterans. A wealth of past experience was suddenly worth less than the ability to **calculate the probable future**. The young technocrats understood forecasting as a scientific based method of policy advising, and claimed that neither experience nor the conventional methods could predict the consequences of political decisions. The very definition of cybernetics, for example, combines a complex relationship to temporality with an obsessive interest in prediction. Instead of thinking of time as a fixed form or a priori category, as Immanuel Kant had understood it, cybernetics instead rationalizes it down to its central unit of measurement. Norbert Wiener, who coined the term, had worked on the analysis of times-series while developing a mathematical theory of prediction that was utilized during World War II for the construction of an anti-aircraft predictor. Wiener calculated the future positions of airplanes with the help of a statistical correlation between a row of time-points. With this calculation, the military should be able to determine when and where one must shoot in order to hit a specific enemy bomber. In this sense, cybernetics was developed as a method of steering present actions towards a desired result in the future. Prognosis is not to be confused with the prediction of possibilities: the aim of cybernetics is to define targets and delineate the course that leads to them in a process of feedback.



Prognosis and course correction stand in a reciprocal relationship, perpetually and incrementally adjusted as one moves forward step-by-step. Norbert Wiener based his principles on a theory that actually called the linear conceptualization of time into question, namely, the theory of relativity. Postmodern intellectuals interpreted this theory as a proof that everything is relative and everything is possible. Without a doubt, the theory of relativity led to the destabilization of a universal and homogeneous understanding of time. Far more important, however, was how the discovery of time’s relativity spurred the ambition to control, regulate and shape it.

In the 1960s, cybernetician Hasan Özbekhan remarked that no preceding era had ever been so obsessed with the future. That there exists a large number of different possible futures to choose from became a central tenet of the fields that would comprise the futurology (also known as future studies) that became so extremely important at the time. The devastation wrought by the war gave rise to the **management of the future through rational, scientific methods**, marking a shift toward the **paradigm of defuturization**. The logic behind these methods was by no means peaceful; **futurology and the nuclear arms race share common roots**. John von Neumann invented the equilibrium strategy of mutually-assured destruction based on Game Theory, and Herman Kahn wrote essays on alternative scenarios of nuclear war, defending war with the same self-evident rhetoric that some of his contemporaries defended free love.

Futurology’s primary achievement was the creation of technological prognosis. The results were intended to overcome a division in public discourse: positive visions of the future glorified technics, while negative visions warned of a takeover by cyborgs and artificial intelligence. To overcome wild speculations, futurists interviewed experts, asking them when particular inventions or milestones would be possible, for example, living on the moon. Their failed forecasts are a testimony to the **limits of the ability to reduce an open future through defuturization**. Claus Koch (a contemporary of Herman Kahn, John von Neumann, and Hasan Özbekhan) put it well: in futurology’s conclusions, only the silhouettes of the present appear.

The actual **present has proven these prognoses** to be **false**: by the year 2000 there were **no artificial moons** to give us daylight, and no **interplanetary space flights**, even though both were predicted. The futurists **predicted neither** the **energy crises** nor the **environmentalist movement**; they didn’t envisage the collapse of the **Soviet Union**, couldn’t forecast the relevance of **computers**, misjudged pop**ulation growth**, and neither of the nuclear disasters in **Chernobyl nor Fukushima** show up in their reports. You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to know how absurd it is that the conceptual ideas of prediction were increasingly integrated into the political sphere, or that prognosis became a widely established practice. What system theorist, government advisor, and OECD consultant Erich Jantsch said in the 1960s remains essentially true: “technological forecasting and planning have a natural and inherent tendency toward fuller integration, which, in the 1970s, may possibly result in the disappearance of forecasting as a distinguishable discipline.” The explanation for this disappearance is as follows: the futurists were employed as planning strategists, and military think tanks provided the methodological knowledge needed to carry out prediction and planning. After World War II, the military apparatus was diminished and the **futurists became the employers**. Some went back to **university**, or remained in **think tanks** where they fine-tuned their methods of prognosis. A considerable portion of them went into **government**, where academic expertise became a highly respected value, while others went on to manage large **corporations** like Ford and General Motors. Robert McNamara did both, well before he became head of the **World Bank**. This is how the early scientific attempts to control nuclear risk by calculating the future eventually became a **major part of our** predominant power structure**.**

In sum, time developed a new meaning by the middle of the 20th century. As fear of an incalculable future deepened, provoking a collapse of the modern era’s eschatological destiny, the cybernetic idea, which posits that control can be retroactively adjusted after a goal is set, brought with it the practice of **structuring the future** into manageable segments in order to gradually **correct deviations**. Yet the use of formal models is by no means a neutral way of depicting the future. **Simplifications are not accurate** representations, but are undeniably marked by **political assumptions** and can be subject to manipulation. Statistics play a key role within strategies aiming to govern the future, since they offer a framework for legitimating decisions in the present. In their hopes of stabilizing power structures and the economy, rulers rely on such methods of calculation to eliminate undesirable possible futures. The goals they set for the future operate like a feedback loop, meaning that in the final analysis, political **prognoses are** not deemed **true because** they are correct, but rather because massive **resources are deployed in** the service of **making them correct**. Thus, aren’t prognoses merely rhetorically-clad formulations of a pre-existing goal designed to steer politics toward a desired future?

### AT: SSD / Ballot PIC / No Spill Up

#### We must endorse pluralist discourse in all instances – an abstract imperative is insufficient for political change

**Nelson 20** (Ceci Nelson. Ill Will, "No Future! Cybernetics and the Genealogy of Time Governance", 11/15/2020, https://illwill.com/no-future, accessed on 7/8/2022)//gideon

Where Are We Now?

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1990 was meant to be the end of history, the obsolescence of all utopian thinking. All hope was placed in the triumph of capitalism. If we say “no future”, this should be understood as **a refusal of both this restriction and of defuturization**—**we do not want to give control over the past, present, and future to experts and those in power.** In our era of perpetual apocalypse, right wing visionaries call crisis “a chance to enforce new solutions”—clearly **a fascist statement**. What else do these backlashes signify? How can we explain the recent return to the nation-state, as evidenced by “Brexit” no less than the Covid pandemic, which signal an obvious crisis in the conception of supranational governance? Instead of accepting this reality as the consequence of our contemporary global politics, we should ask ourselves how the frameworks of crisis **can be** broken down **entirely**. How can we oppose the current mode of crisis governance? For this, it is not sufficient to simply announce, as an abstract imperative**, the need to discard Western conceptions of time**, whether by defining time in a different way, or else nihilistically refusing all vision altogether—neither would have the slightest political effect. Instead, we have no choice but to develop a strategy, one capable of generating new pluralist **forms of** life and discourses**, opening other possible futures**. What do we plan to do with the “now-time” that remains? Will we extricate ourselves from our current repressive utopia, and develop an altogether different and emancipatory future?

#### Philosophical discourse in every instance is critical – it spills up – we are on the brink can solve

**Stiegler 20** (Bernard Stiegler, a French philosopher, head of the Institut de recherche et d'innovation, founder of Ars Industrialis, founder of the philosophy school pharmakon.fr, co-founder of the Collectif Internation, best known for Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Cairn International Edition, "The school of tomorrow", Jan 2020, https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E\_RDES\_097\_0119--the-school-of-tomorrow.htm, accessed on 7/20/2022)//gideon

Journal: The knowledge to which you allude presupposes a reassessment of the current form of knowledge. Is there a field that is best suited to take this critical look? B. Stiegler: In fact, every academic field is critical in this respect: an academy should develop and safeguard these critical spaces, and philosophy must lead the critical debate **given that this debate** always spreads into other disciplines. To grasp its relevance in the un-knowing (inscient) consciousness of the Anthropocene era, I insist that we must study what I have called "doubly epokhal redoubling," which constitutes the dynamic of epiphylogenesis and the tertiary retentions that result from it through the process of exosomatization. To confront these issues today, we have to revisit the history of the production of knowledge based on the founding principles of Greek philosophy, and before that the ideas of the pre-Socratics insofar as they generated the organization of the politeia, and after that, of theology, which profoundly reconfigured the Greco-Roman heritage. In 1158, 70 years after its founding, the university of Bologna began to form the matrix that would emancipate itself and the clerics from papal domination, through the independence guaranteed to them by the Authentica habita that emperor Frederick Barbarossa promulgated the same year. This matrix would engender – alongside Oxford firstly, then the Sorbonne – the model that Kant would later critique in The Conflict of the Faculties. With the University of Berlin, which created the department of philosophy in the wake of Kant’s text, as with the École normale supérieure created by the National Convention during the Revolution, then with the Grandes écoles founded by Napoleon, then through the educational and scientific policies of Jules Ferry, the **university** was to **serve** the interests of **industrial modernization**, and therefore of the economy (what the Romans, devising the concept of the otium, called the negotium), but always under **state control**. Ever since the hegemonic entrenchment first of neoliberal, then ultraliberal, and now **libertarian** thinking – which combines the ultraliberalism of the "conservative revolution" **with** the **disruptive technologies** that **proletarize the state itself**, literally **disintegrating** the connective tissue that **education** in the skholeion maintained with politics from Ancient Greece to the present (see Henri-Irénée Marrou) – the **university** is well on the way **toward privatization**, i.e. also toward defunctionalization and refunctionalization (redefinition of its functions). Both abroad and in France, more or less pitiful attempts to conform to this model fail regularly, leading to the collapse of an academic culture that was a model for centuries, and which has literally been demolished. This is the result of the tide that Jean-François Lyotard saw coming 40 years ago in The Postmodern Condition. I believe, however, that the herd instinct in this matter has been disastrous, for France and more generally for Europe: to a large extent because Europe has not understood that it is not Europe anymore – it has become a colony on the road to underdevelopment, and the **question** many ask is whether it **will remain within the American sphere** (with or without NATO) or whether China will finally seize it for itself. But I am still hoping that Europe will "wake up," and this is also what drives the work of the Institut de recherche et d’innovation, pharmakon.fr, and the Internation/Genève 2020 collective. We must try to think (penser) these questions through, care-fully think (panser) them through. Before anything this means trying to reconsider what is happening to knowledge in the 21st century, concerning both its "**production**" (i.e. scientific institutions – in the broad sense of the word science, irreducible to the computational and narrow-minded mechanicism that is currently ultra-dominant) and its **transmission**, at a time when knowledge is required (cf. Greta Thunberg) in order to "save humanity" from what its adulterated knowledge, transformed and distorted into information (i.e. models of **calculability**), has brought about, as even the value of this knowledge is put into question (this is what we call post-truth). An absolutely **disastrous ideology** – but one that is perfectly in sync with the short-sighted objectives of the negotium of high finance – has finally managed to impose on the more or less muddled state of French public opinion (from the "elites" to the "bottom of the pecking order") the doxa according to which **complete calculability** is the condition of science and, more generally, of any form of knowledge. But on the contrary, its openness to what always exceeds any calculation is what makes a domain of knowledge know, and also what makes it make, allowing it to fight against entropy. This is what Alfred North Whitehead called the function of reason. What burst forth from the 18th century, from the Enlightenment in Europe and America, was at once a product of humanism, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Academies – with their origins in the Republic of Letters – that led to printing, the successive proliferation of libraries, and the emergence of gazettes. The Académie de Dijon, in whose competition Rousseau participated, is one example. Why has digital reticulation not instigated a renewal of the academic system descended from Plato’s academy by way of those in Dijon and elsewhere, and by way of the universities and faculties as they have transformed themselves over the last millennium? Because exosomatization "abhors a vacuum," and because philosophy has made that vacuum possible. The time has come to wake up. We must ask ourselves these questions at a time when **the place and the role of fields of knowledge and their institutions** – the family is one such institution – **are at the heart of vital issues that dominate the Anthropocene** era. What can the **academy, the university and their collective knowledge** do in this era? And what do they know about this era? It is therefore incumbent on us to envision the future of what we must see as the academic system – in the sense that, since the 19th century, it is impossible to separate the disciplinary, didactic and pedagogical training of primary and secondary school teachers from research and coursework in the university. The academic system, such as it became established in France at the end of the 19th century (and in a more or less similar fashion throughout the world), must first be considered as what constitutes the institutional reality of what I have called the "doubly epokhal redoubling," the second period of this double redoubling to be precise, as the first was one of a technological shock brought about by exosomatization. I will briefly summarize the argument underlying this concept. Every human society is firmly based upon a technical system that transforms itself regularly. Ever since the Industrial Revolution, this transformation has been systemically underpinned by the economic war in which the industrial and national capitalisms are engaged. Every time the technical system is transformed on that systemic scale (in Bertrand Gille’s sense of the technical system) the adjustments that had previously been established between it and the social systems (in the sense of Gille and Niklas Luhmann) are put into question, triggering a noetic reconstitution that appropriates the new technical system while creating new circuits of transindividuation, i.e. new knowledge – in academia as well as in the empirical practices that characterize what consequently forms an epistēmē. On the other hand, we should bear in mind that this whole system, which was first developed out of the fundamentals of Western philosophy – first Greco-Roman, then Christian – and later from modern philosophy and what Marx called German idealism, is as a result based upon a repression of the question of technics – German ideology, however, asserts that this is its starting point. With the arrival of industrial society, the academic system had to train producers who were capable of playing various roles in production, from the proletarian to the engineer and the banker, up to the head of the firm: it had to train a "national elite." And what was true of production was equally true of the army, the legal and medical systems, the arts, etc., who had to deal with constant technological change. This responsibility to train producers, which was assigned to the academic system, had at one time belonged to craftsmen’s guilds. In addition, a trained citizenry was then required to guarantee national unity, above and beyond the borders of European France. This was a crucial issue for Jules Ferry, a colonial and colonialist issue: not only did the unity of the colonial empire have to be produced, but there had to be unity among the regions of the national territory and fewer "particularities," with the "universal" as the operator of what, however, laid the groundwork for the homogenization of the marketplace. Concerning all of these new arrangements and the way they came to be, which deserves closer study, I would like to outline an overall perspective on their consequences in the Anthropocene era, emphasizing first of all that the academic system has been, in a clearly un-knowing way, the primary operator. The result is that in today’s "post-truth" context, what prevails is a feeling, if not of uselessness, at least of inefficiency and of disrepute: a fundamental sense of unease in the academic system, whether in primary, secondary and high schools or in the universities. In various texts, I have tried to demonstrate that this unease has been engendered by a situation in which the programming industries (both audiovisual and algorithmic) are now competing with the programming institutions that form the academic system. This means, on the one hand, that children no longer have the necessary attention span to be ready to listen, and on the other – but this is less widely admitted and obviously hard to say and to accept – the teachers are themselves massively affected by this competition. This is just as true of the parents, who don’t always tolerate being told that: and many of us are parents as well. The result is that attention, and consequently the sense of responsibility, grows ever weaker – and this is also what Greta Thunberg says to her elders, i.e. to us. In fact, the whole problem is what is going on in the academic field in the broadest sense. When the name of the TV show Star Academy is more or less the symptom of a functional disintegration of knowledge (academic or otherwise), effectively, at the end of the Anthropocene era, all that has therefore become illegitimate. The **legitimacy of the academy has crumbled** under the influence of analogic and numeric technologies whose implementation is entirely beholden to the programming industries, while we ask the programming institutions to adapt more and more to these industries and their informational and communicational models.

#### We should not be forced to rhetorically justify capital

**Taylor and Bean 19** (\*Bryan Taylor and \*\*Hamilton Bean, \*PhD, professor of communication, \*\*PhD, associate professor of communications. Routledge, "The Handbook of Communication and Security", 6/28/2019, https://www-taylorfrancis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/books/edit/10.4324/9781351180962/handbook-communication-security-bryan-taylor-hamilton-bean, accessed on 7/20/2022)//gideon

What I hope to have demonstrated here are the deep rhetorical links between neoliberalism, globalisation, and militarisation in terms of ‘security’ and the personal, political, economic, and cybernetic deployments of ‘security’ in communication. By ‘rhetorical’ I mean a conscious and concerted effort of **communication aimed at working up the attitudes and actions of people** en masse (Graham, 2017). A quote by Thomas L. Friedman will do to set the tone of my summary: The **hidden hand** of the market will **never work without a hidden fist**—McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnel Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the **hidden fist** that **keeps the world safe for** Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. ‘Good ideas and technologies need a strong power that promotes those ideas by example and protects those ideas by winning on the battlefield,’ says the foreign policy historian Robert Kagan. (Friedman, 1999, p. 84) There are many internal paradoxes and contradictions at the core of the neoliberalism–globalism– militarism nexus. All turn on notions of security at one or more points, but more importantly, all are integral parts of a communicative complex through which fear is propagated as a primary **political means of** motivating people (Graham & Luke, 2003; Graham, Keenan, & Dowd, 2004). Hermann Goering put it as plainly as possible: Why, of course, **the people don’t want war** . . . Why would some poor slob want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the **leaders of the country who determine the policy** and it a simple matter to **drag the people along**, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship . . . voice or no voice, can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to tell them is they are being attacked and **denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism** exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country. (Goering, 1938; cited in Gilbert, 1947, pp. 278–279)

#### Only reading it on the aff solves – trying to understand technology in the context of a policy that can ‘solve’ it is doomed to fail

**Frabetti 10** (Federica Frabetti, PhD in Media and Communications, a background in cultural theory and ICT, worked for a decade as a Software Engineer and a mid-manager in telecommunications companies. Culture Machine, "’DOES IT WORK?’: THE UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES OF QUASI-FAILING TECHNOLOGY", 2010, https://culturemachine.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/388-648-1-PB.pdf, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

Once again I want to emphasize here that in order to make responsible decisions about technology, one must be aware that technology, as well as the conceptual system on which it is based, can only be problematized from within. This is precisely what the search for the points of opacity of technology allows us to do – stepping **out of a conceptual system** by continuing to **use its concepts** while at the same time **demonstrating their limitations** (Derrida, 1980). This process of the **problematization of technology** is **creative, productive and politically meaningful**. In fact, it shows that, since not everything in technology can be thought or fully conceptualized within one consistent framework, and since points of opacity always remain, technology also always brings about unexpected consequences. Perhaps the most important point of opacity that emerges from such a problematizing reading is the conceptualization of technology in terms of instrumentality. As we have seen, a sustained attempt to define software as instrumental can be found in Software Engineering. Such a definition presupposes **that software is controllable**, that its development and uses can be planned and that the risks and consequences implicit in software can be foreseen. Broadly speaking, this concept of software is based on the Aristotelian idea that technology is a tool that must be mastered by humans to pursue certain ends – a concept that constitutes the foundation of the general understanding of technology in the Western philosophical tradition. Consistently with this Aristotelian line of thought, not only is software defined as a tool in Software Engineering, but it is also conceptualized in terms of binary oppositions (for instance the one between technology and society) and its development is articulated in **linear terms**, as a **controllable sequence of step**s. This philosophico-technical conjuncture is what, in the words of Timothy Clark, Derrida understands as the ‘**complicity of technology with metaphysics’** (Clark, 2000: 248). And yet, as the thinkers of ‘orginary technicity’ have shown, **technology cannot be fully conceptualized** within the Aristotelian framework (Beardsworth, 1996).10 In fact, the understanding of software as a tool is continuously undone by the unexpected consequences brought about by software – which must be excluded and controlled in order for software to reach a point of stability but which at the same time remain necessary to its development.11

#### The judge is the audience of securitization – a neg ballot legitimizes capital, and an aff ballot is the only way to solve – interaction between the speaker and audience creates reality

**Sperling and Webber 17** (\*James Sperling and \*\*Mark Webber, \*Professor of Political Science, \*\*Professor of International Politics. Cambridge Core, "NATO and the Ukraine crisis: Collective securitisation", Feb 2016, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/nato-and-the-ukraine-crisis-collective-securitisation/E5EEFF2446628BE886EB5106771E32F5, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

From ST certain core assumptions can be elicited relevant to the process of collective securitization. To that end, we draw upon CS, still the most influential (and debated) contribution to the securitization literature. Two considerations dictated our choice. First, given the near absence of securitization scholarship in relation to NATO an underlying task of this article is to establish the appropriateness of ST as such. There is no unified or ‘grand theory’ of securitization upon which we can call in this respect,26 but CS occupies the ‘city-centre’ of securitization scholarship. Its foundational concepts thus have a justified claim to be the starting point of application.27 Second, the ‘neighbourhoods’ of ST (to continue the analogy) are less suited to the object of our concern. The so-called Paris School, for instance, does not view securitization primarily through rhetorical performance,28 a weakness in the case under consideration given that the rupture in NATO-Russia relations from 2014 was occasioned most obviously by a marked shift of discourse. In its original formulation, CS viewed ST as having a twofold purpose. First, ST explained how issues moved from the realm of ‘normal’ politics to the realm of security where the state could bypass democratic discourse and procedure. Second, ST isolated the mechanisms whereby such a move was enacted. Securitization **is initiated by a** speech act**, a ‘**securitizing move’ **‘through which an** intersubjective understanding is constructed **within a political community to** treat something as an existential threat **to a valued referent object, and to enable a** call for urgent and exceptional measures **to deal with the threat**.’29 The alternative, desecuritization process, shifts ‘issues off the “security” agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and “normal” political dispute and accommodation.’30 Three issues—state-centrism, threat construction, and audience role— have been contested within ST. Our preliminary purpose here is to set up the CS approach as relevant despite these concerns. The further amendments necessary for a theory of collective securitization are then considered in the next section. The first issue revolves around the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ that embeds the CS in **Euro-centric understandings** of state capacity and which **privileges the role of authoritative governing elites** in threat definition.31 This charge of state-centrism is only partially justified. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have argued that the CS is ‘not dogmatically state-centric in its premises’ even if for ‘contingent, empirical reasons […] securitization theory is […] somewhat state-centric in its findings.’ 32 In fact, a not insignificant literature exists informed by ST in which both inter-governmental and non-governmental actors are given due consideration.33 In a recent intervention, ST has been explicitly applied to NATO,34 and there is a body of work of longer-standing which, informed by ST, regards NATO through a discursive lens.35 These studies are not, however, about collective securitization, insofar as they simply swap one actor (the state) for another (an international or non-governmental organization) as the focus of analytical attention. What interests us, rather, is the neglected question of how a **group of states undertakes securitization in concert** and how, at the international level, that process is expressed and institutionalized. CS initially held out this possibility in relation to the EU. 36 We see no reason why it cannot be extended to NATO. As for threat construction, the initial and influential claim of the CS was that the speech act itself constituted ‘security’ not the ‘something more real’ which the act described.37 Such a position is now seen as **untenable**. The speech act is not separate from reality; **it only interprets it in a particular way**.38 **What** **threats** become subject to **securitization** is, in fact, a matter of **political choice**. 39 Both national and system-wide dynamics are relevant here. States will of necessity respond to threats which impact upon them directly (when their territorial integrity, national identity or constitutional order is infringed). Acting collectively in the face of such threats cannot be excluded (acts of solidarity are possible), but collective securitization is more likely to occur when a threat has a systemic referent (impinging upon international and collective identities, or the rules and norms governing interstate interactions).40 NATO’s character as a military alliance bound by a mutual defence pledge and as a community of norms means it embraces both these dynamics. The third contested issue concerns the precise relationship between the securitizing actor and its audience. In their original formulation, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde suggested ‘an issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.’41 The act of acceptance, however, was left unexplored thus leaving the audience marginalized as an analytical category. 42 More recently, Wæver has argued that securitization involves political interaction between both actor and audience through which agreement is reached on what constitutes the source of insecurity.43 Viewing securitization in this manner has two advantages. First, it points to a process that is **ongoing**, one that entails dialogue, negotiation **and compromise rather than a single, unidirectional transaction by the securitizing actor**. Here, the audience becomes **more than a passive recipient** of a securitizing move; it **empowers that move** and may even initiate it. This process within an international organization we define as recursive interaction: repeated bargaining procedures and substantive exchanges between a security actor (the organization) and its audience (the organization’s constituent members) over the content and form of threats as well as the policy responses appropriate to mitigating them. In collective securitization this means the audience takes on a particular form and meaning; it is not external to the securitizing actor but constitutive of it. Second, an active understanding of audience helps explain policy choice: why some issues (and not others) are securitized and, thus, why certain policies are formulated in response.44 The outcome here remains dependent on the balance of positional power between actor and audience. In a national setting the former will always have an advantage (even in democracies) given its association with government and access to the resources of the state. The latter (whether defined as public opinion, the electorate, political elites, or interested minorities) will be more constrained in its ability to mobilize political resources. Collective securitization (particularly in the military sector) gives rise, however, to a quite different dynamic: the empowering audience is itself comprised of states and the securitizing actor (i.e. NATO) does not enjoy default positional power. Such a dynamic affirms the need to take the role of audience, and recursive interaction, seriously.

#### Discourse shapes reality

**Baumann 1/30** (Mario Baumann, PhD student in International Relations. Handbook of Military Sciences, "Poststructuralism in International Relations: Discourse and the Military", 1/30/22, https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4\_38-1, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

This chapter introduces the poststructuralist perspective on international relations (IR). It outlines the epistemological and ontological fundament of poststructuralist thinking and introduces key concepts, notably discourse. This chapter aims to show that the way we talk about the world, about ourselves and others matters. It employs a particular focus on issues and examples that relate to the military – a domain that for long has been dealt with from more traditional IR perspectives. It seeks to encourage to look at those issues from a different, more critical, angle. It touches upon questions like: Can we ever be fully secure or do we need threats? How did the Global War on Terror become thinkable? What is the relationship between humanitarian interventions and identity? By presenting key contributions to the poststructuralist body of literature in IR, this chapter traces a poststructuralist perspective on issues of international relations, notably the state and foreign policy, security and threats. It encourages to scrutinize them critically and gives an overview of how to employ this theoretical perspective for empirical discourse analyses in practice. When former US President Donald Trump met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in 2018, he suddenly found himself confronted with the **power of discourse**. As a response to a journalist’s question on whether he believed US intelligence agencies’ accusations that Russia was meddling in United States’ Presidential elections, Trump replied: “[President **Putin**] just **said it’s not Russia**. […] **I don’t see any reason why it would be**” (Foreign Policy, 2018). His siding with Putin was met with a fierce backlash across the political spectrum in the United States, including in his own party. The **Western discourse** about Russian disinformation had produced a clear view on who was the **perpetrator** – **Russia** – and who was the **victim** – the **United States**. Irrespective of the actual circumstances of the US elections, this discourse made Trump’s comment virtually unsayable – forcing him to awkwardly deny his remark only one day later (Baumann, 2020: 303; Landler & Haberman, 2018). There is an intimate link between foreign policy and how we talk about ourselves and others. This is the terrain of poststructuralists in international relations. This terrain offers profound and critical insights to anyone seeking to make sense of international relations, including those in the military who are implicated in them on the ground. This chapter seeks to map this theoretical terrain by, first, introducing the basic tenets of the poststructuralist perspective. It will, secondly, trace poststructuralism’s entry into the field of international relations (IR) by means of discussing “the state” and, thirdly, the poststructuralist take on “security.” A final section will offer a brief guide to methodology, illustrating how to devise theory-driven analyses in practice. How can we as researchers make sense of the world? Poststructuralism has emerged in part as a response to a more traditional research philosophy that informs other IR theories, such as Realism or Liberalism, as outlined in the preceding chapters (see chapters “Realist International Relations Theory and the Military” by B. Schmidt, this volume; “Liberal International Relations Theory and the Military” by S. Silverstone, this volume). The poststructuralist perspective on the world is different from the maybe more intuitive one adopted by those, often deemed positivist, theories. Positivist theories rest on the assumption that researchers have unmediated access to the “outside world.” They presume that they can uncover “reality,” objectively describe, and formulate true statements about it. Positivism is an epistemological position. Epistemology is a branch of the philosophy of science which deals with the study of knowledge. It concerns questions like what is recognized as knowledge and how it can be acquired (see chapter “Philosophy of Military Sciences” by A.M. Sookermany, this volume). Poststructuralists take issue with such a positivist epistemology. They dispute positivists’ claim of unmediated access, arguing that the researcher cannot take an entirely neutral position. Our **observations** of the world are always **mediated by our interpretations** of it. Our **knowledge** of the world is thus not an objective truth but instead **depends on how we subjectively perceive it**, how we, in theoretical terms, construct it. Take the basic realist claim that states strive for security. This claim, realists argue, is an apt description of “reality.” They do not question the underlying assumptions informing this claim such as how we come to think of notions as “the state” or “security” in the first place. Poststructuralists take a step back, questioning the meaning of such notions and arguing that our understandings of them are fundamental for how we see the world and, consequently, how we act in it. What does it mean to be secure? What is the threat to be secure from? Just as a stone can be understood as a building block, a war memorial, or a weapon depending on the context, another country does not constitute a threat in itself. Whether we apprehend another country as threatening to us depends on our subjective interpretation of it. This critical stance towards a positivist epistemology also has implications for poststructuralism’s ontology, a different branch of the philosophy of science. Ontology is the study of being. It concerns questions of what is deemed to exist, what is taken into account, and what can be studied (see chapter “Philosophy of Military Sciences” by A.M. Sookermany, this volume). According to poststructuralists, what we should study – that is what is ontologically significant – is not the world out there as it is because we can never know that. Instead, we should pay attention to our interpretations of it. It is our subjective understandings of the world – the meaning that we attribute to things like, for example, another country – that are relevant for how we act. Poststructuralists’ anti-foundationalist ontology – assuming that there is no hard foundation for our knowledge “out there” – thus sheds light on meaning and interpretation, on how they come into being and how they change. But how do meaning and interpretation come into being? This is where poststructuralists’ central concept comes in: Discourse. Poststructuralists attribute to **language** a central role in the production of meaning. **The way we talk about things affects how we understand them**. Discourses define what we perceive as “normal” or “natural,” what we take as a given and how we look at the world. They determine **what is sayable** – **even imaginable** – in a given context. Hence, poststructuralists argue, as researchers we must study language in order to understand what interpretations guide peoples’ actions. Poststructuralists have developed an intricate idea of how meaning and interpretations are produced in discourse. The poststructuralist understanding of language goes back to an earlier structuralist one formulated in linguistics notably by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). According to Saussure, language is a system of differences. Things do not have a meaning in themselves; the meaning attributed to them is the result of linking a thing (what structuralists call a “sign”) to some things and differentiating it from others. Discourses in international politics would link “security,” for example, to “peace” and differentiate it from “danger” and “war.” It is through such grids of signification that we make sense of the world. Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), an important contributor to poststructuralist thought, has taken this structuralist understanding of language further by arguing that the grid of signification is inherently unstable (Derrida, 1978). The relations of linking and differentiation between signs are not fixed but always in motion and transforming. This is why the meaning that we attribute to things can change. In international politics, for example, the notion of “security” has profoundly transformed after the end of the Cold War. Since then, its scope has been extended significantly to cover also nonconventional contexts other than war, such as natural disasters or terrorism. In its 1999 Strategic Concept, for example, NATO extended its traditional notion of security tightly linked to “defense” to also recognize “the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors” as aspects of security (NATO, 1999). Until today, there are heated political disputes about what should be seen as a threat, ultimately also changing the meaning of “security.” From Derrida’s claim that meaning is inherently unstable does not follow, however, that meaning also is always transforming. Poststructuralists show how discourses strive to fix meaning around a given structure. By articulating something in a certain way, discourses create relationships of sameness and difference and thereby structure the grid of signification. The discourse on the Global War on Terror, for example, has for two decades now linked “the West” to notions of rationality, benignancy, morality, and civilization while differentiating it from “the terrorist,” which again was connotated with notions of irrationality, evil, and barbarism (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 243–246). Derrida has shown how Western discourses are organized around **binary oppositions**. Such hierarchical oppositions, or dichotomies, like man/woman, culture/nature, or, with reference to our example, morality/barbarism are powerful signposts in the discursive structure. This structuring may appear to us as natural and just “as it is.” Yet, Derrida has pointed out that any organization of dichotomic terms is not a neutral one but inherently political and normative. Most importantly, he has shown that there is no necessity to any such organization. While discursive structures can become very stable and enduring – think about the persistence of gender roles in Western societies or the Global War on Terror – **they can never be ultimately fixed.** This is a fundamental claim of all poststructuralists: **No interpretation of the world, no meaning that we attach to it is a necessary one.** No interpretation is God-given or otherwise determined. It is **just one of many** **possibilities**. This is what poststructuralists call contingency, and it is contingency which makes poststructuralism a profoundly critical project. It encourages us to look beyond the established order that we take for granted in our everyday life. The fact that such orders – like gender roles, for example – are often treated as “objective” knowledge illustrates what poststructuralists refer to as the power/knowledge nexus. Power and knowledge, poststructuralists argue, are inextricably linked. This understanding of power as productive goes back to Michel Foucault (1926–1984). It points to the fact that discourses establish a seemingly natural order, define what counts as “knowledge,” and construct the meanings and identities through which we make sense of ourselves and the world (Foucault, 1977, 1990). Let’s take a look again at the previous example of gender, which has been at the center of poststructuralist feminist studies (see, for example, Shepherd, 2008). Think of the implications the acceptance of seemingly “objective” gender roles had in the past and continuing today. This illustrates the productive power of discourse. To criticize any form of such “objective” knowledge opens up the possibility to question what seems natural to us. Another concept that for long has remained unquestioned at the center of IR theorizing is “the state.” The poststructuralist critique of this concept will form the point of departure for the next section. Poststructuralism entered the IR literature during the 1980s in the context of the Second Cold War. Critical interventions by Richard Ashley (1988), Rob Walker (1993), James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (1989) targeted how conventional approaches theorized international politics in a seemingly neutral and static way. Poststructuralists argue that the purportedly unchanging eternal truths formulated by those approaches need to be understood rather as the mirror image of a particular period in time (the modern period of sovereign states) and place (the West) (cf. Walker, 1993). This model, however, has become so entrenched that it presents itself to us as an accurate and neutral description of “reality”; and as such it has a profound impact on the analysis and formulation of foreign policy. A major driver behind this new critical perspective on international relations was a discontent with the role of the then prevalent conception of the state. Poststructuralists do not question the centrality of states for today’s international politics per se (Hansen, 2014: 176) in the same way as liberals and others have argued, for example, for a more global or more individual focus. What poststructuralists take issue with is the uncritical “taken-for-granted” attitude of traditional IR theories, such as Realism or Liberalism. Representatives of those theories, so the poststructuralist contention goes, present their view on the world as some kind of “timeless wisdom” (Buzan, 1996) – without engaging critically with the underlying core assumptions that inform those views. For realists, for example, the sovereign state is understood in abstraction from the individual as a unitary and rational actor who, following Hobbes’ state of nature, finds itself in an environment of anarchy without a centralized ordering power. This notion of the state is at the center of realist thinking and therefore plays an unprecedented role for how those scholars explain international politics. Poststructuralists dig deeper. Inspired by French poststructuralist philosophers like Derrida and Foucault, they do not take such assumptions at face value. They scrutinize, instead, how our understandings of “the sovereign state” affect how we make sense of international relations in the first place. This was the point of departure for some of the early influential poststructuralist interventions into IR, notably the works by Ashley (1987, 1988) and Walker (1990, 1993, 1997). They illustrate that the common understanding of the state rests on a dichotomy of sovereignty inside and anarchy, as its opposite, outside. Sovereignty and anarchy – the national and the international – are thus understood to be mutually constitutive, that is to say they both exist only as the other’s opposite. This reading of dichotomous structures reveals further binary oppositions, for example, between a rational inside and an irrational outside, between order/chaos, security/insecurity, justice/lawlessness, effective institutions/fragile alliances, and others. Consequently, “however normal politics is understood, inter-state politics may be presented as its negation” (Walker, 1990: 15). Ashley and Walker show how contemporary discourses perpetuate this dichotomy over and over again and thereby produce an understanding of **the state as natural and objective** – which they maintain **it is not**. By tracing the evolution of the concept of sovereignty back to its roots in the seventeenth century, Walker (1990) shows that **the sovereign** state is only one of several possible forms for organizing **a political community**. Other forms, such as hierarchical empires built on socioeconomic order from God, the Emperor, and the church, all the way down to subordinate individuals, do not seem natural in our contemporary world. Today, its **seeming objectivity** makes the sovereign state **in** contemporary discourses the unchallenged **and unquestioned form of** political organization, and it is hard for us to think beyond it. In this way, dominant discourses have a strong impact on how we think and talk. Consequently, most of traditional IR theorizing unfolds within the confines of this modern discourse on the sovereign state and thereby reproduces it. By uncovering the origin and working of this discourse (that is, by showing its contingency, see above), Ashley and Walker deconstruct the traditional notion of the sovereign state. Fleshing out the dichotomies upon which it builds and how they are perpetuated in discourse, they show that the sovereign state is not a neutral description of “the world as it is,” but that it is inherently normative and ideological. Walker (1990) further demonstrates that the inside/outside dichotomy that sustains the dominant notion of the sovereign state is also inextricably linked to a notion of identity – that is, how we perceive ourselves. Talking about the sovereign state, he argues, implies a boundary between a community inside and Others outside. For poststructuralists, identity is a central concept because it tells us not only how someone – for example, a state – perceives itself. More importantly, it also tells us what perspective it takes on the world. Understanding a subject’s identity is to understand how they view the world and thus illuminates why a subject acts in a certain way. To fully appreciate this argument, we require a broader context. As the inside/outside dichotomy suggests, the poststructuralist conception of identity is inherently relational. A “Self” always defines itself in relation to “Others.” Such a Self can be, for example, a state. France is France because it is not India, Brazil, or Germany. For poststructuralists, a state can be regarded as an actor in international relations because it speaks as a subject and articulates in its foreign policy a notion of “we-ness” – which poststructuralists term a notion of Self. The fundamental question for poststructuralists is: Who speaks (Epstein, 2011)? That also means, however, that poststructuralists need not limit their analyses to states as relevant actors. While the state remains the dominant form of Self in international politics, poststructuralists also take into account any other Self that is discursively articulated – for example, the European Union as a union of sovereign states or the Catalans as an ethnic group with a strong sense of identity. Crucially, a Self is always defined through its relations to Others. William Connolly (2002) writes that “identity requires difference to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (p. 64). Identity does thus not differ from any other discursive structure that, as outlined above, is the result of processes of linking and differentiation. Take the example of NATO. **NATO’s identity** as a Western military alliance during the Cold War was **fundamentally shaped by its opposition to the Soviet Union** (Klein, 1990). After the Soviet Union ceased to exist, NATO’s identity inevitably changed. Michael Williams and Iver Neumann (2000) point out how NATO’s self-understanding transformed during the 1990s from one of military defense towards one of cultural or civilizational unity based on common values. Suddenly the **major Other** in the discourses of NATO’s official documents and declarations **shifted from** an external **Soviet threat to “instability,”** defined as the absence of those declared **common values**, notably democracy. The poststructuralist notion of identity as relational helps to understand how an actor perceives Others and, hence, what kind of foreign policy they might formulate towards them. Have you ever heard that a certain foreign policy-move – such as a troop deployment, a peacekeeping mission, or an intervention – was justified by saying that “it is in our interest”? Poststructuralists argue that to speak of “the national interest,” as many realists frequently do, only makes sense if we understand what decision-makers consider to be in the interest of the state (Weldes, 1996). “Interests – ‘national’ or other – are never a priori given,” but always the interests of someone. “It follows that we cannot know what someone’s interests are unless we know who that someone is” (Ringmar, 2002: 131). Studying identity discourses is to understand the specific interpretation of the world, that decision-makers might hold. Based on this worldview, different foreign policies may be considered detrimental or beneficial. This relationship between identity and foreign policy, however, is not a one-way road with the former determining the latter. Since poststructuralists assert that no meaning or identity is ever already given nor ultimately fixed – as posited by rationalist approaches – identity is also the result of discursive practices such as foreign policy. Identity and foreign policy are thus linked in both ways: Their relationship is performative, which means that they are mutually constitutive. Identity discourses facilitate and limit the formulation of particular foreign policies. Those discursive structures determine more or less rigidly what is doable, sayable, or imaginable. At the same time, foreign policies in turn have an impact on how we talk about Others and ourselves. Take, for example, the Global War on Terror: Speaking of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in his 2002 State of the Union address, then US President George W. Bush stated that “States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an **axis of evil**, arming to **threaten the peace** of the world” whereas **America will bring “lasting peace,” “liberty and justice”** (Bush, 2002). Referring to terrorism and the “axis of evil,” Bush **discursively constructs a “civilized” Self** in differentiation from this “**threatening” Other**. The representation – a theoretical term for how something is depicted, talked, or written about in discourse – of those countries as “axis of evil” forms the discursive background, against which **the War on Terror** becomes intelligible and **can be** justified. At the same time, this discursive background also came into being and was perpetuated through the foreign policy practices it facilitated. This performative construction of the War on Terror, however, is an ongoing process and can never be complete. Emile Simpson (2014) states that the War on Terror at least partly constitutes “a continuous effort to shape worldwide political perceptions according to the West’s security interests.” Because discourses can never ultimately be fixed, however, the War on Terror “[lacks] a clear end point, as perceptions continuously evolve” (p. 19). The intimate relationship between identity and foreign policy highlights the centrality of interpretations and shared understandings for making sense of international relations. This forms the background for the topic of the next section “Security and Threat.” When talking about security, notions of threat and danger take center stage. In international relations, threat and danger are inextricably linked to war and conflict. As outlined in Carsten Roennfeldt’s introductory chapter to this book section, much of IR’s purpose has traditionally been to avoid war and conflict. But what is threatening? What is dangerous? Given that those questions have provoked war and conflict, determined the deployment of troops, or forged alliances, they should not be taken easily. A poststructuralist approach to those questions is hence entirely different from a rationalist one (cf. Rønnfeldt, 2021, this “International Relations and Military Sciences” volume). Rationalists, including proponents of traditional IR theories like Realism and Liberalism, understand security largely in materialist terms, focusing, for example, on military capabilities (Walt, 1991). They further assume that matters of security can be assessed objectively (Hansen, 2006: 29–30; Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 142–143). Arnold Wolfers (1952), a prominent realist, for example, claims that an “actual or objective state of danger” can – at least retrospectively – be precisely evaluated (p. 485). Poststructuralists adopt a different perspective on security. They do not deny the reality of war and conflict. Nor do they deny the existence of obvious and immediate threats to our well-being, such as the danger of being run over by a car or the potentially deadly consequences of being hit by a bullet. As the discussion of the term “security” above suggests, however, poststructuralists argue that what is perceived as a threat is **not something that can be objectively measured**. Quite to the contrary: Whether we consider something dangerous is always an interpretation. To call something or someone a **threat** to security should therefore **not** be merely accepted as an **objective observation** but understood, instead, as a **normative claim**. Are troops crossing the border an aggressive attack, a liberation, or maybe part of a peacekeeping operation? Was Crimea in 2014 annexed by or reunited with Russia? The dominant discourses on this event might diverge substantially in Kyiv and Moscow. David Campbell, an early representative of poststructuralism’s entry into IR, writes that “[danger] is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat” (1992: 1). What **security** is, is fundamentally tied to our perspective on the world and can therefore **never be discussed in separation from who we are**. Walker (1997) asserts that our understanding of security is derived from an idea of “**who or what it is that needs to be secured**” (p. 68). Talking about security in the context of international relations therefore inevitably reasserts a certain identity. Discourses of security, however, not only constitute and reaffirm who we are. They also define who or what the threatening Other is from which we need to be protected. They **establish categories of Self and Other, friends and enemies**. Do you remember from the last section that identity is relational? Poststructuralists assert that security discourses are central for constructing such Others to which the Self relates. A seminal study on the construction of enemies during the Cold War was presented by Campbell in his book Writing Security (1992). According to him, threat and danger are a fundamental necessity for the state to exist. The state, Campbell argues, relies on the **articulation of outside threats** against which it can **define the inside**. From this perspective, the Cold War was much more than a military confrontation between two superpowers. On the US side, it was a process through which discourses on the dangers of communism and the Soviet threat continuously (re)produced a particular US identity. Campbell also shows how those discourses of threat and danger served to discipline dissident elements within the country. Discursively linking those “internal Others” to an external threat delegitimizes their cause and justifies their persecution. Campbell goes as far as to say that “[should] the **state project of security be successful** in the terms in which it is articulated, the **state would cease to exist**.” (p. 12). His argument thus suggests that the West would suffer from a major identity crisis after the collapse of its radical Other, the Soviet Union. At the time, poststructuralism was grabbling with the question of whether states need enemies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 218), and the changing security discourses produced a more nuanced understanding of it. With the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the theme of **military interventions** in other states became more pronounced. Was Campbell’s notion of the radical threatening Other still apt to make sense of those new contexts? In her book Simulating Sovereignty (1995), Cynthia Weber analyzes how justifications for such interventions have evolved over time. She finds that the **discourses legitimizing interventions** frequently invoke “**the people**,” which must be **protected from their own government**. Similar to NATO’s shifting self-understanding after the Cold War as illustrated above, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009) argue that the increasing prevalence of the humanitarian intervention-discourse in the 1990s also changed the identity of “the West.” Poststructuralist studies now identified as the central Other not the radical threat anymore that Campbell found during the Cold War. Instead, the discourses invoked the “humanitarian ‘victim’ in need of a ‘rescue’,” which depoliticized and thereby helped to legitimize Western interventionist policies (pp. 219–220). All this is to show that poststructuralists have a deep interest in security. They are not concerned, however, with security as an objective state like rationalists such as realists and liberals would have it. They are interested, instead, in understanding how security discourses bring into existence an understanding of ourselves and Others, friends and enemies. When dealing with conflicts, this poststructuralist approach cautions us to be aware that there is certainly more than one “objective” interpretation of it. When engaging with complex settings, such as Afghanistan, one should therefore be wary of a simple division into friends and enemies. This is because others implicated in the conflict – the broader public, nongovernmental actors, neighboring states, or an international audience – might have different interpretations of it and, possibly, identify different threats or draw the friend-enemy line differently. The same act, for example, a counterinsurgency operation, can be perceived vastly differently by different audiences, because different discourses will offer different frameworks for making sense of the operation. Poststructuralists suggest that an awareness of the different discourses prevalent within a conflict is crucial for those analyzing or engaging with it – at a policy, strategic, or tactical level. “Securitization” theory offers another insightful perspective on security. While not a poststructuralist approach in the narrow sense, securitization theory points our attention to security dynamics that are equally interesting to poststructuralists, namely the role of language and representation in and for international politics. Securitization has sparked a broader discussion in the field of IR. A distinction, for example, is often made between a “Copenhagen School” and a more sociologically oriented “Paris School” (cf. Wæver, 2004). The former can be traced in particular to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde’s Security: A New Framework For Analysis (1998). Buzan et al.’s point of departure is the widening security agenda since the 1970s and 1980s (Wæver, 2004: 8). This widening was a reaction to the narrow focus on military matters during the Cold War (Fierke, 2015: 1–2). While generally sympathetic to that move, Buzan et al. (1998) pose the question of what it means that nonmilitary issues, for example, environmental, economic, or social phenomena, were increasingly framed as problems of security. Irrespective of the sector, they argue, this framing follows the same underlying logic. This is what Buzan et al. term “securitization”: An issue is presented – for example, by a politician – as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and this claim is accepted as such by the audience. Such an issue could be the amassing of foreign troops at the border, environmental pollution, or migration. Think of the role the alleged – and later on never found – Weapons of Mass Destruction of the Hussein-Regime played in public discourse prior to the Iraq war in 2003 (cf. Donnelly, 2013). In the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush said “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.” (Bush, 2002). Bush clearly insinuates that doing nothing would pose an existential threat to the United States and therefore suggests to act accordingly. Securitization is not unproblematic, however. Because “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23), securitization withdraws an issue from the usual political process. The justification of exceptional measures through security thwarts the careful deliberation of an issue and may even circumvent established democratic procedures and institutions. Consequently, in order to soberly weigh and evaluate delicate issues from various perspectives, Buzan et al. (1998) argue in favor of desecuritizing them: “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” (p. 4). Securitization theory, just like poststructuralists, treats security primarily as a matter of subjective interpretation: “‘Security’ is […] a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). This underlines the role shared interpretations play for foreign and security policies. Consequently, the task of the researcher “is not to assess some objective threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to illuminate the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.” (p. 26). The next section will outline in greater detail how we as researchers can shed light on such discursive dynamics in the context of international relations. The preceding sections introduced the poststructuralist perspective on international relations. For many, this perspective is not the most intuitive and accessible one. Once you come to realize, however, the role subjective interpretations play in international politics, you will recognize how powerful a poststructuralist inquiry into their constitution and working can be. But how can you make this theoretical perspective work for your empirical analysis? This section will outline some methodological considerations when studying discourse. It will first clarify the research logic of poststructuralist inquiries before presenting the method of poststructuralist discourse analysis (For an overview of different traditions of discourse analysis, see Jørgensen and Phillips (2002)). Like any inquiry in our field, let us start this methodological intro with the research question. Unlike more traditional, rationalists IR theories like Realism or Liberalism, poststructuralists do not ask research questions that follow a causal why-logic, such as “why does country A attack country B”? This kind of question requires the identification of distinct causes that can explain a given outcome. Such a causal description can only make sense within a positivist framework that, as you will remember, is built on the assumption of objective knowledge about the world. Poststructuralists, on the other hand, are concerned with how the meaning and identities that form the context of our actions are constituted and how they change. Poststructuralist inquiries shed light on the particular discursive structures that facilitate certain practices – or policies – make them thinkable and doable within a given discursive context. In short, they analyze discourse in order to understand its “implications […] for the way we think and act in the contemporary world” (George, 1994: 191). Poststructuralist research questions therefore follow a how possible-logic. An example could be: “How does country B come to be represented as a threat in country A’s foreign policy discourse?” An answer to this question can help to understand how a conflict between country A and B becomes possible in the first place. Importantly, poststructuralists always keep in mind that there is no necessity to any given discourse and that it is only one of many possibilities. As you will remember, this is called the “contingency” of discourse. Even if in our view the representation of country B as threatening seems “natural” or “objective,” poststructuralists will maintain that this is just one of many possible interpretations and that no discourse is constituted irrevocably. This is where deconstruction comes in: The seeming objectivity of a discourse is unmasked by showing how this particular discourse works, for example, what dichotomies sustain the representation of country B as threatening. Whether country B has come to be understood as a friend or a foe will facilitate vastly different policy options. To analyze a given discourse thus also means to “[consider] the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another” (Campbell, 1992: 4). To sum up, discourse analysists seek to capture how meaning is discursively produced and how it changes, as well as the implications of one particular discourse over other possible ones. Against this background: How to carry out a discourse analysis in practice? Because poststructuralists are interested in profoundly understanding a given context, their analyses are based first and foremost on qualitative data. This could be any text, such as a speech, an interview, or a newspaper article. A close investigation thereof is aimed at understanding the underlying discursive structure, “how signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize particular policies” (Hansen, 2006: 41). While every articulation forms part of discourse and therefore lends itself for analysis, understanding discourse as producing shared understandings suggests taking into account a broader set of texts (Milliken, 1999: 233). But how many? And when to stop? To this, Jennifer Milliken (1999) responds that an “analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts […], the researcher finds consistently that the [discursive structures] she has generated work for those texts” (p. 234). There is no ready-made template for how to carry out a poststructuralist discourse analysis. As a “problem-driven” approach (Howarth, 2005), every discourse analysis ought to be tailored to the research interest in question. Lene Hansen’s book Security as Practice (2006) constitutes a comprehensive guide to discourse analytical research designs. She highlights four parameters in particular that should be taken into account when devising an empirical analysis (pp. 65–82). In order to illustrate how to approach discourse analytical inquiries, the following paragraph will provide a simplified overview of Hansen’s four parameters. A promising research design will take each of them into account. As with every methodology, this requires you to take many informed decisions and to justify your choices. An empirical inquiry must, first, specify whose discourses it focusses on. Are you looking at the foreign policy discourse of one or more Selves? Who is speaking (cf. Epstein, 2011)? Are you focusing on one or more states or other foreign policy subjects? A second parameter to be determined is what event the respective discourse is about. This could be any issue in international politics: A conflict such as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine or a topic like climate change. An example: Analyzing Russia’s foreign policy discourse on the events in Ukraine, how it represents the Russian Self, the Ukrainian, and the Western Others can be helpful for understanding how this discourse facilitated certain Russian foreign policies towards Ukraine and how it precluded others. A concise analysis, thirdly, requires a clarification of where to look for a specific discourse. What is the discursive arena of interest? Are you taking into account only the Russian government’s official rhetoric, or are you broadening the scope of your study by also including the wider foreign policy debate as articulated by other political figures or in the media? To study media discourses can be helpful in order to gauge the room of maneuver politicians find themselves in. After all, this constitutes the discursive context in which policy-makers formulate, explain, and justify foreign policies. For an even broader inquiry, it might also be insightful to consider discourse as articulated in cultural sources (see, for example, Der Derian, 1992, and Shapiro, 1988, 1990). A final parameter Hansen (2006) points out is the temporal dimension of an inquiry, the when. What time frame are you taking into account? Are you looking at one particular moment, or are you comparing different periods? To pick up the example above, you could focus your analysis of Russian foreign policy discourse on key moments in the Ukraine crisis, such as the Maidan protests or the annexation of Crimea. Alternatively, you could also choose a more long-term perspective to illuminate how representations, for example, of Ukraine or “the West,” have evolved over time in the Russian discourse. To trace the development of a specific representation or concept is to study its “genealogy.” Foucault has coined this notion as “history of the present.” A genealogical inquiry seeks “to show ‘descent’ and ‘emergence’ and how the contingencies of these processes continue to shape the present” (Garland, 2014: 371; cf. Foucault, 1984: 76–100). The aim is thus to show that what now may be taken for granted has not always been understood in this way but is, in fact, the outcome of a series of forgotten struggles in the past that might as well have turned out differently. Some groups of people might have had a greater impact in this process because others were marginalized or not allowed to speak. A famous example of a genealogical inquiry is provided by Edward Said’s book Orientalism (1978). Said traces how the representations of “the Orient” have evolved in Western European intellectual discourses since the eighteenth century. He shows how those representations, that continue to impact the Western perception of the East, were discursively constructed in contrast to a superior “occidental” Self, thereby simultaneously reflecting and perpetuating European racism and imperialism. As such, a genealogical inquiry not only illuminates what changes and/or continuities a certain concept underwent and how our present thinking came about. Importantly, by exposing how the productive power of discourses established seemingly objective meanings and identities, it is a reminder that much of the understandings that guide our thinking and acting today are a contingent outcome of the past, and it therefore encourages us to question them. This chapter aimed to show that discourse – the way we talk about the world, about ourselves and others – matters. It brings into being our understanding of the world and as such cannot be separated from our thinking and acting. Discourses construct what is considered “natural” or “objective.” The poststructuralist project does not accept those established orders as “natural” and points to the contingency of discourse, that is, of any meanings and identities. This poststructuralist approach has also encountered criticism. Two often articulated critiques merit a quick critical review. The first one concerns poststructuralism’s epistemology – as you remember, this philosophical term concerns the question of what counts as knowledge. Representatives of traditional approaches have accused poststructuralists and other so-called reflectivists (cf. Rønnfeldt, 2021, this volume) of lacking “a coherent research program” (Keohane, 1988: 379) that would meet scientific standards. This judgement is shortsighted, however, because poststructuralists take issue with those standards in the first place. Robert Keohane and others thus fail to acknowledge the divergent epistemological positions poststructuralists take on what counts as knowledge. A second line of criticism (cf. Brown, 1994) takes issue with poststructuralists’ anti-foundationalist ontology. As you will remember, poststructuralists claim that there is no hard foundation for our knowledge “out there” and that the meaning we attach to things is a discursive construction instead. Critics have dismissed such a worldview as “relativist” or “nihilistic” and claimed that it rids one of the ability to distinguish right from wrong. This accusation, however, mistakes poststructuralists’ rejection of transcendental foundations as a wholesale rejection of the fact that things do exist. For example, poststructuralists do not question or reject the existence of “the state” as a contemporary form of political organization. They simply point out that “the state” is a **contingent result of historical processes** that could as well have taken **different turns**. It therefore should be regarded as **one possibility** of many **instead of a** **neutral description** of simply “how it is.” Poststructuralists’ mission, so to say, is not to eliminate a certain way of thinking, but to highlight that **this particular way of thinking is not God-given or neutral.** Poststructuralism has much to offer for anyone interested in and working with international affairs, military professionals included. Its analytical approach reminds us that there is no objective, no God-given, foundation to our understandings of the state, threats, foreign policy, and other aspects of international relations. Instead, the meaning individuals attach to the world and their respective behavior are shaped by and at the same time shape the discourses that they are implicated in. From the point of view of the military, special attention ought to be paid to discourses of security. It is through discourses of security that the use of armed force is typically justified. Whether or not something, for instance another state, a militant organization, or migration, is perceived as a threat has far-reaching consequences for a country’s foreign policy decisions. Like any foreign policy discourse, **talking about security is intimately linked to how we see the world and what policies we deem appropriate**. It is therefore important to keep in mind that “**threats” are** no objective conditions, but **normative, political representations**. Instead of taking them at face value, poststructuralists argue, we as researches should ask how those discourses work to structure, facilitate, and, at the same time, limit our thinking and acting within the established order. There is no escape from discourse, but being aware of how they work is a precondition for being critical about them and questioning seemingly objective “truths.”

### Squo Bad

#### The modern era is collapsing – dwelling in the myth of US functionality dooms us to extinction

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Tightly connected to the new **global regimes of information production, ownership, and control** is that there is **no functional world order**. Any notion of the possibility of a rapprochement between the global power blocs looks more remote than ever. The international influence of the United States has diminished, China’s economic power has continued to grow and it has asserted that the South and East China Seas are within its ‘sphere of influence’—a claim supported by its construction of military bases on several islands in the region, combined with the continual expansion of its navy. **Russia** has exposed itself as **a disruptive force** of national security in, and beyond, Eastern Europe. Meanwhile the **Middle East** remains a centre of instability, and the power of **the E**uropean **U**nion has **weakened**. More broadly, recoil from globalisation is underway, evident in a widening **schism between the Global North and South** as cultural and political communities of the South increasingly embrace the post-postcolonial project of decoloniality. Layered onto this situation is, and has been, the rise of **insurgencies**, **asymmetrical conflict**, **proxy wars**, plus a gradual increase of **nuclear** arms **proliferation**, with as mentioned signs of a new nuclear arms race beginning. Added to the outlined dangers has been the transformation in the nature of war. First of all it is no longer confined to discernable military confrontation and is now arriving in **hybrid forms** including cyber aggression, the militarisation of space, the use of social media as an agent of political disruption, the many internal wars the United States has waged on its own people (the wars on drugs, poverty, crime, and terror), and now the uneven militarisation of the COVID19 pandemic. De facto, a condition of low-level global conflict now pertains in which there are multiple overt ‘hot-spots’ where conflict threatens. Effectively, **the war/peace binary no longer holds**. As Fry writes in his forthcoming book, ‘war has become a plural, complex and unstable category, while peace now lacks coherence, definition and strategic practices adequate to the demands of the multiple and extremely complex contexts in which it is employed. As for the relation of war and peace it is now by no means a natural union in binary opposition. The relation is actually more appropriately seen as aporetic’ (Fry, 2020a: viii–ix). Second, the dangers of ‘dwelling in the **age of the** (post-)Anthropocene’ are projected to **become** more **severe**. For instance, there is already substantial evidence showing that climate change will cause the breakdown of many agricultural systems (thus making food security a far more critical concern) with some regions becoming unlivable (which is already the case in parts of central China), and displace tens, or even hundreds of millions of people (especially from the river delta regions of the planet). Increasing competition between nations over **natural resources** also poses major dangers. In sum, this means that **climate change will** **dramatically increase the likelihood of** large- and smallscale regional **conflicts**. It also posed a major challenge to the yet to be renamed ‘humanities’ as a changed climate transforms ways of life, cultural practices, diet, moods, and much more.

#### The discourse of a ‘century of peace’ is wrong and overtly violent

**Taylor and Bean 19** (\*Bryan Taylor and \*\*Hamilton Bean, \*PhD, professor of communication, \*\*PhD, associate professor of communications. Routledge, "The Handbook of Communication and Security", 6/28/2019, https://www-taylorfrancis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/books/edit/10.4324/9781351180962/handbook-communication-security-bryan-taylor-hamilton-bean, accessed on 7/20/2022)//gideon

Hence, framing the birth of neoliberalism was a reaction to what many of the colloquium participants saw as a failure of completion for 19th-century liberalism; for them it was the result of insufficient free trade. Additionally, neoliberalism was a response to militarism, and specifically the impending violence that would later come to be known as World War II, and which would be seen as the product of authoritarian governments whose nationalist populism was based in militaristic display, rhetoric, and intent. The colloquium was also in part a response to the massification of society, central planning, protectionism, and state intervention into previously unregulated aspects of life. Naturally its members stood opposed to authoritarianism, with more than one of the colloquium participants suggesting that liberalism ought to be altogether discarded as a terminology in favour of ‘individualism.’ Other terms besides neoliberalism that were in contention among colloquium participants as the name for this new character include ‘neo-capitalism,’ ‘constructor liberalism,’ ‘ordoliberalism,’ ‘left liberalism,’ and ‘positive liberalism’ (Reinhoudt & Audier, 2018, p. 6). The great hypocrisy in the underpinning assumptions of neoliberalism, at least as they were realised during the course of the colloquium, is the idea that liberalism had been responsible for ‘**a century of peace**.’ Any idea of a ‘peaceful’ 19th century must of course ignore the massive violence associated with 19th-century colonialism and the greatest organised slaughter of people in history, at least up to the First World War, that took place during the American Civil War. Rougier implicitly notes the productive aspects of colonial violence when he says that the ‘**merit of liberalism is to increase** the dynamism of **production**. Yet, nowadays, this vibrancy seems **slowed** down **by the halt of colonial expansion’** (in Reinhoudt & Audier, 2018, p. 139). Even more explicitly, he says that On the one hand, the doctrine of liberalism has been the economic policy [la politique économique] of the nineteenth century; on the other hand, the application of this policy has transformed the face of the world. It has been accompanied: 1. By the **settling of the white race outside of Europe**; 2. By the **growth of the white population**. Today, the expansion of the white race is almost finished. A nation has to wrest its colonies from another one. (p. 139) Not to put too fine a point on it, **neoliberalism** was **brought into the world as** an idea informed in no small part by intense Eurocentricity, outright racism, eugenics, and a blindness to any kind of damage, whether human or otherwise, inflicted upon countries outside Europe, including the United States, whether through civil strife or rampant colonialism.

#### Intellectual monopoly capitalism is the new wedge splitting our world

Rikap 21

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What is new with contemporary (global) leading corporations? If gigantic monopolies are a repeated phenomenon in capitalism’s history, why all the fuss we see every day regarding high concentration? Leading corporations of the 21st century are intellectual monopolies. These are firms that rely on a permanent and expanding monopoly over portions of society’s knowledge. A recent joint OECD and European Union report shows that the top 2000 corporations in business expenditure in research and development (BERD) concentrated 60% of total IP5 [1](https://mronline.org/2021/05/04/intellectual-monopoly-capitalism-and-its-effects-on-development/#edn_1) patents between 2014 and 2016 (Dernis et al., 2019). How did this happen if intellectual rents enjoyed by the innovator were supposed to disappear once the rest of the industry adopts the new technique? They disappeared if the secret was broken, the patent expired, or when another firm innovated, overcoming the innovating firm’s advantage. Knowledge is cumulative and those innovating have a greater absorptive capacity to keep innovating. Aided by a more stringent and global intellectual property regime, the continuous reinforcement of knowledge monopolies has led to a perpetuation of the core, maximizing rentiership over time. Intellectual monopolies may not monopolize the markets they operate, which can even be competitive markets like Amazon’s marketplace, where Amazon sells its products with millions of other sellers. Their monopolistic condition relies on their capacity to significantly and systematically monopolize knowledge, which generally–but not always–contributes to market concentration. What we are witnessing is the climax of a process that began almost half a century ago with the formation of global value chains (GVC) led by multinational corporations that retained the exclusive knowledge on how to integrate the supply chain. It was also in the 1970s that the big pharma blockbuster drug model emerged signalling a turning point in terms of intellectual property and rents. Furthermore, the initial policy transformations that paved the way for intellectual monopoly capitalism also date from the 1980s and continued during the 1990s (from the Bayh-Dole Act to the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights followed by free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and regional pacts that installed a global intellectual property regime). Yet, it was not until this century, in particular after the advancements in deep learning and neural networks that unleashed big data based innovations that the consequences of intellectual monopoly capitalism became apparent. To acknowledge them, I suggest thinking of innovation, as any process based on human labour, not only from its implications but also as a social relation of production. In other words, innovating always has a twofold meaning. One looks forward and starts when the innovation is achieved, thus studying the effects of innovation as an accomplished result. The subordination of complementors in digital platforms (such as third-party sellers in e-commerce) as well as of outsourced firms in GVC exemplify how innovations (or more broadly intangibles), once monopolized, are used to subordinate other organizations. The other approach looks backward and delves into the social relations of production that take place in order to innovate. This is innovation as a process. In contemporary capitalism, this process increasingly takes place as networks, organized and planned by intellectual monopolies. Intellectual monopolies are not only–nor mainly–a result of giant corporations’ in-house R&D. Their knowledge monopoly is based on appropriating and monetizing knowledge results from their multiple innovation networks organized as modularized knowledge steps in charge of different organizations (from start-ups to public research organizations and universities). Intellectual monopolies also outsource innovation steps by actively engaging in open access or open science initiatives (including open-source software in the case of tech giants), monetizing knowledge commons. In this context, what is the fate of the rest of the firms–which are the overwhelming majority of the industrial landscape–and how do they manage to remain profitable while subordinating to intellectual monopolies? How are science and technology transformed in this context? What are the implications for research universities and other public research organizations? What is the place of the peripheries as profits concentrate in a handful of corporations from core countries? What is the role played by those core countries’ states in the emergence and spread of intellectual monopoly? To answer these questions, I elaborate on the concept of predation, initially defined by Veblen (1899) as a direct relation of spoliation. Predation contributes to explaining the higher concentration of intangible assets by intellectual monopolies. Intellectual monopolies predate knowledge from other organizations. Innovation in capitalism has thus grown as a power relationship. “Inventors” (those actually working on intellectual monopolies’ innovations) will at most receive a minor payment in comparison with the rents amassed by the intellectual monopoly that surveilled the whole process. As a result of this division of intellectual labour, the industrial landscape is split between corporations that control production, distribution, and consumption by controlling innovation processes and a myriad of organizations whose best alternative is to subordinate. Meeting the world’s predators In our epoch, intangibles assets’ rise cannot be understood without considering the-highly asymmetric-digital economy. Its five leading corporations represent over 25% of the S&P 500. The combined market capitalization of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) is even above Japan’s 2019 GDP. As well as their counterparts from China, GAFAM concentrate profits and (tangible and intangible) capital based on monetizing knowledge and data. Their continuous innovations rely on their exclusive access to big data sources, thus predating society by curtailing access to an input that was socially constructed. Furthermore, they analyse data with artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms that, more often than not, were developed by other organizations. They use that data to orient their business and innovate based on customized models that are capable of predicting and shaping each individual’s behaviours with the greatest existing accuracy. Although at the forefront of this new stage, intellectual monopoly capitalism goes beyond digital industries. Big pharmaceuticals are another paradigmatic example. Furthermore, companies from the most diverse industries are becoming intellectual monopolies. From State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), China’s state-owned utility company, to BlackRock’s financial data monopoly. Depending on the diversity of knowledge management techniques and on the multiplicity of monopolized technologies, intellectual monopolies differ in scope. Some are focused on narrow niches–such as Siemens’ dominance of AI for life and medical sciences inventions or SGCC’s lead in AI-related inventions for energy management (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2019). Meanwhile, GAFAM and its Chinese counterparts expand their power, dominating general-purpose technologies. All in all, intellectual monopoly capitalism can be conceived as the stage in capitalism where capital accumulation (and distribution) is led by a core of intellectual monopolies that base their accumulation (and power) on their permanent and expanding monopoly (and assetization) of predated knowledge. By synthesizing the common traits of these cases, I argue that intellectual monopoly capitalism capital accumulation is increasingly driven (and hampered) by rent-seeking and predation. Intellectual monopolies sabotage society by privately monetizing intangible goods; they are–simultaneously- capitalists, rentiers, and predators. The more their rents grow, the more the rest of the world will be deprived of access to knowledge and of a greater portion of the total value produced. Intellectual monopolies are also the corporations leading the rankings of offshored retained earnings and declare profits in tax havens, further favouring their shareholders by minimizing paid taxes. This points to the entangled connection between an accumulation strategy based on rentiership and predation that results in levels of earnings and financial strength that allow to further expand rents, this time by participating in financial markets. Intellectual Monopolies maximize their appropriation of wealth ultimately at the expense of workers of all the subordinate firms but also including their own workers. Workers’ differentiation under intellectual monopoly capitalism results in a majority with earnings below what they need to reproduce themselves and their families. To tilt the scale, unions must regain the power they lost in Western countries and gain the power they never had in Asia. A global organization of labour is required. However, this is much easier said than done. The effects of intellectual monopoly capitalism on the peripheries The persistently uneven distribution of innovation in the world is a structural truth worsened by intellectual monopoly capitalism. Intellectual monopolies originate in core countries, in particular in the United States, but their effects are spread all over the world.

### Res Bad

#### Speaking from the perspective of the west and NATO as hypothetical political actors is securitizing and violent

**Hellmann et al. 17** (\*Gunther Hellmann, \*\*Benjamin Herborth, \*\*\*Gabi Schlag, and \*\*\*\*Christian Weber, \*PhD, professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt. His research interests are in the fields of international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and international security; \*\*PhD, professor, DAAD fellow at AICGS, \*\*\*academic councilor at the Institute for Political Science, \*\*\*\* Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences. Journal of International Relations and Development, "The West: a securitising community?", 4/18/2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.9, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

Yet, to treat democratic values or human rights, for instance, **as attributes** that **specific societies possess** or acquire is to conceal **the intersubjective construction of these concepts** and to **ignore their** productive, even hegemonic power. This is the reason why Iver Neumann and Michael Williams have proposed that constructivist analyses of NATO's enlargement should consider the alliance's self-description as a ‘**democratic** security community’ not as an unproblematic fact but as a way of exercising symbolic power. Claiming a democratic identity can then be interpreted as a political practice that assigns legitimacy to NATO's actions and at the same time structures the realm of possibilities for acceptable Russian self-conceptions. Hence, the ‘**capacity to claim such identities**, and to **grant and deny them to others**, is a source of **social power’** (Williams and Neumann 2000: 364).

An approach that treats references to common Western values as evidence for an alleged reality — the existence of a transatlantic security community — risks committing an **essentialist fallacy** by taking the invocation of these depictions at face value. One problematic consequence of such an account is that it becomes methodologically impossible to distinguish between a political assertion of ‘shared values’ and its performative effects. Assuming an already existing transatlantic security community with certain ‘shared values’ and a ‘**collective identity’** tends to **reify prevalent notions of political discourse** instead of interpreting them as an element in processes of social construction. In our view, claims to a **democratic identity of NATO** or public commitments to **human rights** constitute a valuable body of empirical material that social scientists ought to be interested in. However, instead of treating them as evidence for an alleged ‘Western’ identity, we suggest treating them as a **distinct and powerful move in a political struggle** (Jackson 2006b). Invocation of **‘Western values’** or **a ‘democratic identity’** can then be interpreted with regard to their **performative effects** and **institutional consequences**.

Thus, instead of presupposing the existence of an Atlantic security community, we are interested in reconstructing processes of community formation, that is, processes that lead to the evolution, reproduction and transformation of an inter-state political space commonly described as ‘the West’ (e.g., Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005). Just like Deutsch and his colleagues, we assume that **political orders** are integrated via the **construction and reproduction** of a **sense of community** in **complex and non-linear dynamic processes**. However, in contrast to the initial work on security communities, which focused on measuring the quantity and density of transactions, we propose that the emergence and the reproduction of a sense of community should be studied by focusing on the productive power of representations in contingent processes of signification. As these processes of community formation are open ended and non-linear, they can be **reconstructed from within** by interpreting how **contentious references to ‘the West’ operate in** political discourse.

#### Concepts of ‘the west’ and securitization of Russia and China are germane to the topic – we shouldn’t have to defend them

**Hellmann et al. 17** (\*Gunther Hellmann, \*\*Benjamin Herborth, \*\*\*Gabi Schlag, and \*\*\*\*Christian Weber, \*PhD, professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt. His research interests are in the fields of international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and international security; \*\*PhD, professor, DAAD fellow at AICGS, \*\*\*academic councilor at the Institute for Political Science, \*\*\*\* Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences. Journal of International Relations and Development, "The West: a securitising community?", 4/18/2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.9, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

In a nutshell, the **re-constitution of a transatlantic community** is based on an **idealisation of** distinct **value** **commitments** and the consequent **normative demarcation from authoritarian states such as China and Russia**. What is often described in static terms as the ‘cohesion’ of transatlantic relations proves to be a process of self-affirmation that relies on the **construction of fundamental differences** and the moral de-legitimation of the ‘non-West’. This finding confirms postcolonial and poststructuralist analyses of how Eurocentric patterns of thought shape the relations between ‘the West’ and its Other(s). In this sense, the attitudes and patterns of interpretation at work in processes of ‘Western’ community formation are just one further episode to deal in a self-righteous way with differences in world politics. In the relations towards China and Russia, however, an important aspect is added to the equation. Both are regarded as powerful countries, a fact that apparently makes it more delicate when they fail to adopt liberal democracy as the **superior model** of political rule. The refusal by the Chinese and Russian governments to acknowledge such **universalist claims** makes them appear as incalculable or even hostile opponents.

**China apparently** is about to **surpass liberal countries** in economic development without the anticipated democratic reforms taking place. **Russia** in turn is attributed with the potential to **provoke Eastern European countries** militarily or blackmail them economically. When the prospects for a transformation of these countries seem to diminish, the self-confidence of North American and European elites easily turned into the fear that precious normative achievements may be in danger and must be defended against possible assaults. Thus, when it comes to China and Russia, the already present sense of superiority combines with diffuse fears of a shrinking material power basis for **projecting allegedly universal norms and institutions**. As a result, a morally superior but materially declining ‘West’ is called upon to safeguard the liberal international order before it falls prey to ‘rising’ authoritarian great powers. This is the case-specific pull towards the securitisationpole. The normative demarcation vis-à-vis unpredictable and morally questionable authoritarian great powers engender a latent confrontational posture against these states. As long as they have not transformed into liberal democracies, their moves tend to be observed with fearful scepticism.

In sum, a strong sense of superiority, which is semantically linked to the notion of ‘the West’, provides the basis for diffuse threat scenarios in transatlantic discourse on ‘authoritarian great powers’. The idea **that** **non-Western others might propose acceptable alternatives to existing rules and institutions is hard to reconcile with the self-conception of European and North American elites** as representing the vanguard of the political and moral development of humankind. This self-conception predisposes these elites to interpret those Chinese and Russian positions, which run counter to such pretensions either as ‘challenges’ for the stability of the ‘liberal international order’ or even as potential long-term security threats to ‘the West’ as a community of values.

#### NATO security cooperation is the lynchpin of western securitization – justifications for NATO action are securitizations that produce anti-communist operations and imperial exploitation

**Hellmann et al. 17** (\*Gunther Hellmann, \*\*Benjamin Herborth, \*\*\*Gabi Schlag, and \*\*\*\*Christian Weber, \*PhD, professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt. His research interests are in the fields of international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and international security; \*\*PhD, professor, DAAD fellow at AICGS, \*\*\*academic councilor at the Institute for Political Science, \*\*\*\* Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences. Journal of International Relations and Development, "The West: a securitising community?", 4/18/2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.9, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.

NATO's (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep **institutionalisation of military cooperation** with an integrated command structure including US **nuclear weapons**, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, **this project was continued** but it has certainly changed in form. **Out-of-area operations** and the development of **a globally active alliance** is one of the most visible expressions of such self-authorising practices. These dynamics were central to **re-constitute NATO** during critical junctures and have been **productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today** (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an **inherently normative rhetoric** when it stated that the parties ‘**are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’** (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a **common culture** and even ‘**civilisation’** (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interest-driven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘**indivisibility of allied security’**.Footnote6

Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the **inclusion of an autocratic state** such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked **narrative of shared norms**, values, and a common heritage **provided** a sufficiently strong **rationale for** **defending** the North Atlantic Area **against any** potential **threat**. Moreover, it also legitimised taking **whatever measures** were deemed ‘**necessary’** to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO's post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an **alliance in ‘crisis’** as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the **invocation of a normative foundation** of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation **even against the background of internal political dissent** was as much a **securitising move** as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation **was** only manageable **by** invoking **such a** normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.

The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany's membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO's double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of **alliance disruption** that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up **of the Atlantic alliance**. In these situations **strategic concepts** turned out to be crucial in **re-establishing coherence** and unity by **reaffirming the authority of the alliance** and its **ability to (re-)act**. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO's post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at **justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance** against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).

In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.Footnote7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance's global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a **global mission** to NATO's members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards **self-authorisation** in **the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’**. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, **NATO** itself **became a** **producer of a common law** where **the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention**. The specific formation of NATO's strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’être. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the **attack on ‘Western’ values** as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of **our citizens**, and **their human rights and civil liberties’** were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to **combat this scourge**. Our **security requires no less’** (NATO 2001).Footnote8

During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but **feel secure’** (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO's strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a **nuclearisation** of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.

#### The resolution’s conceptualization of data as an international political tool stimulates endless growth with limited regulation

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Data form an increasingly essential element of contemporary politics, as both **public and private actors extend claims of their legitimate control in diverse areas** including health, security, and trade. This paper investigates **data governance** as a site of fundamental **normative and political ordering** processes that unfold in light of ever-increasing inter- and **transnational linkages**. Drawing on the concept of jurisdictional conflicts, the paper traces the evolution of data governance in three cases of transatlantic conflicts as diverging definitional claims over data. The paper argues that these conflicts reveal varying conceptualizations of data linked to four distinct visions of the social world. First, a conceptualization of data as an individual rights issue links human rights with the promotion of sovereignty to a vision of data governance as local liberalism. Second, **proponents of a security partnership promote** global security cooperation **based on the conceptualization of** data as a neutral instrument. Third, a conceptualization of data as an economic resource is linked to a vision of the digital economy that endorses progress and innovation with limited regulation. Fourth, a conceptualization of data as a collective resource links the values of universal rights and global rules to a vision of global protection.

The ever-increasing relevance of the internet has contributed to the recognition of data as a key concern in social, political, and economic lives. How data are collected, processed, and shared has significant implications for contemporary politics in areas, such as security, health, democracy, and human rights (van Puyvelde, Coulthart, and Hossain 2017; Davies and Wenham 2020). After the 2013 Snowden revelations of mass surveillance by intelligence agencies around the world but also following potential voter manipulation in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, data governance has experienced a “salience shock” (Kalyanpur and Newman 2019). Data governance describes ordering processes by actors including but not limited to states, international organizations, local authorities, and private companies that relate to the processing, transfer, sharing, and general use practices of digital data. Regulatory measures on the international, regional, and domestic level have proliferated. Of the 132 countries that have at least minimal data privacy laws in place, 55 countries have adopted such legislation only in the last ten years (UNCTAD 2020). As even tech companies have increasingly called for regulation (Hern 2019), former European Commissioner Martine Reicherts has claimed that “[d]ata protection is the new business model” (Reicherts 2014). While there seems to be convergence around common standards (Bradford 2020), conflicts resulting from different approaches to the governance of digital data have shaken particularly transatlantic relations in the last decade (Farrell and Newman 2019). Actors face significant incentives to avoid such conflicts. In 2013, the European Centre for Political Economy estimated that a serious disruption in transatlantic data flows could have a negative impact on the EU Gross Domestic Product of between 0.8 and 1.3 percent (ECIPE 2013, 3). Yet, overlapping claims of control have adversely affected the transatlantic data transfer regime multiple times. For instance, in 2015 and again in 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the main transatlantic data sharing agreement for commercial transfers exposing more than 5,000 businesses to legal uncertainty.

#### Information inequality is the invisible monster poisoning debate. Debate itself is but one of the victims of the episteme focused on the supremacy and preservation of “Data” and “Information”

Triumph Debate No Date

“Triumph Debate, "We Always Say There’s A Wealth Disparity in Speech and Debate – Now Here’s the Proof," https://triumphdebate.com/we-always-say-theres-a-wealth-disparity-in-speech-and-debate-now-heres-the-proof/”

Wealthy debaters have a laundry list of advantages in Speech and Debate. Generally, the wealthier you are, the better school you go to – even if it’s not a private school, you likely live in a district that receives better funding and has more resources available. The more money your school has, the more it can pay coaches, attracting both better quality coaches (generally, not always) and being able to hire multiple coaches for one category. Your school can afford to go to tournaments that are far away, including national circuit tournaments, meaning you can face the best competition and can have access to longer tournaments with break rounds. Even the smaller issues can add up – being able to afford briefs/websites, getting an extra 2 hours of sleep because your team can afford a hotel for travel tournaments, being able to afford nicer suits and better laptops, having the ability to prep rather than spend weekends fundraising for their team to even compete, etc. And, all of these advantages compound, creating “dynasty teams”; wealthy schools with wealthy debaters who all enjoy these privileges and therefore elevate one another. Say, for example, Roosevelt HS (generic presidential named school), devotes thousands to their debate team, they have multiple PF coaches, their students never have to fundraise and can all spend time prepping, they have access to every brief, and can have a 14 person strong team because they can afford to travel to avoid event caps. They all get the best education, and with 10 students researching and several coaches to bounce ideas off of, they likely come in with some of the strongest arguments. They’ve all practiced them two, three, four, five times because their team is so large they can do as many mock rounds as they want. They show up to the tournament, not only as some of the strongest debaters, but also not being able to debate each other. Compare that with a poor inner-city public school; the LD team has no coach and was just founded in the last few years. There are 3 debaters, one varsity, two novices, so they get very few mock rounds, and the ones they get are much less productive. They can’t afford to go to tournaments out of district, so they get less out-round experience. They spend their Sunday fundraising so their team can compete, so they lose out on a whole day of prepping. The team can’t afford JSTOR or briefs. How does the latter compete with the former? I wanted to paint this image because often unless you come from a low-income school or are low-income yourself, it can be hard to see the privilege you have. You’ve never not had briefs, or mock rounds, or a coach, or a captain to read over your case. It is easy to take these things for granted. But the more we talk about these inequities, the closer we can get to filling the gap. In order to analyze the effects of wealth on debate, we compared the performance of students who attend private schools with students who attend public schools at the state tournament in Ohio over the course of the last 5 years. While this is not a perfect methodology, we simply don’t have access to students’ financial records, so this is the best we could do. We do believe that, for the most part, when talking about trends and averages, the type of school students attend can give insight on their socioeconomic status.

#### NATO is but an extension of US to legitimize it’s actions

Garey 20

(Julie Garey PHD. Is the director of Security and Resilience Studies Program; Assistant Teaching Professor of Political Science, at the Northeastern University, ２０２０, The US Role in NATO’s Survival After the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan Cham , <https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-13675-8_2.pdf>, DOA July 21 2022)

In the months following the 2003 invasion, the debate between the United States and allies opposed to the United States’ actions (namely France and Germany) continued in the Atlantic Council. The United States appealed to the alliance for support in training new Iraqi security forces, and NATO complied in establishing the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), circumventing the objections of France. But, as Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argue, the short-term damage to the US-NATO relationship was immediately evident. “By the time the war began in March 2003, the Iraq crisis was no longer just a result of transatlantic differences, but a significant cause of them. The crisis reinforced many of the worst transatlantic stereotypes – depicting the United States as unilateralist and militaristic in European eyes, and Europeans as unreliable and ungrateful allies in American eyes” (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). The Iraq case provides valuable information about the effects of NATO’s nonparticipation on legitimacy. While the US mission’s likelihood of success for finding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was uncertain at best, disputes between the allies and NATO’s absence in Operation Iraqi Freedom further damaged both the legitimacy of the operation and the perception of US adherence to international norms. J. GAREY 37 When the Bush administration acted without the alliance, it was seen as aggressive and unilateral despite having assembled a coalition for the Iraq effort and continued to pursue NATO’s support throughout the operation. Policymakers also recognized the utility of the alliance and benefitted from the allies’ participation through the NTM-I. Thus, while the Iraq War did not result in a US-NATO partnership or a major NATO undertaking, the hypotheses on the importance of the alliance to the United States are confirmed. Both legitimacy and utility led the United States to pursue the alliance

#### Libya proves NATO is an extension of US’s hegemonic actions to maintain and legitimize her actions. AND, it is the start of the US surveillance expansions.

Garey 20

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Speculation of both US and NATO intervention in Libya began with the protests in Benghazi in February 2011. Shortly after protestors stormed the city, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1970 condemning the government’s actions and applying sanctions. In the following weeks, the Security Council also passed UNSC Resolution 1973 authorizing international intervention (NATO 2012). On March 19, 2011, one day after the UNSC Resolution 1973, the United States launched Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) to further enforce the no-fly zone. In the days following the initiation of OOD, NATO placed ships and aircraft in the Central Mediterranean to prevent the shipment of arms to Colonel Qaddafi’s army. They also instituted a search and seizure order of all incoming ships. One week after the passage of UNSCR 1973, NATO agreed to take control of the multinational effort at the behest of several organizations, including the Arab League and other non-NATO partners. Beginning March 31, 2011, NATO air and sea assets deployed as NATO launched Operation Unified Protector (OUP) (NATO 2011). The mandate of OUP was threefold: to enforce an arms embargo, to maintain a no-fly zone over Libya, and to ensure the protection of Libyan civilians. Through the two overlapping operations, the United States participated in the air campaign over Libya for eight months, first as the leader of the coalition effort (under OOD), and then as a vital component of the NATO led OUP. Not only was the United States successful in enforcing these sanctions, but NATO also counted the operation as a “win.” The Libyan operation confirms all four of the hypotheses on the importance of US-NATO relations. Although many states and international organizations—including the Arab League and other regional partners—agreed on the necessity of intervention, and the UN Security Council essentially authorized the allies’ actions, the United States pursued NATO partnership to enhance its legitimacy as a multinational effort and adhere to international norms. Furthermore, the Obama administration insisted on NATO leadership because of the heightened utility of the alliance vis-à-vis other multilateral arrangements. Policymakers recognized the alliance’s capacities to coordinate the multinational coalition were unmatched by any other organization, and they wanted to ensure the successful handoff of responsibility for the mission. The United States also exerted its influence within the alliance to highlight NATO’s shortcomings in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and pushed the alliance to acquire the necessary resources for future ISR missions.

#### NATO was made to keep imperialist control around the world

Wojcik 19 – [John Wojcik is Editor-in-Chief of People's World and a political action reporter for the Daily World, this newspaper's predecessor, and was active in electoral politics in Brooklyn; 12/4/19; “NATO gathering this week did nothing for world peace and progress”; <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/nato-gathering-this-week-did-nothing-for-world-peace-and-progress/>; accessed 7/15/22; Lowell-JL]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy for seven decades, has never been the good-guy guardian of world peace and progress. Instead, it has been the instrument by which U.S. and transnational corporations can dominate the planet through military, economic, and political means.

When the situation called for it—whether in Iraq, Serbia, Croatia, Libya, Syria, or Afghanistan—NATO could be counted on to step forward in full support of U.S. foreign policy. Today it plays that role by planning, under the leadership of the U.S., war games on the borders of Russia that involve hundreds of thousands of troops and weapons and by backing up U.S. military operations in the Middle East.

NATO policy, like most of U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years, has resulted not in peace and democracy but in war, massive human suffering, displacement of millions of refugees, and, not least, incredible numbers of deaths.

In addition to being a military protector of capitalism and guarantor of its export to formerly socialist Eastern European countries, NATO is also an international outlaw organization.

Like the U.S., it has conducted many illegal wars. In violation of its own constitution, it goes to war without UN authorization and almost always in cases where there has been no military attack on one of its members. Essentially every single military exploit undertaken by NATO has been just as illegal under international law as have been the wars conducted by the United States since NATO was founded.

Instead of bringing these truths to Americans, the media was busy this week talking about the fight between Trump and French President Macron over France paying its “fair share” into the alliance piggy bank. They never bothered to touch on where those NATO dues go once they’re paid up.

When the corporate media does talk about the alliance, they usually put forward false narratives. They say, for example, that NATO was formed in response to Soviet aggression.

When the alliance was founded in 1949, the Soviet Union had just lost 25 million of its people fighting Hitler and the Nazis. The countries that founded NATO, with the exception of Germany of course, had been allied with the Soviet Union in that fight. What changed by 1949 was that the capitalists in control of NATO’s founding members were alarmed that in one European country after another, the left was growing and often taking political power.

Around the world, former colonies were breaking away from their masters. NATO was created to foster the unity of the capitalist Western countries to enable them to maintain economic and political control of as much of the world as possible. The need, as far as NATO was concerned, was to make sure the 20th century would be the century that saw capitalism triumph over socialism. The truth is that when NATO began in 1949, there was no threat of aggression coming from the Soviet Union.

If the reason for starting NATO was to counter Soviet aggression, then why did NATO not disband after the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were defeated? The reason, of course, is that maintaining capitalism and imperialist control of the world was always the real goal. From the time of the end of the USSR and the socialist countries in Europe until now, NATO has continued in this role, becoming capitalism’s global military arm.

After the defeat of the socialist countries, Russia was promised by the U.S. that NATO would not be expanded to include Soviet-allied states. That pledge was of course ignored. Instead, the alliance expanded from a dozen to 29 countries, including many on the borders of Russia. And they haven’t stopped, pushing now to grab Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—all former republics that made up part of the Soviet Union itself. On top of that, they are also expanding into Latin America, with their eyes on Colombia and Brazil.

Trump bragged this week that he had a good meeting with NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg was happy about Trump’s push for higher NATO spending by member countries, who have now pledged to hike the NATO coffers by some $400 billion.

It should frighten us that where the people rise up for economic justice, like in Venezuela and Bolivia, for example, the progressive forces have to be ready for the U.S. and NATO to pounce. It is no accident that NATO is putting the moves on countries that surround Venezuela and Bolivia, countries that have rejected U.S. imperialism. Free elections, democracy, and human rights are not the criteria for NATO action. The alliance acts whenever and wherever the interests of imperialism or capitalism are threatened.

Yet today, we unfortunately see liberal lawmakers who join in support for NATO even though the defense of that alliance and support for the U.S. military budget threatens world peace and the funding for progressive programs here at home. Even the best in the U.S. Congress, among them Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ilhan Omar, voted for the NATO Support Act earlier this year.

#### The government is key player

Stanger 21 – [Allison Stanger is an American political scientist and the Russell J. Leng '60 Professor of International Politics and Economics at Middlebury College; 11/24/21; Perspectives on Digital Humanism; The Real Cost of Surveillance Capitalism: Digital Humanism in the United States and Europe; Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2022//JL]

In the New York Times piece, Zuboff argues that the world is currently experiencing both “epistemic chaos” and an “epistemic coup.” The Big Tech companies have executed a silent epistemic coup, Zuboff warns, to which we must pay close attention if we are to sustain democracy. “In an information civilization, societies are defined by questions of knowledge—how it is distributed, the authority that governs its distribution and the power that protects that authority,” Zuboff writes. “Who knows? Who decides who knows? Who decides who decides who knows? Surveillance capitalists now hold the answers to each question, though we never elected them to govern. This is the essence of the epistemic coup” (Zuboff 2021).

Zuboff’s epistemic coup proceeds in four stages. The first is the “appropriation of epistemic rights.” The second involves a rise in epistemic inequality, “The difference between what I can know and what can be known about me.” The third and present stage is one of “epistemic chaos” that is the result of prior coordinated manipulation; this is the stage where there is disagreement about the truth that cannot be bridged. The fourth is epistemic dominance, effectively the institutionalization of computational government by “private surveillance capital.” The epistemic chaos reflected in the January 6 siege of the capital, according to Zuboff, was a warning shot (Zuboff 2021).

Who or what is driving this sequential epistemic nightmare? Presumably the appropriators are private surveillance capitalists, and the implication is that Zuboff is mounting a Marxist argument, as she seems to be pointing a finger squarely at capitalism itself. She also sees the CIA and NSA—i.e., government—as part of surveillance capitalism. Is this the deep state as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie? While Marx references feature prominently in Zuboff’s book, they are not mentioned in the New York Times essay, suggesting that capitalism itself isn’t the problem. But if the capitalist profit motive is not the problem, what is? What does any of this have to do with epistemology? Big data in and of itself is not knowledge. The interpretation of data produces knowledge rather than mere noise. Who are these knowledge creators? Is Zuboff one of them?

2 What the Metaphor of Surveillance Capitalism Obfuscates

Zuboff’s concepts of surveillance capitalism and a related epistemic coup pose obstacles to understanding, for at least four reasons. First, coups, which involve the military, have clear objectives in mind. They involve an intention to seize power. The military has not sanctioned Facebook and Google’s rising power. Yes, Facebook knows more about us than we know about ourselves and each other, and they cut off the communications of Donald Trump just as the military will close down airports and all communications in the aftermath of a coup. But not only is the military not involved in any of this, there is nothing to stop Donald Trump or any one of us, to communicate by alternative means. Trump can still send a mass email, and we can still delete and block, or simply migrate to another platform. Facebook and Twitter appear to have total information dominance only when we allow them to do so. We are choosing to allow companies to commodify our personal data and use us in this way.

Second, there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary surveillance, between whether the citizen volunteers the information or has it hijacked by a company or government agency. From a foreigner’s perspective, the NSA conducts involuntary surveillance when it exploits the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as not extending to foreigners. According to existing American constitutional interpretation, American citizens have the right to privacy; non-American citizens do not. Perhaps extending Fourth Amendment protections to Europeans is a promising change to consider, but the question that rightfully then arises is why Europeans should receive a privilege that non-Europeans do not. The status quo jurisprudence has the virtue of being non-discriminatory, as it applies to all non-citizens. In addition, consumers may volunteer their personal data to Facebook in exchange for using the platform, but that initial consent could in the future be ruled involuntary when Facebook sells the data to third parties or stands as a gatekeeper to the use of other apps requiring a Facebook login.

Third, rather than government and business being co-conspirators in surveillance capitalism, as Zuboff suggests, it is possible to find numerous instances where Big Tech and governments have been at loggerheads, both within the United States and especially when one extends one’s gaze beyond American borders. Twitter and Facebook banning the former American president from their platforms is the most recent example of the former. The myriad ways that the capitalist economies of continental Europe and the European Union have challenged the excesses of surveillance capitalism through national and EU legislation are evidence against a business-government conspiracy. If there has been an epistemic coup, as Zuboff argues, democratic governments are clearly not entirely on board.

Finally, surveillance capitalism suggests that there is something intrinsic to capitalism that is animating data collection, when this is not the case. While its economy certainly has some capitalist features, the Chinese Communist Party’s interventions in economic life are incompatible with capitalism. Beijing’s restructuring of Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma’s corporate empire is a case in point (Zhong 2021). The China Brain Project, which involves the Chinese military, harvests data from Baidu that fuels China’s controversial Social Credit System, designed to reward “pro-social” and punish “anti-social” behavior. China is also apparently interested in building expertise in American behavior modification, and Americans have willingly volunteered their personal data for Chinese use in exchange for using the popular app TikTok, which has been banned in India for national security reasons. It may not be the case, however, that securing American data to train algorithms to better manipulate or sell to Americans is necessary. A 2007 multinational study found that the OCEAN Big Five personality inventory, which was exploited so brilliantly by Cambridge Analytica to interfere in the 2016 US presidential election, is “robust across major areas of the world” (Schmitt et al. 2007).

In mischaracterizing the nature of the problem, therefore, Zuboff misses the real story. Coups are intentional, and if anything, technology companies don’t want the political power that has inadvertently accrued to them through their monopoly of information. Mark Zuckerberg and other tech titans have repeatedly stated that they want appropriate government regulation but have been forced to do the best they can with self-regulation until government again assumes its proper role as overseer and promoter of the greater good. The inherent problems with self-regulation are obvious. But it is not difficult to see that government has been slow to come to terms with the dramatic transformation of democracy’s public sphere through technological innovation.

To summarize, the Big Tech companies have not orchestrated a coup; they have myopically optimized for shareholder value at the expense of civic life. They have created products for other children that they do not want their own children to use (The Social Dilemma 2020). Further, these companies haven’t cornered the market on knowledge, as the word epistemic suggests, but on data, and data can mislead just as easily as it can inform.

## AT: Other Args

### AT: Generic

This is filled with indicts of like 40 authors and broadly says no anyone that argues:

* Political – that we cannot make systemic shifts through gradual, historical change
* Theoretical – that science doesn’t work without a new, unique knowledge production method
* Cultural – that we should reject a ‘lack of sophistication’
* Academic – that we are too cross-disciplinary with no traditional knowledge (i.e. quals not ‘good’ enough)

#### Rejecting us is a replication of oppression and supposed dialectical superiority

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 7: Four Cheers for Vulgarity!!!!)//gideon

If you want to show that your version of Marxism is a cut above somebody else ‘s, the quickest way to do so is to call the other vulgar. One’s own is sophisticated, subtle, erudite, philosophically rich—all the things the vulgar is not. Or so it has been for a century. Even outside the small world of selfdescribed Marxists, some versions of Marxism have been acceptable in polite company—but rarely the vulgar ones. What is wrong about the vulgar other is a bit of a moving target, as we shall see. The category works by contrast, as the bad term in a combinatory. The sins of the vulgarians are what you claim your refinement of Marxism is a cut above. When Marx said something was vulgar, he often meant it was bourgeois. This sense of the vulgar is that which has been stripped of its qualities by exchange. But vulgar is a promiscuous word, and sometimes even among Marxists it refers not to the exchangeable thing, but the laboring peoples and the “dirt” that sticks to them one way or another. Does it not seem strange that there are Marxists who want to distance themselves from the vulgar? Does that make them genteel Marxists? Perhaps the very notion that there’s something bad about what is vulgar needs challenging. While far from exhausting the multitudinous senses of the word, here are some of the things the vulgar can be: ill-bred, obscene, crude, base, earthy, ordinary, popular, current, vernacular, coarse, common, indelicate, unlettered, idiomatic, heretical. It’s curious how this range of meanings also resonates with Blackness or queerness and with that femininity (trans and cis) that finds itself policed rather than idealized. There are certainly strands of Marxist or Marxist-influenced thought that, while (more or less) respectable, engage with one or other of these senses of the vulgar. At the level of the concept Aimé Cesaire and negritude, George Bataille and base matter, Raymond Williams and the ordinary, Silvia Federici on the body-politic—to name just four. 1 At the level of the radical subject, consider Guy Debord and the urban workshirker, Paul Préciado and the queer sex worker. 2 One could compose a **whole countertradition of these affirmative vulgar Marxisms**. In this chapter’s thought experiment, let’s suppose that getting a conceptual grasp on the twenty-first century might only be possible from the everyday experiences of the various vulgarians **who were insulted during the twentieth century.** But first, I want to look a bit more closely now at how the insult “vulgar Marxist!” is deployed, and in otherwise not wholly compatible ways, before moving on to four other forms of vulgarity that I think are worth particular attention in the current situation. Finding the vulgar distasteful is perhaps the defining gesture of so-called Western Marxism.3 For Georg Lukács, the vulgarians think the foundations of bourgeois society are pretty unshakeable. They are in it for the long haul, building **unions**, mass **cultural institutions**, and **electoral bases**.4 This gradualism in practice corresponds to a **theoretical failing**. The vulgarian does not take the totality as the central category and sees it as unscientific. Vulgar Marxists **reject the doctrine of commodity fetishism as the root of a false consciousness** that occludes the thought of the totality. They merely practice **marxisant flavors** of each of the specialized forms of knowledge. A proper dialectical theory grasps History as a totality both as concept and as sphere of action for the proletariat, with the party as the total unifier of theory and practice—or the philosopher. Karl Korsch thinks the vulgarians do not understand the central importance of the correct dialectical method. They **lack a philosophical perspective**. For Korsch, as for Lukács, the “orthodox” Marxism of the Second International is the main target of attack. They both dissent from its social theory, where base “mechanically” determines superstructure, and also from its historical theory, which insists on the succession of economic stages and their corresponding political forms. It is too “materialist” a Marxism, not dialectical enough. Although he had some quirky vulgarian tendencies of his own, Walter Benjamin deploys a slightly different version of the vulgarian insult in “On the Concept of History,” worth quoting a little: “The conformism which has dwelt within social democracy from the very beginning rests not merely on its political tactics, but also on its economic conceptions. It is a fundamental cause of the later collapse. There is nothing which has corrupted the German working-class so much as the opinion that they were swimming with the tide. Technical developments counted to them as the course of the stream, which they thought they were swimming in. From this, it was only a step to the illusion that the factory-labor set forth by the path of technological progress represented a political achievement. The old Protestant work ethic celebrated its resurrection among German workers in secularized form. The Gotha Program already bore traces of this confusion. It defined labor as ‘the source of all wealth and all culture.’… This vulgar-Marxist concept of what labor is … wishes to **perceive only the progression of the exploitation of nature, not the regression of society**… Labor, as it is henceforth conceived, is tantamount to the **exploitation of nature**, which is **contrasted to** the **exploitation of the proletariat** with **naïve selfsatisfaction**.”5 Benjamin is resistant to the working class point of view of proletarian culture. From Joseph Dietzgen comes what one might call the myth of labor as a key resource for self-organization.6 From the labor point of view, how could labor come into its own if it did not imagine itself as the source of value? In Korsch and Lukács, what is vulgar lacks a proper understanding of philosophy. Here in Benjamin, interestingly, is a distancing from a positive sense of the vulgar, as the self-image of the working class. And not entirely without justice, but if we are indeed to be dialectians, perhaps now is the time to negate the negation and return a rude prole stare to this genteel gaze. Adorno deploys the vulgar insult in a different way. In Minima Moralia he claims that the critique of ideology as false consciousness has itself become an ideology. 7 The vulgar Marxist reduction of the cultural artifact to its basic economic determinants comes too close to paralleling the culture industry’s own evaluation of its products by their sales numbers. That which in culture might escape exchange value also escapes the vulgar Marxist’s attention. For Adorno, as for Lukács and Korsch, what is vulgar lacks a proper understanding of Hegelian dialectics, but for Adorno the dialectic needs an extra twist: absent the revolution, eternal Capital remains a false totality. Maurice Merleau-Ponty concurs with Lukács’s Hegelian-Marxist variant of the insult: The vulgarians **neglect** the central concept of **totality**. 8 By the time we get to Althusser, it is precisely the dialectic that is vulgar! For Althusser, those vulgarians think of the economic base as an essence and the superstructures as mere appearances. Moreover, they miss Marx’s crucial intervention in his critique of the economics of David Ricardo. Marx did not simply take over the object of economic science and bring a “dialectical” method to it. He constructs a whole new and properly “scientific” theoretical object. While Althusser sees dialectics as the taint of the vulgar, this is still in the name of a genteel Marxism that calls for more, not less, engagement in philosophy. If for Lukács the genteel Marxist has to bring dialectics to Marxism, for Althusser the genteel Marxist has to undo the vulgarizing effects of that dialectics in the name of a better sense of the correct method, but which is still a philosophical method.9 E. P. Thompson is famous for a book- length tirade against Althusser. 10 Yet even in Thompson there is a tactical deployment of the vulgarian insult. In his appreciation of Christopher Caudwell, what Thompson finds vulgar is a lack of respect for disciplinary boundaries and hierarchies. 11 This is not that different from Althusser’s anxiety about Marxists working in newfangled forms of knowledge such as the study of communication, who he insists need to have the objects of their field defined and policed by Marxist philosophy. In both Thompson and Althusser, there’s a sovereign form of knowledge: For Thompson, history is the queen of the sciences; for Althusser, philosophy is king. This sense of **the vulgar other** as having **tracked their muddy footprints across the disciplines** and not followed the protocols of its sovereign form is different to its sense in Lukács or Merleau-Ponty where to be vulgar is to lack a sense of the whole, although both of the latter will claim in turn to have the more elevated means of affecting the synthesis. They are all variants of the **genteel gesture** of reserving to itself a sovereign role for a more **refined Marxism**, with access to a special method or perspective. There are then **four** general **actions of othering** involved **in calling a Marxism vulgar**. The first is political. The vulgarians think in terms of a gradual or evolutionary process of historical change. They lack a taste for the political leap. The second is theoretical. The vulgarians pay too much attention to specialized knowledge such as the sciences. They lack the sovereign method. The third is cultural. The vulgarians are too close to the culture of the subordinate classes. They lack a **sophistication** about the struggle within bourgeois culture. The fourth is more strictly academic. The vulgarian ranges too promiscuously across disciplinary knowledge and lacks training in a traditional knowledge-form that is sovereign. All of these uses of the vulgarian insult are designed to produce a certain **autonomy and priority** for the **genteel Marxist** in relation to the working class. **Marxism can’t be vulgar, because** then **the subordinate classes might figure out how to apply it for themselves** to their own situation. Marxism also has to be something **superior to the sciences**, otherwise actual scientists, engineers, designers, media producers, or technical people more generally would have to be **acknowledged as co-producers of knowledge**. Genteel Marxism can’t prioritize the nexus between labor, technology, and nature, as that would pretty much exclude text-based, interpretive forms of knowing such as philosophy or history from claiming a sovereign role. On the other hand, Marxism can’t claim to critique scholarly knowledge from without. That would concede too much to those trained (as I was) in the party schools, or with organic experience with emerging forces of production. If you’ll pardon a moment of twenty-first century vulgarity: track Anglophone usage of “vulgar+marxism” in Google’s ngram, and one finds that its use ramps up steadily through the seventies and then declines in the eighties.12 The seventies was the time when Lukács, Korsch, Benjamin, Althusser, and many other Western Marxists were translated into English and became textbooks for academic study. After the decline of the last wave of first-world struggles against Fordist forms of industrial production, Marxism took refuge in the superstructures, particularly in the expanding world of higher education and state-subsidized high culture industries. There is a new range of extensions and developments of the insult in and after this peak period. Antonio Negri thinks the vulgarians limit themselves to an objectivist and economistic Marxism and fail to understand the potential for revolutionary subjectivity. He even has the wit to hint at the vulgarity of Marx’s Capital itself, which in his view falls away from the integration of objective and subjective aspects of the Grundrisse.13 Kojin Karatani criticizes as vulgar those Marxisms that take Marx’s economics to be an extension of Ricardo’s, whereas Ernesto Laclau declares that the vulgarians make a philosophical error in thinking the revolutionary moment as one that produces an absolute reconciliation of society with itself, dissolving false appearances. Cornel West sees the vulgarian as the essentialist and reductionist Marxist who thinks of action entirely as force and does not understand the discursive nature of the political.14 Fredric Jameson defends himself against “avant-garde art critics” who “quickly identified me as a vulgar Marxist hatchet man.” In some of his most popular works, Terry Eagleton frequently distances his own method from vulgar Marxism, which he puts in scare quotes. Writers otherwise as different as Samir Amin and Julia Kristeva share a disdain for vulgarians, who they think adhere to a mechanistic and deterministic basic metaphor for conceiving the social and historical.15 In an original move, Jean Baudrillard takes up Walter Benjamin’s disdain for proletarian culture’s celebration of labor as vulgar but pairs it with genteel Marxism’s attempt to critique what labor becomes under capitalism. To him, both positions already concede too much to capitalism as an economic order, which creates this fetish of commodity production in the first place.16 The vulgarian insult lived on past the high point of genteel Marxism in the seventies. Perhaps part of what happened is that as Marxism became a creature of the academy, it became a habit to cordon off respectable approaches to Marxist knowledge that could fit within disciplines. In the absence of first-world working class movements that could even appear to effect social change, hope retreated to the academy or other cultural superstructures. But there was another driver as well: Social movements such as **feminism and gay liberation refused to settle for** secondary status as mere **epiphenomenon to the class struggle**. However, the locus for articulating the centrality of these movements was sometimes positioned as outside of productive relations. The terrain of **language**, or the social or domestic and reproductive relations became the **new site of** both conceptual and practical **struggle**. Making the case for such a locus sometimes proceeded through a distancing from vulgar Marxism, to which a relentlessly economic and class-centric approach would be imputed. Times change, however. Coming out of the theory wars of the eighties, Gayle Rubin seems more concerned about “vulgar Lacanians.”17 By the mid-nineties, Laura Mulvey is surveying the media and culture industries and almost longing for a rather vulgar Marxism to return: “This Marx would no doubt have reflected with interest on the Rupert Murdoch phenomena. For most of my intellectual life, such simple correlations would have fallen into the category of vulgar Marxism. Nowadays the gap of determination between economic structures and culture seems to be narrowing.”18 Particularly in the era of **climate change,** **revisiting vulgar Marxism might be timely**. Lukács disqualified the sciences as fetishes of the particular, unable to grasp the totality, over which only the nonscience of philosophy had dominion. John Bellamy Foster has provided a whole missing lineage of those Marxists who were excluded from the genteel canon for one kind of vulgarity or other, including Engels, Bogdanov, Bukharin, and many lesser known lights who took the heavy, sweaty, gritty engagement of labor and technology with nature, and the sciences that make all that possible, as objects of attention.19 Genteel Marxism is a **wannabe sovereign discourse**, usually a traditional one like philosophy, rather than a more **collaborative and comradely production of knowledge**. The sciences and social sciences are taken to be specialized, instrumental, to reify their object. One finds variants of this genteel strategy in Negri, Karatani, and Žižek. (Žižek’s jokes are vulgar; his philosophy is not.20) But this is surely an **outdated view** of the sciences, based on a critique of its nineteenth century form. As I argued in Molecular Red, **climate science has to be addressed as** being, for better or worse, **a science of the totality**. 21

#### Prefer pragmatism over bad faith

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 6: Nature as Extrapolation and Inertia)//gideon

The conscious human subject, the **for-itself**, is **not an identity**. It is nothing but a difference, **a lack**. The for-itself depends on its desire for what it is not. The lack that the for-itself feels can never be overcome, as there is no prior unity to uncover, **nor** is there a **final form** to posit as a goal **at the end of History** in the manner of the negationists. Nor are the in-itself and the for-itself in any relation of reciprocity. The **for-itself lacks the in-itself, but not vice versa**.31 It is not Capital but unhappy consciousness that is a permanent condition. Sartre’s thought (at this time) is relentlessly individualist. Relations between atomistic subjects are conflictual. Only the objectifying gaze of an external, third-party observer can make squabbling individuals cohere into a group by producing a sense of community, the us-object. But this has its limits. There’s no God who can occupy that place for the whole species-being. Nor is there ever a time of reconciliation. The for-itself is **future-oriented**, and the future is **always open**, a realm of **freedom**.32 Sartre agrees with Lukács contra Engels (and his vulgar Marxist followers such as Needham) that nature is undialectical, but for Sartre history cannot be thought separately from nature. In Sartre, nondialectical nature permeates the human, in the form of the body, troubling the foritself. Nausea (also the title of Sartre’s first novel) reveals the body to consciousness.33 As Martin Jay remarks in Marxism and Totality: “In short, the radical heterogeneity between history and nature that was posited by Hegelian Marxists like Lukács and Kojève in order to save dialectical totalization for human practice was interiorized within the realm of human history itself by Sartre.”34 We are confronted by the facticity of an **alien world** that is not for us. And **yet we must act**, and we are responsible for all our acts: **we are condemned to freedom**. And yet **we dwell in** bad faith, refusing to accept that we are our choices. What we must do is choose a project and embark on it. The goal of such projects is however an impossible one: the fusion of the for-itself with the in-itself. There is no God to fuse with, just the inert, repulsive facticity of an alien nature. And so as Sartre says in Being and Nothingness, “man is a useless passion.”35 Such was the worldview Sartre formed in the 1930s, a depressing and dark time, where it would have been foolish to expect any reconciliation of reason and History.

### AT: Just Another Capitalism / Cap v Cap

#### Their obsession with modified modifiers around the eternal essence of capital is wrong

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Introduction)//gideon

In other accounts, the strangeness of this state of affairs is elided by making it simply a variation on received ideas about Capital.20 **Just add a modifier** to it: **surveillance** capitalism, **platform** capitalism, **neoliberal** capitalism, **postfordist** capitalism, and so on.21 The essence stays the same, only the appearances change. But to sustain that argument, surely one has to at least entertain the thought experiment that this is no longer capitalism at all. Curiously, the attempt to make this thought experiment meets with **strong resistance**. Even **critical theory seems** very emotionally **attached to the notion that capitalism still goes on**, and on. Against this trend, Paul Mason has risked the concept of postcapitalism, which has the merit of raising the stakes, even if it does not venture a language for an emerging mode of production. As Mason says, “The main contradiction today is between the possibility **of free, abundant goods and information** and a **system of monopolies, banks and governments trying to keep things private, scarce and commercial**.”22 Through a fresh reading of Marxist political economy, Mason offers a way of thinking how capitalism may have mutated that confounds received ideas about its form and trajectory. It’s a stimulating read and implies two further projects: coming up with a **renewed language** for describing the present situation and identifying what in the received language about capitalism impedes forward movement in thought and action. That this is not capitalism any more but something worse is a possibility I have tried out on all sorts of audiences, both activist and academic, for some years now. To some, this matches their experience and seems obvious, but it also meets with pretty strong resistance. There’s a curious need to find reasons in advance not to think about it. Here might be the place to play postcapitalist bingo, where I list the most common reactions to even the possibility of thinking that this is no longer capitalism. I am told that I am just talking about finance capitalism and that this is nothing new. (Sorry, but information has worked its way through the entire value production and reproduction cycle.) I am told I am just talking about circulation. (See previous answer.) I’m told that information is just ideas, which is idealism. Materialism is about matter. (Even the science of the mid-twentieth century had a more sophisticated “materialism” than that.) I’m told that a lot of features of the present still look like the capitalism of the age of steam. (Yes, you can make it all look the same if you want, but let’s try to focus also on what’s not the same and account for both.) I’m told that since the telegraph existed in Marx’s day, information is not all that new. (There are always historical precedents, long histories.) I’m told that to talk about information is the language of Silicon Valley. (Why let them monopolize the thinking about information as well as the actual information?) I’m told (usually by some professor who has tenure) that Marx already explained everything in some obscure footnote in Volume 2 of Capital and that I should read the distinguished professor’s very long exegesis of it. (Marx was not a professor, did not have tenure, and was trying to explain both continuity and change in his own historical time.) Or I am told, as if I did not know it, that the exploitation of labor still exists. (On that we can agree, but so does the extraction of rent from tenant farmers. Even slavery is not extinct. Modes of production co-exist and interact. I’m only asking if an additional one is emerging, not whether it describes the totality.) Another objection is that I am only talking about the overdeveloped world, about Europe, Japan, and the United States. (Information is now the means to control global supply chains that reach deep into the so-called underdeveloped world.23) Or that I am only talking about the “tech” sector, which is not the same as the “real” economy. (This seems like an increasingly feeble objection, given how large the leading tech companies now are, measured by market capitalization.)

#### The third class relation subsumes prior exploitation of nature in a global network of surplus information extraction, a truly free labor. Labor is dead; workers produce unique instances and hackers produce new forms, but it’s all owned by someone else. The means of production or land are no longer necessary – information is the sole vector of control. Addressing the vector is sufficient, and anything that refuses the stack is doomed

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 4: The Class Location Blues)//gideon

A reminder of the thought experiment that threads through these chapters: What if this was no longer capitalism, but something worse? Could we approach this now by describing relations of exploitation and domination in the **present**, starting with the emerging features, and work back and out and up from that? This chapter plays mostly with the sociological imagination.1 This is the ability to conceptualize the problem synchronically, as if we could slice through the social formation of the present and look at its anatomy, rather than diachronically, in terms of patterns of development through time (a topic discussed in Chapter 5, a historical fantasia). Since the sociology we are playing with is vulgar Marxist, our imagination might be drawn initially to some features of the forces of production. It is still the case that **extracting** useful **organic and inorganic matter from the earth is the basis of social existence.** And it is still the case that applying vast amounts of energy in the form of **fossil fuels and labor** to that base matter is still how the endless array of commodities around us come into existence. But both of those processes seem these days to be **subordinated to a third** form of **relation**. At the smallest and largest scales, so much of primary production and secondary manufacturing seems to be controlled by **rapid flows, extensive archives and complex algorithms** whose concrete existence is in a tertiary form—that of **information**. The forces of production that instrumentalize information extend all the way into the production process, whether in the form of **industrial robotics** or the detailed and constant **surveillance of living labor**. They extend all the way out to **global networks of measurement, command**, and control that work in **real time**. These networks of information **subsume** not only **inorganic** and **organic matter** and **energy** in their web but also **the human as “user**,” who becomes a **producer of information** **even when not working**. The value of information can be extracted even from **free labor**. The relations of production seem to evolve to enclose these forces in rather novel extensions of the private property form. Wittgenstein’s contribution to communism was his robust proof of the proposition that there is no private language, but in our time, privatized languages are everywhere.2 And not just languages: **Images, codes, algorithms**, even **genes** can **become private property**, and in turn private property shapes what we imagine the limits and possibilities of this information to be. Information is a **relation between novelty and repetition**, noise and order. 3 Novelty is extracted from a class whose efforts are hardly described by the category of labor, for the simple reason that while labor repeats an action whose form is given in advance, the whole point of these actions is to produce **unique instances** of such forms in the first place. Alongside the worker is the figure of the hacker, producer not of repeated content but of **novel form**, and form which more often than not ends up being **someone else’s property.** One has to ask whether the ruling class presiding over this mode of production is still adequately described as capitalist.4 It seems no longer necessary to directly own the means of production. A remarkable amount of the valuation of the leading companies of our time consists not of tangible assets, but rather of information. A company is its **brands**, its **patents**, its **trademarks**, its **reputation**, its **logistics**, and perhaps above all its distinctive **practices of evaluating information** itself. Some like to talk as if one could just add an adjective or two to capitalism and describe all this, but we have already rejected that option as uninteresting poetry. Maybe it’s not the same old familiar endless essence of capitalism cloaked in new appearances. For instance, call it finance capitalism if you like, but perhaps the rise of finance is really **just** a symptom. Yann Moulier Boutang invites us to see finance as something other than speculative or fictive excess.5 It has to do with the whole problem of exchange value in an age where the forces of production are extensively and intensively controlled by information: **nobody knows what anything is worth**. Financialization is a perverse socializing of the problem of the uncertainty of information about value. So let’s think of it as a **postcapitalist mode of production**, with a ruling class of a different kind, the vectoralist class. Their **power does not lie in** directly owning **the means of production**, as the capitalist class does. **Nor** does it lie **in** owning agricultural **land**, as the capitalists’ old enemy, the landlord class, does. And just as there was conflict between capitalist and landlord, so now there is conflict between capitalist and vectoralist. Capital is dead; long live the vectoralist class. It was with new forces of production that Capital defeated labor in the late twentieth century. Like the sorcerer’s apprentice, Capital summoned up forces it could not restrain or control. Capital in turn finds itself struggling against a rising class that provided the very means of that victory. If one can use an information infrastructure to route around labor’s power to block the production process, one can use the same means to make capitalist producers compete with each other on a global scale.6

#### The new class antagonism subordinates previous class relations

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 2: Capitalism—or Worse?)//gideon

Industrial capitalism was not terribly interested in workers who think and feel. It wanted hands. It wanted muscle. It was a flesh-eating machine. Whatever disgusting and terrifying power lurks in these more recent stories does not so much eat bodies as brains. This combinatory works two ways: either your mind is erased and your body is another mind’s vehicle; or your mind is subordinated to the will of another power. 9 Either way, **your mind is not your own**. It feels like some vile takeover. But what if this isn’t just a takeover, but **a whole new class relation**? Let’s start thinking through this curious class relation by being very “orthodox.” Let’s start with the forces of production, the relations of production that correspond to them, the class antagonism generated out of those relations of production, and the political and culture superstructures that correspond to that base.10 And let us also try to describe, just as Marx did, what may be emerging rather than what is established. If one **starts with what is established**, it is **easy to interpret any new aspect** of the situation **as** simply **variations** on the same essence. Starting with what may be emerging provides a suitable derangement of the senses, a giddy hint that all that was solid is melting into air. 11 The thought experiment that might result is quite simple. Here’s a sketch, to be elaborated upon as we go: There really is something qualitatively **distinct** about the forces of production that **eat brains**, that **produce** and **instrumentalize and control information**. This is because information really does turn out to have **strange** ontological properties. Making information a force of production produces something of a conundrum within the commodity form. Information wants to be free but is everywhere in chains.12 Information is no longer scarce, it is infinitely replicable, cheap to store, cheap to transmit, and yet the whole premise of the commodity is its scarcity. Information as a force of production calls into being particular relations of production and is at the same time formed by those relations. In classic Marxist style, one can look here at the evolution of legal forms.13 In the late twentieth century “intellectual property” emerged as almost an absolute private property right.14 One that makes the once separate and local property forms of patent, copyright, and trademark equivalent and exchangeable forms of private property. These forms need transnational legal enforcement, precisely because information is such a slippery and abstract thing.15 And so, like the enclosures or the joint-stock company before it, intellectual property law becomes the form of a new kind of relation of production, more abstract than its predecessors, and one that makes not land or physical plant, but rather information itself, a form of private property. Like those preceding forms of private property, this one crystalizes into a class relation. As an absolute form of private property, it creates **classes of owners and nonowners of the means of realizing its value**. Land as private property gave rise to the two great classes of farmer and landlord. Capital as private property gave rise to the two great classes of worker and capitalist. Is there **a** new class relation that emerges **out of** the commodification of information? For this thought experiment, let’s say it does. I call those classes the hacker class and the vectoralist class. **The hacker class produces new information**. But what is “new” information? It is whatever intellectual property law recognizes as new. It’s a strange kind of production. Where the farmer grows crops through a seasonal cycle and the worker stamps out repetitive units of commodities, the hacker has to use their time in a different way, to turn the same old information into new. Getting this done is not like the seasonal repetitions of farming or the clocking-on of the worker. It happens when it happens, including time spent napping or pulling all-nighters.16 The workplace nightmare of the worker is having to make the same thing, over and over, against the pressure of the clock; the workplace nightmare of the hacker is to produce different things, over and over, against the pressure of the clock. The characters of Peggy and Don in the TV series Mad Men work as midcentury prototypes.17 It’s the advertising business during the golden years of Fordism.18 Don is a creative, struggling within the agency with its owners to become an owner too. Peggy is a secretary, a white collar worker, and her struggle is to become a creative. Meanwhile, Joan is already at the top of the secretarial pool, managing it, but wants to become an owner. As the show progresses, the women make a little headway in this male business. By show’s end, Black women are just starting to get the secretarial jobs, but the computer has arrived and will make some of them obsolete anyway. Like much of bourgeois culture, it is a small business narrative, which compresses the classes and blurs the lines between them. The prize of becoming truly ruling class is always just out of reach. For our purposes, the interesting part is its picture of the activities of one prototype of the hacker class. The camera is fascinated by Don and Peggy actually doing their jobs. Don takes long naps on his office sofa. Sometimes he just wanders off. The material for his brilliant ad campaigns come from all sorts of incidental sources. He drinks too much, tries smoking pot. The whole office takes amphetamine shots and pulls an all-nighter, making speed-induced creative work full of tremendous energy and really bad decisions. Meanwhile Peggy manages to transition from worker to hacker because she actually knows something about how to address the desires of women, but she ends up limited and stymied in all sorts of ways by an industry that does not know the value of her difference. The less popular series Halt and Catch Fire shows us the early tech industry version of the same set of activities, this same work that isn’t quite regular work.19 Hackers can’t be managed like farmers or workers; they are not the same as either class. There’s no relation between the units of labor time and the units of value produced. Something cooked up on the spur of the moment might have enormous value. Long hours of slog might end up being for nothing. Being exempt from routine work is not really all that glamorous in either story, as it just brings uncertainty, frustration, pressure, and (for some) madness. Both of these shows hinge on the desire to escape from the limits of the hacker class and become owners. That’s the limit to the desire the culture industry can admit for this class. And yet both these shows portray a continual treadmill of hope and failure. Like the farmer and the worker, the hacker does not usually end up owning the product of her efforts. Unless you own a drug company or a tech company or media conglomerate, you have to sell the rights to what you produce. It is not always the same as selling labor power. You might still own the intellectual property, for example. But the hacker rarely captures much of the value of what they create or invent. Nobody else gets to be Google’s Sergey Brin precisely because there is a Sergey Brin, who is not the avatar of the hacker class, but of its opposite— the vectoralist class. He is the real unicorn: the hacker become owner. The one that perpetuates the myth that drives a million start-ups on the path to the same desire, not realizing that it is the very thing that now blocks that desire. It is highly unlikely that your start-up will be the next Google. At best, you might sell it to Google or to some other avatar of the vectoralist class. **The vectoralist class owns and controls the vector**, a concept I use to describe in the abstract **the infrastructure on which information is routed**, whether through time or space.20 A vector in geometry is simply a line of fixed length but of unfixed position. It’s a way of thinking about a technology as having something about it that shapes the world in a particular way, but which can shape different aspects of the world. You can own stocks or flows of information, but far better to own the vector, the legal and technical protocols for making otherwise abundant information scarce. If one takes a look at the top Fortune 500 companies, it is surprising how many of them are really in the information business. I don’t just mean the technology and telecommunication companies like Apple or Google or Verizon or Cisco or the drug companies like Pfizer. One could also think of the big banks as a subset of the vectoralist class rather than as “finance capital.” They too are in the information asymmetry business. And as we learned in the 2008 crash, even the car companies are in the information business—they made more money from car loans than cars. The military— industrial sector is also in the information business. The companies that appear to sell actual things, like Nike, are really in the brand business. Walmart and Amazon compete with different models of the information logistics business.21 Even the oil companies are in part at least in the information-about-the-geology-of-possible-oil-deposits business. Perhaps the vectoralist class is no longer emerging. Maybe it is the new dominant class. One could make the case here that information was always central to capitalism and that this is just capitalism. To some extent, that may be the case. However, to even think that capitalism is about information is a fairly recent perspective. It ends up being a way of retrospectively seeing the whole course of capitalism in terms of something that only emerged as a concept and an instrumental reality as one of its late products. The other point to clarify here is that there’s a difference between information as a force of production and information as a dominant force of production. **The vectoralist class doesn’t need to own the other forces of production** any more. Apple and Google don’t actually make their own products. A sizable chunk of those they directly employ are not workers but hackers, people who come up with new information, whether of a technical or cultural kind, to be incorporated into products whose manufacture can be tendered out to a subordinate class of capitalists. That might only be the case in the overdeveloped world where I happen to live.22 Many of the world’s peoples are not even workers but still peasants who are being turned into tenant farmers by the theft of their common land by a landlord class. Much of the world is also a giant sweatshop. The resistance of labor to capital is alive and well in China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The older class antagonisms have not gone away. It’s just that there’s a new layer on top**, trying to control them**. Just as the capitalist class sought to dominate the landlord class as a subordinate ruling class, so too the vectoralist class tries to subordinate both landlords and capitalists by controlling the patents, the brands, the trademarks, the copyrights, but more importantly the logistics of the information vector. The vector has also worked its way throughout the production process. This was already beginning in the so-called Fordist era. Some proposed naming it instead after the great Japanese companies that boomed in the mid to late twentieth century, such as Toyota and Sony. They were the ones who figured out how to extract not just labor but also information from the labor force. It turns out that to extract not only efficiency but also quality from industrial labor, it is best to incorporate the information held by those who know the labor process best—its workers.23 That there is a hacker class at all is in part because workers have been stripped of the information they possess about the labor process itself. In Capital, Marx mostly deals with an ideal-type political economy with two classes. But in his political writings it is clear that he understands social formations as hybrids of combined and overlapping modes of production.24 His writing on France isn’t just a grand confrontation between proletariat and bourgeoisie; the scene looms large with farmers, landlords, and peasants. So here I’m simply taking my cue from the political writings and thinking a matrix of six classes, three ruling and three subordinate. **The dominant classes are landlords, capitalists, vectoralists. The subordinate classes are farmers, workers, hackers**. Now imagine all the possibilities of class alliance and conflict that this generates. It turns out that politics is much less about the relation between the friend and the enemy, and much more crucially about relations among nonfriends and nonenemies.25 It’s about shifting alliances of convenience between heterogeneous class interests. It’s about conflicts that can take many forms, only some of them open, many of them discreet.

### AT: Other Ks

#### Stop talking about ‘subversion’ and ‘revolution’ – that game’s over. You’re playing into capitalist realism – the theological obsession with capital-as-eternal, that it must be negated or subsumed. The world’s materiality is critical but so is the lens through which we view it, and that lens has been dirtied by submission and recreation of the same essence through modified modifiers. We must understand the world beyond capital, something worse, with a new approach and rhetoric. Old systems of thought and writing are stuck in the 19th century

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 1: The Sublime Language of My Century)//gideon

One thing that the left and right now seem to agree on is that the society in which we live is called capitalism.1 And strangely enough, both now seem to agree that it is eternal. Even the left seems to think that there is an eternal essence to Capital and that only its appearances change. The parade of changing appearances yields a series of modifiers: this could be necro capitalism, communicative capitalism, cognitive capitalism, platform capitalism, neoliberal capitalism, or computational capitalism.2 But short of an increasingly allegorical or messianic leap into something other, it is as if this self-same thing just went on forever. I have a taste for the writerly tactics of modernism, so whenever I come across a piece of language about which there is such wide consensus I want to trouble it somehow. 3 This capitalism that we have all agreed that we live in, has it not become too familiar, too cozy, too roomy an idea? Why are we so devoted to its name? The reality the term tried to describe is, of course, far from comfortable. Capitalism is a world of exploitation, domination, and oppression. Capitalism, if this is what this still is, appears to be like a steam-hammer smashing not only the social but also the natural conditions of its existence to pieces. But then maybe this is the thing to ask about. Why have we become so comfortable with a way of describing an uncomfortable reality? Do we want a certainty in language that can’t be had anywhere else? That the world we live in is capitalism has become a familiar way of describing something that destroys what is familiar. 4 Capitalism atomizes and alienates. It renders everything precarious—except its own hold on the imagination. If the greatest trick of the devil was to persuade us that the devil does not exist, then maybe the **greatest trick of capitalism** is to gull us into **imagining that there is nothing but eternal capitalism**. It is hard to describe things that change imperceptibly. 5 Some changes are like the crack in the china cup that just appears one day. 6 This may well be the level of language on which the problem rests. Language has to describe change using the combinations and permutations of terms that language offers: **the combinatory**. This combinatory of terms always has something of a binary quality. 7 If this is not capitalism, well then it must be communism, the term that negates it. Since this is obviously not communism, then it must still be capitalism after all. But what about when the change to be described doesn’t correspond well to the neat digital chop between one term and another? Perhaps it is as hard to describe transitions between modes of production as it is to describe changes in mood. There was once a language about transitions between modes of production. There’s an elaborate argument about how feudalism became capitalism, about whether there might be multiple routes toward capitalism, about whether there could be more than one kind of socialism to come after. The debates about where capitalism came from are fascinating but mostly of academic interest.8 The debates about where it might go got caught up in Cold War discourse; with the demise of the Soviet Union, they appear to be moot. With the truncating of the historical time line to the chunk in the middle called capitalism, the **historical imagination finds itself reduced** as well. That language tends to work this way leaves us with a very odd situation. Now, both the left and the right alike end up working within the same language about this being capitalism. It was surely not Marx’s intention that the language he brought together to get critical leverage on his times would become commonplace terms also used by our enemies. Among other qualities as a writer, Marx really was one of the great modern poets.9 He made modifications to the language that have stuck. Of course he worked with the materials of the languages he had at hand, but he wrought something lasting: a combinatory of terms, a matrix of concepts, for describing History. 10 Like any great poetic corpus, his work contains multitudes. But a few standard permutations came to stick in the mind, like great pop songs, although maybe with misremembered lyrics.11 Here I think is his greatest hit, his epic track, the one that has become something of an earworm. Here’s how it goes: this is capitalism. It has an essence and it has appearances. Its appearances are false, a phantasmagoria of fetishes, in which commodities appear as if endowed with self-moving spirit. Its real essence is defined by these things: the commodity form, with its doublet of use value and exchange value; by labor’s double form, as concrete labor and abstract labor; by the extraction of surplus value in the production process, by the wage relation, by the rising organic composition of capital, in which more and more of it is made up of dead labor rather than living labor, by the crisis caused of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. And finally, by negation.12 One could debate endlessly whether this is what Marx really meant, but I think that’s a fair condensation of how many have heard him. It’s a sort of ur-version of Marx that has become something of a refrain. Or even a myth. There are actually two main variants of the myth here about negation. Either capitalism negates itself, brought to ruin by its own contradictions. Or it is negated by a subject that it produces as its own negation, the working class. In either variant, one thing is key: until the moment of negation, capitalism can change its appearances but never its essence. **Its essence can only be negated by contradiction or struggle**. Assorted variant tunes spill out of this rhetorical frame, mutating like genres of techno music. There are other ways to perform variations on Marx’s combinatory of terms. For instance, one can swap out the abstract verb negation and replace it with acceleration. This approach was popular again in the early twentyfirst century, as it was in the early twentieth century. 13 Here the idea is that there’s nothing that can negate capital, either in its own contradictions or in the force it produces in and against itself. Rather, the best one can do is accelerate it to its end, toward a Promethean leap into another mode of production.14 But note that this is not as much a change in tune as its advocates like to imagine. It leaves intact the mythic form of Capital as an essence. Yet faith in either the negation or acceleration of Capital has grown faint. The essence of Capital is eternal—this is the striking feature of how it is now imagined.15 Naturally, those who love it embrace this thought. It needs merely to be perfected by our love. This is sometimes called (with a stunning lack of imagination) neoliberalism. But what is even stranger is that those who do not love it seem to agree.16 The essence of Capital is eternal. It goes on forever, and everything is an expression of its essence. Capital is the essence expressed everywhere, and its expression is tending to become ever more total. The other side of the eternal essence of Capital is its ever-changing appearances. Change is accounted for through the use of modifiers. Its appearances can even be periodized. There was merchant capitalism, then liberal capitalism, then monopoly capitalism, then neoliberal capitalism. (Let’s not even mention that other and more problematic category, the Asiatic mode of production, because that was not supposed to have a history. 17) There’s some ambiguity as to what to call the current stage, however. It could be disaster, cognitive, semio, neuro, late, biopolitical, neoliberal, or postfordist capitalism, to name just a few options.18 Note that the last two are temporal modifications to a modifier: neoliberal, postfordist. Could there be any better tribute to the **complete enervation of the imaginal faculty by capitalism**, or whatever it is, that this is the best our poets can do?19 **Modify the modifier**? Besides adding modified modifiers to the sacred category of Capital, another variant is worth a mention, one that works on different terms within the combinatory. This is a poetics that opens a split within its essential categories. Its partisans tend to go a bit overboard with the binary difference between two terms that emerges out of the split, although they have not been so bold as to break too much with the essence of capitalism. Rather, it worked like this: there used to be material labor; now there is immaterial labor. It’s a different kind of labor. It’s the opposite! But what this labor produces, and is exploited by, is still only a modified capitalism, a **cognitive capitalism**.20 It’s not material any more. Capitalism itself is about ideas. It’s striking how much one can get carried away with the play of language and forget to look at the world. Somehow, I don’t think the tens of millions of industrial workers in China perceive their work as immaterial.21 Nor does this strange immaterial labor of the overdeveloped world happen without an **extensive technical apparatus**, indeed a whole new suite of forces of production, **a stack of vectors, an infrastructure**—call it what you like. The task of this little book is thus a provocation: to think the possibility that **capitalism has** already **been** **rendered historical** but that **the period that replaces it is worse**. That it could be worse gets us away from the happy narratives in which latter-day capitalism is the magic kingdom, free from contradiction and class struggle, where History ends.22 Rather, in this thought experiment, I propose to write the present as including **a new kind of class conflict**, including **new kinds of class,** arising out of recent mutations in the forces and relations of production. By putting this pressure on our received ideas and **legacy language**, perhaps we can begin to see the outlines of the present afresh, **estranged from our habits of thought**. There was once a grand attempt to have done with at least part of this great epic-poetic edifice. It started with questioning the idea of Capital as having an essence and an appearance. What if appearances were as real as the essence? Before addressing that, let’s add just a little more nuance. There were actually two versions of the essence–appearance structure. One took the economic to be the essence, but in the sense of being the base, and everything else is built upon on it. This rather vulgar version is called **economism**. In the other version, it’s not the economic, but the commodity form that is the essence, one that has come into being in history and then become the essence of history, which records its forms of appearance as a false totality or as spectacle.23 Against this, Louis Althusser took the view that the economic base only determined everything else in the last instance. The political and cultural superstructures were not mere appearances. They have their own material form, but one whose function is the reproduction of the essential economic form of capitalism.24 Whatever its merits, this version was like catnip to academic Marxists looking for ways to fit into conventional academic disciplines, because it allowed for three distinct objects of study: the economic, the political, and the ideological (or cultural). These conceptual objects conveniently correspond to those of existing academic disciplines. If things like politics or culture are relatively autonomous superstructures of an economic base, and if they have their own material form, maybe they even have their own essence! It did not take long for culture to have its own essential categories, borrowed from linguistics: the signifier and the signified were just like exchange value and use value. An abstract essence! A different one! So one could just specialize in singing the song of this (relatively) autonomous world of essences and appearances, while still gesturing to the master narrative, that this is indeed and will remain capitalism.25 If the economy has an essence and appearances, and culture has an essence and appearances, then maybe politics does too. The wonderful thing about language is that if you seek it, you can find it. Yes, politics has an essence too! It is The Political, the great fundamental drama of friend versus enemy, or maybe it’s dissensus, or something.26 The main thing is that we can sing the song of the essence and appearances of politics, while still gesturing to the master narrative, that this is indeed and will remain capitalism. I have to say that my inner modernist finds this all rather banal. **Is this the best we can do to speak the sublime language of our century**?27 Why does it all seem the same, like pop music? Variations on themes, all leading back to the same old note, that capital is eternal? One day (that never comes) there will be a messianic leap into something else.28 It seems to me that our poetry of capitalism, or whatever this is, shows all the signs of being a culture industry. Nowhere in these tunes is there that striking note of nonequivalence or that moment of defamiliarization when the roof falls in.29 One has to ask: what is the emotional attachment that we have to the idea that this is capitalism and that it is eternal?30 It has to be said that the most vigorous attempts to tell a different story, to strike a different tune, were made in bad faith. There was a time when it was a popular art form. While the Soviet Union claimed ownership of the narrative of capitalism and its coming negation, you could make a good living in the “free world” coming up with a different story. Not surprisingly, it was former Marxists and socialists who wrote most of those alternative epic poems that sprouted into whole worldviews. These former Marxists would sing of the glories of the “managerial revolution,” of the “postindustrial society,” of the conditions for “take-off” and growth, of the “future shock” of technological disruption. What these epic narratives all had in common was that they **accepted the basic Marxist combinatory of terms** for understanding History. They conceded its power, its poetry. 31 But they changed the ending. Rather than negation, the story ends with Capital resolving its own contradictions. It’s a happy ending that Theodor Adorno would have called an extorted reconciliation?32 This mytho-poetics had some currency during the Cold War. But with the collapse of the supposedly socialist world of the Soviet Union, which claimed all subsidiary rights to the great Marxist story, these counternarratives lost their force. One influential counterstory from the twentieth century survives. The author who inspired it, Joseph Schumpeter, was not a socialist, although he briefly worked for a socialist government.33 He probably got it from that original Marxist sellout, Werner Sombart. In this play on the combinatory of Marxist language, Capital affirms itself continually by negating itself continually. It negates itself, and in an affirmative way, as “creative destruction.” It can “disrupt” itself! Indeed, its essence becomes its selfdisruption. And **it is our sacred duty never to get in its way**. In our own times this old story was adapted into the belief system of the so-called tech industry, as a part of what Richard Barbrook calls **the California Ideology**. 34 Into it can be folded certain other variations, about **the “fourth industrial revolution**,” for example.35 The conceit of all these postcapitalist stories was that this is not the same old capitalism—it’s better! When people hear the beginnings of a story about this no longer being capitalism, their resistance generally rises. Unless you happen to be worth several million dollars, the chances are you do not perceive this as something better than capitalism or a capitalism that always improves on itself. Maybe it would be interesting, aesthetically and politically, to take the other fork of possible epic-poetic combinations of terms. Instead of the line that this is not capitalism, it’s better, what if we explored the line that this is not capitalism, but worse? This meets a lot of resistance too. This I can tell you from experience, having tried to write variations on this text for fifteen years.36 Nobody wants to leave the certainty of the devil they know, or think they know, for something that promises to be worse. So the bad news is: this is not capitalism anymore, it’s something worse. And the good news is: Capital is not eternal, and even if this mode of production is worse, it is not forever. There could be others. That’s the struggle today. OK, so that’s not particularly good news. But there is also this: an end to left-melancholia, that eternal sadness about eternal capitalism.37 Interestingly, few people will even attempt to think Capital-is-dead even as a thought experiment. There really is something fundamental to the myth that this is capitalism, **as if Capital were the name of a God**. It may even be the defining feature of ideology today. Ideology today is not the acceptance of a neoliberal structure of feeling or habits of thought and action.38 Ideology today is clinging to the belief that this is capitalism. To think that we live in an illusory world of capitalist realism still might concede too much reality to the belief in eternal Capital.39 I think **it’s time to be bold**. Let’s reanimate Marx’s infamous remark: “All I know is that I am not a Marxist.”40 What if we took that in the sense that he was not one of those who simply took a language and a poetic form extracted from his predecessors as a given? He was, to the contrary, the one who had constructed that language with a quite particular purpose in mind: to understand the situation of his times from the labor point of view. So: what if we kept the commitment to understanding, not his situation, but ours, from the labor point of view—whatever that might mean now—and bracketed off the rest? That makes a certain sense to me. I really am puzzled by why we should use blocks of linguistic material from his time to understand our time. **Why use Marx’s** playful modifications of the fashionable philosophy, the popular science, the political tracts, or the **technological metaphors of the midnineteenth century**? When poets or novelists inhabit old forms like that, we immediately think it’s dated or ironically retro. But somehow **we want our critical theory to still be about eternal Capital, as if it were some subgenre of steampunk**.41 Different genres of text have a different relationship to tradition and innovation, and at different moments in their development. They aren’t always in synch. There’s generally a **culture industry** that **pulps** the more **innovative texts into sameness** and an avant-garde trying to escape that sameness and do something else. If you are trying to write an interesting (rather than merely successful) novel or poem, you want to change things at the formal level, rather than ship your wine in the same old bottles. The thing is, where readings and rewritings of Marx are concerned, they seem to me to belong to the culture industry. It’s a commonplace now to read Capital as a work of philosophy or even as a novel, but to do so **with a distinctly un-Marxist reverence**.42 Like everything else, the transmission of the Marxian corpus through time is a matter of what Raymond Williams called selective tradition.43 Most textology of Marx deploys conventional protocols of quotation, exegesis, and interpretation.44 In these habitual readings, selections from the **canonic texts are ma**de to yield an underlying meaning **that subtends them**. The texts count as evidence that represents an underlying essence. Where Capital is thought as an essence that produces appearances that are false, the **Marx-corpus is read as an appearance that is true to an essence** —most of the time. Marx’s texts can be discreetly corrected to correspond to their true essence. (Writing this sort of Marx fan-fiction gives our conservative textologists enough of a thrill of originality). This essence is the veracity against which the false appearances of the world are then held to account. Alternatively, rather than read the Marx-corpus through the interpretive filter of a Marx essence, Marx texts can be read through the interpretive filter of someone else’s text. This yields all of the supplemental Marxisms: Marx read through structuralism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and so on.45 Rather than a Marx-corpus read in terms of its fidelity to a Marxessence that it resembles, this procedure is a bit different. It yields a Marx who says something other than what he probably thought he meant to say. There’s still a “real” Marx, to be interpreted, but it may be at variance with the surface of the text. Capitalism can then be read in terms of what this other Marx meant, and the surface effects of Marx that don’t conform to it are themselves residues of Capital itself. Pursued to its limit, this method tends to become post-Marxist, when Marx himself appears to be more symptom than diagnosis.46 One ends up saying, with Foucault: “Marxism exists in the nineteenth century like a fish in water: that is, unable to breathe anywhere else.”47 The paradox here is that because the reading protocols operating in the selective tradition of Marxism are rather conservative, Marx ends up snagged on the language of his times. His combinatory is not really opened up to play freely in our times.

#### Ideology is a myth – information infrastructure caused change, not an idea – reject their historical idealism

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 5: A Time Machine Theory of History)//gideon

The **myth of neoliberalism** is that **the idea** of neoliberalism **came first**, and then **politicians** like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan **made it policy** and then law. This narrative is sometimes popular among leftists despite its clearly **idealist** view of history. 48 I think it’s possible to tell the story another way. After all, what made it possible to implement neoliberal policies in the first place? What changed since the seventies that made it possible to **globalize banking** and build vast **international supply chains** to combine components of a manufacturing process from all over the world? The clue is already there in the stray fact that Microsoft came into existence in the mid-seventies. It was not information as an idea —free markets—that changed the mode of production. It was **a vast**, global infrastructure in which information enabled the control of flows of money, machines, resources, and labor. If you can use a **computer to** calculate the positions of ten thousand atoms in a protein, you can use it to **calculate a global production system that routes** around **the power of** militant **labor** in a factory in Detroit.49 There isn’t really a time machine that will take you back to the seventies. Or rather, we have only a one-way time machine, or perhaps not a time machine so much as a tome machine. You can **look in the archive** for some neglected storylines, and the past comes back as something else. Maybe something even more amazing than the surprises you could spring on people in the past if you had a time machine are the surprises the past can spring on us through the tome machine of the archive. Maybe we could practice a kind of historical art, of telling the stories otherwise, as a way of inquiring into why certain kinds of story are neglected or suppressed. The default stories selected from the combinatory of story elements may be **arbitrary narrative habits**. Here’s a story, then: **It is an error to call our times neoliberal when its politics are not “neo” and its politics are not “liberal,”** anyway. The politics of the present might just as well be described with the equally retro term alt-fascist.50 It is all about **securing ruling class power** through the manipulation of **racial and ethnic** prejudice and the use of surveillance and **overt violence** to **suppress dissent**. It is centrally about the prison— industrial complex**, expanded now on a** global scale**,** as Angela Davis reminds us.51 What is **new** is **not the politics** at all, which is a farcical double of the superstructures of old, but rather **the mode of production underneath it**. Here one might say that the economics are **not “liberal**” either and **that is what makes them new**. **Forces of production organized around information change the commodity form.**

### AT: Tech Always Good / Bad

#### The form of technology is capital – it is the dead labor of our time. There is no inherent normative being to technology; only its use for and by capital is wrong

Wark 19 (McKenzie Wark, Activist, Writer, PhD in Communications, Professor at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, Culture and Media; Program Director, Gender Studies, 2019, Verso, "Capital is dead", Chapter 3: The Forces of Production)//gideon

The first and last question that usually comes up about technology is whether it is a good or a bad thing. This can apply both to particular technologies and to technology in general. Marx can readily be recruited to either side of this argument, either through quoting selectively, picking the Marx of a particular period, or extracting a particular perspective out of his work at the expense of the dialectical and poetical play at work in his corpus. Marx has a lot of uses on the technology question. He is an allpurpose tool. Marx might also offer “tools” for thinking a bit more critically about technology. Do we have to subject technology to a moral decision only, as good or bad? How does this technology appear as a thing apart that one could contemplate and judge? From what kind of genteel point of view does it seem something separate? What range of things are we thinking of as technical, anyway? Starting from the last of those questions, it is important to situate Marx in his own times. What we now think of as technology was for Marx more a question of **the machine**. His was an era of steam, which powered factories, railways, shipping, and the printing presses of the newspapers for which he wrote.1 It was an era of telegraphy, but before the wide distribution of electric power, or the rise of modern chemistry, particle physics, genetics, climate science, or information science. Marx did his best to keep up with the scientific and technical developments of his time, but that was more Engels’s job. Marx’s knowledge of how the physical world works, and hence his materialism, stops short at a certain historical threshold.2 Nevertheless, Marx makes important steps toward thinking technology as a set of things that can be grasped with a concept. Particularly in the Grundrisse, he starts to write about **technology beyond the moral decision of whether it is good or bad**.3 He starts to write of it as having a **range of possibilities**, as something that has, as one might say in a more modern idiom, “affordances.” Consistent with the rest of his thinking, Marx comes to understand technology **not as having an essence**, but as something emerging out of particular historical circumstances. This gave him a way to think beyond the curious way that technology appears as something separate. Technology is intimately connected on the one hand to the human and on the other to the nonhuman. Indeed, technology may be **the inhuman zone** where distinctions between the human and the nonhuman, not to mention anxieties about their permeability, originate. Among other things, technology mediates senses of the human to the human. To take up just the first of these connections for now: Marx could see technology as connected to the human in a double way. To put it simply: **the content of technology is labor; the form of technology is capital**. It is **living labor** that **makes** **technology**; technology is congealed dead labor—pink goo —that then **returns to confront the worker in the form of capital**. The form of technology is capital, in that it is shaped by the objective of **extracting value** from labor (and from nature) **as** **efficiently as possible.** As particular capitalist firms compete with each other, they reach for labor-saving devices to increase output and drive down costs, **replacing living labor with dead labor**, but in the long run putting a squeeze on profits, as surplus value is extracted from exploiting human labor alone. The form of technology is capital in a second sense, too. Not all decisions that capital makes about technical change in the workplace are, strictly speaking, economic. Capital may also implement technical change that takes power away from the worker at the point of production.4 Technology is not a separate thing, then. It is intimate to the human, in a bifurcated way: **capital in form is capital; in content, it is labor**. **Labor makes the machine, but not in the design of its own choosing**. There is a parallel connection, on the other side, to the nonhuman, to nature. Technology is made of, and remakes, nature itself. Technology’s content is sensuous materiality, iron and coal and so forth, mixed with labor; its form is once again the form of capital. Rimbaud: “**If the brass awakens as a horn, it’s not to blame**.”5

#### The internet’s a liberating tool but was coopted by the California ideology to create the new ruling class in the ‘90s. The ‘hero’ of the entrepreneur hides a history of oppression and violence. Whether technology is good or bad cannot be found without first resolving class conflicts

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The Internet came out of the university and took capital by surprise. While many a scholar was writing genteel Marxist theory in the humanities, in information science a whole new mode of production was germinating. It had already transformed much of the sciences. By the nineties there was enough cheap technology around to take a punk approach and develop new theories and practices with and about it. I’ll mention just two examples, starting with Dmytri Kleiner’s détourned text, the Telekommunist Manifesto.36 Kleiner’s starting point is the transformation of the forces of production and the pressure this put on the relations of production. **Cheap computation plus the Internet** vector was supposed to **make capitalism more efficient** and enable capital to **route around the power of workers** at the point of production. It did all that, but it also opened the prospect of **self-organized peer-to-peer production**.37 There really could have been a telecommunism (“tele” = “at a distance”). Autonomous producers could cheaply and easily communicate and coordinate. This was a possibility that had to be foreclosed to enable a new kind of capture of the surplus by the rising ruling class that I call the vectoralist class. On the technical level, what developed in place of a peer-to-peer network was a **client–server network**, built around privately owned hubs— what Benjamin Bratton calls stacks.38 Meanwhile, states engaged each other in trade agreements, which produced transnational regimes of intellectual property designed to **secure surplus information** within novel forms of private property. The free creation of information would be alternately policed and encouraged: policed where it infringed on corporate monopolies; encouraged where free labor or nonlabor could be captured as information that had value. We now have the information commons as a form of disintegrated spectacle, owned by the vectoralist class. What Kleiner advocates as a counterstrategy is what he calls venture communism: “Politics is not a battle of ideas it is a battle of capacities.”39 The hacker class has to **create its own autonomous forms**. “A specter is haunting the net, the specter of communism.” 40 Like Kleiner, Richard Barbrook (and his collaborator, the late Andy Cameron) emerged out of the intersection of media activism and practice and produced illuminating détournements of Marxist texts as a way to grasp the nineties situation. Barbrook took the point of view of what he called digital artisans against the rise of the virtual class.41 What was particularly useful in these polemical texts was the identification of the California Ideology as the worldview of this emerging ruling class, one whose success is to be measured by the sad fact that even critics of “bad technology” take it for gospel. The California Ideology emerged out of seemingly progressive movements of the counterculture in California in the mid to late twentieth century. 42 Once again, repression played a role. Black militants of this period were **systematically murdered or imprisoned**.43 To give just one example, **Angela Davis** survived a criminal trial and was fired from her teaching job. Shorn of its more radical edge, the counterculture became merely cultural, and its anti-state posture made its peace with free market libertarian enthusiasms. Like the worldviews of capital under feudalism, the California Ideology promised a **universal liberation**, which turned out on its ascendency to be just that of a **new ruling class**. Drawing on the historical vision of the lapsed socialist Alvin Toffler, the California Ideology proposed a world in which technology itself was the sole transformative force of history. 44 The hero of this epical-poetical myth was the entrepreneur, who single-handedly battles against labor, state, and culture to unleash the supposedly “natural” force of technology. Once unbound, technology will show itself to be inherently the vehicle of free markets and a return to Jeffersonian democracy. 45 Hence, technology is good in essence. Barbrook follows Marx in seeking out the internal contradictions in this emerging ruling class ideology. He notes the irony of the retro-futurist celebration of Thomas Jefferson as the patron saint of yeoman democracy that fails to mention that he was a slaveholder. 46 Unfortunately, many of the tech-pundits of today lack Barbrook’s wit and historical acumen, and they take much of the California Ideology for granted. The result is a sort of conspiracy theory, in which the public was allegedly duped by a cabal of “Silicon Valley” entrepreneurs. To mask their intention to unleash powerful tools of monopoly and political control, they lulled everyone into thinking technology was in essence good when it is in essence bad. As Barbrook points out, the development of the forces of production is not magically called into being from the brains of business geniuses. In the case of Silicon Valley, it took a massive amount of state funding, passing through university research labs.47 It may at one point have been quite possible that these developments could have led to a **digital agora** or commons as well as (or as an alternative to) new forms of class power based on information asymmetries and the surveillance state. What gets erased in **both moral fables** about technology, the one where its essence is good and the one where its essence is bad, is the **struggle over the form** the technologies **of Internet** would take. Both Barbrook and Kleiner get critical purchase through a détour-nement of classic Marx texts, erasing terms that spoke to the past, replacing them with a language saturated in the emerging class struggles of the times. Interestingly, both deployed the modifier, but they added it not to Capital but to their concepts of what might come into being within and against it to negate it: Kleiner’s telekommunism and Barbrook’s cybercommunism. I read this now as a useful transitional tactic for working in and against the combinatory of terms inherited from former historical conflicts, on its way to a theory of the present situation, wherein the development of the forces of production might start to escape the porous bounds of the relations of production through unanticipated cracks. In the nineties it still seemed possible to shape a different future for the Internet, and there were many struggles around its emerging form: technical, political, legal, and cultural. We won some battles; we lost the war. Like the progressive wing of the Social Relations of Science, this was in the end a defeated movement. But that is no reason to pretend it didn’t exist. Rather, there’s work to be done to narrate and analyze the struggles of that time and those that continue as relatively novel expressions of what kinds of worlds are possible in and against the forces of production of these times.48 Marx saw capitalism as evidence in the negative that the problem of material scarcity was potentially solvable. We now see that **information scarcity is** in principle **solved already**. In both cases, we get critical leverage, in the first case, on the persistence on exploitation; in the second, on the **persistence of disinformation, noise, and information asymmetry**. Once again, **the means are at hand to solve these problems**, but the **class nature** of the existing **relations of production** are a **fetter** on the forces of production. Only it is not just the capitalist class that is a fetter on development this time—it is the vectoralist class as well. But to think of that as a problem means not only to pay attention to the forces of production, it is to look again at the class relations they both generate and are structured within. What is good or bad about technology is the outcome of class conflict **over its form and between more than two classes.**

## IP Law

### IP Law

#### IP law is incoherent and ridiculous, but its upheld by the courts – governmental action gets challenged and overturned

**Perelman 3** (Michael Perelman, American economist and economic historian, former professor of economics at California State University, Chico. Monthly Review, "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property", 1/1/2003, https://monthlyreview.org/2003/01/01/the-political-economy-of-intellectual-property/, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

The dramatic **expansion of** intellectual property rights represents a **new stage in** commodification that threatens to make virtually **everything bad about** capitalism even worse. Stronger intellectual property rights will reinforce class differences, undermine science and technology, speed up the corporatization of the university, inundate society in legal disputes, and reduce personal freedoms. We have no precise measure of the extent of intellectual property, but a rough calculation by Marjorie Kelly suggests the magnitude of intellectual property rights. At the end of 1995, the book value of the Standard and Poor (S&P) index of 500 companies accounted for only 26 percent of market value. Intangible **assets** were **worth** three times the value **of tangible assets**.1 Of course, not all intangible assets are intellectual property rights, but a substantial proportion certainly is. While the legal protection of intellectual property might seem inseparable from contemporary global capitalism, until fairly recently capitalists were equivocal about such things. During the first six decades of the nineteenth century, corporations in the United States were not inclined to respect such intellectual property rights. For example, they often paid as little as possible, or nothing at all, to inventors. In addition, the United States did not even recognize international copyrights. The free-marketeers of the nineteenth century vigorously opposed intellectual property rights as feudalistic monopolies. Their view of intellectual property rights mostly dominated political economic opinion in the United States until the massive depression of 1870s weakened faith in market forces. In the context of the economic crisis, business was desperate for anything that would return profits to what they considered to be an acceptable level. At first, business owners tried forming cartels and trusts to hobble competitive forces. In response to vigorous protests, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act. However, corporations were able to use **patents**, which were perfectly legal, as a convenient **loophole** to evade the intent of that law. Through patent pools, they could divide up the market and exclude new competitors. In this way, intellectual property rights were important in establishing monopoly capitalism. The strengthening of intellectual property rights accelerated once again as the bloom wore off the post-Second World War “Golden Age” and the United States’ export surplus disappeared. Behind closed doors, corporate leaders successfully lobbied the government to strengthen intellectual property rights that would give advantages to their industries. Just as in the late nineteenth century, business saw property rights as a means of increasing profits when economic conditions began to sour. The public never had a clue about the extent to which the government had given away important rights. Today, **intellectual property rights** claims go **far beyond patent protection** for useful inventions and copyrights for new music. Some claims are so **outlandish** that they would be humorous if the courts did not take them so seriously. For example, lawyers are now suggesting that athletes should patent the way they shoot a basket or catch a pass.2 The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), ever on the lookout for more royalties, was about to sue the Girl Scouts for singing “Row, Row, Row Your Boat” and other songs **around campfires** until adverse publicity caused it to relent.3 On the same day that the Girl Scout article appeared, a Wall Street Journal article reported that the National Basketball Association was engaged in a suit against America Online over the transmission of game scores and statistics from NBA games in progress.4 In another case, someone, in all seriousness, patented the correct way of lifting a box.5 In one remarkable case, a patient found that his doctor had patented genetic material from the patient’s own body without informing him. The patient sued for compensation, but the **courts upheld the doctor’s rights to the intellectual property encoded in the patient’s genes**.6 Absurd claims to informational property rights have been expanding by leaps and bounds. People have successfully convinced the Patent and Trademark Office to grant property rights for everything from colors to a specific number.7 The Patent and Trademark Office even registered the “frowny” emoticon as a trademark of Despair.com. Ralph Lauren won a victory in an appeals court in 2000, when his lawyers forced a magazine, begun in 1975 as the official publication of the U.S. Polo Association, to change its name because Lauren claimed the word “Polo” **as intellectual property**.8 In a similar case, when educators at the Australian Institute of Management listed a twenty-year-old course, “Effective Negotiation Skills,” on the organization’s Web site, a United States training group, Karrass, told the institute to take the course description off the site because Karrass has a U.S. trademark over the expressions “effective negotiating,” “advanced effective negotiating,” and “effective sales negotiating.”9 One critic of the patent system even succeeded in winning a patent for Kirchoff’s law, a scientific principle first developed in 1845, proving that the electric current flowing into a function equals the current flowing out.10 If an individual critic of the patent system is able to manipulate the Patent and Trademark Office into registering such ridiculous claims, think of how much profit-maximizing corporations, with enormous resources available for research and legal expenses, are able to stake out as private property. To illustrate this point, Richard Stallman, winner of a MacArthur “genius” award, challenged Bruce Lehman, then head of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at a contentious meeting. Stallman produced a voluminous, unwieldy printout of a computer program he had written earlier with several colleagues. He explained that the program was currently in use on more than a million computers, including those of the U.S. Air Force and major companies, such as Intel and Motorola. “Just a few lines of code can be enough to infringe a patent, and this compiler has ten thousand pages,” Stallman said, gesturing to the document. “How many patents does it infringe? I don’t know. Nobody does. Perhaps you can read the code and tell me?” he challenged Mr. Lehman.11 Intellectual property rights **change the nature of competition**. Most industries that do not enjoy the protection of intellectual property rights find themselves involved in intense competition, which lowers their profits. In contrast, companies with intellectual property rights face **limited competition** and can enjoy elevated profits. For example, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan recently told Congress: “Indeed, a striking feature of the current cyclical episode relative to many earlier ones has been the virtual absence of pricing power across much of American business, as increasing globalization and deregulation have enhanced competition. In this low-inflation environment, firms have perceived very little ability to pass cost increases on to customers.”12 Let us decode the Chairman’s words. For agricultural products, steel, and other commodity-like goods with no intellectual property protection, competitive forces put powerful pressure on profits. If the entire economy were like those industries, a severe crisis would engulf it. In particular, those industries that depended on intellectual property would tend to be especially vulnerable. Reproduction costs for software, pharmaceuticals, or movies are trivial. In the language of economics, marginal costs are small and fixed costs are high. Without the legal protection of intellectual property rights, strong competition in such industries would mean certain bankruptcy. Consequently, **monopoly** in these sectors **is essential**, and **monopoly** is **made possible by intellectual property rights protection**. A few years earlier, Greenspan was emphasizing a different part of the economy, breathlessly rhapsodizing about a weightless economy: The world of 1948 was vastly different from the world of 1996. The American economy, more then than now, was viewed as the ultimate in technology and productivity in virtually all fields of economic endeavor. The quintessential model of industrial might in those days was the array of vast, smoke-encased integrated steel mills in the Pittsburgh district and on the shores of Lake Michigan. Output was things, big physical things. Virtually unimaginable a half-century ago was the extent to which concepts and ideas would substitute for physical resources and human brawn in the production of goods and services. In 1948 radios were still being powered by vacuum tubes. Today, transistors deliver far higher quality with a mere fraction of the bulk. Fiber-optics has [sic] replaced huge tonnages of copper wire, and advances in architectural and engineering design have made possible the construction of buildings with much greater floor space but significantly less physical material than the buildings erected just after World War II. Accordingly, while the weight of current economic output is probably only modestly higher than it was a half-century ago, value added, adjusted for price change, has risen well over threefold.13 Over and above the obvious exaggeration, Greenspan’s words here appeal to the marvels of high technology. But the so-called weightless economy has more to do with the legislated powers of intellectual property that the government granted to powerful corporations.14 For example, companies such as Nike, Microsoft, and Pfizer sell stuff that has high value relative to its weight only because their intellectual property rights insulate them from competition. In his more recent testimony, Greenspan noted, however, “a firm is inherently fragile if its value-added emanates more from conceptual as distinct from physical assets.”15 This possibility would be even more terrifying to holders of intellectual property was it not for the powerful protection that the state provides. Not a day goes by when some legislature or some courtroom fails to grant new powers to holders of intellectual property. Intellectual property rights are in the process of corrupting society in a number of ways. First of all, intellectual property rights will **reinforce class differences**. Worldwide, the rich have become richer to an unimaginable extent in recent years. The members of the “Forbes 400,” a compilation of the 400 richest people in the United States, have a combined net worth of $1 trillion-greater than the gross domestic product of China.16 Between 1995 and 1998, the average annual income for a member of this elite group rose from $50 million to a staggering $110 million. The obscene wealth of a Bill Gates of Microsoft, a Phil Knight of Nike, and all of the other instant Internet billionaires, alongside the sizable residue of poverty that blights the contemporary United States, reminds us of the link between the distribution of income and intellectual property. Emblematic of the extent of this new distribution of property, in 1999 outside of those who have inherited their wealth, three of the four richest people in the world, according to a Forbes magazine survey, owed their wealth to Microsoft, one of the major holders of intellectual property rights, befitting the so-called New Economy in which “DOS Capital” has supplanted Das Kapital.17 Perhaps the famous trickle down effect could justify the obscene maldistribution of wealth if intellectual property rights actually improved productivity. In fact, intellectual property rights are terribly destructive of productivity on many counts. First of all, intellectual property rights undermine the very science and technology that they are supposed to promote. Intellectual property rights are to science what tollbooths are to highway traffic. Both create bottlenecks and impede forward progress, but in the case of intellectual property rights, innumerable disputes arise about who gets to collect the tolls and how much the tolls should be. To the extent that the present system of intellectual property rights constricts the flow of new technologies, it imposes another incalculable cost on society. For example, virtually no new technology is the product of a single person or even a single corporation. Ideas and discoveries, what Marx called “universal labor,” draw upon a multitude of sources. Sorting out who deserves legitimate credit for any technology is impossible. Just consider the complexity of a large software system with 100,000 components. It can use hundreds of previously patented techniques. Because each patent search costs about a thousand dollars, searching for all the possible patent potholes in the program could easily run well over $1 million, and that far exceeds the cost of writing the program.18 Intellectual property rights spawn a system of wasteful litigation. Already, by the early 1990s, Intel’s annual litigation budget alone was believed to be at least $100 million. No doubt it has grown significantly since then. Intellectual property rights also create an atmosphere of **secrecy**, which is **inimical to scientific progress**. Finally, the quest for intellectual property rights is speeding up the **corporatization of the** university. Universities now routinely **sell to corporations** the rights to the patents developed in university laboratories, often at public expense. While energy sources are the central to maintaining life itself, let alone the capitalist mode of production, intellectual property rights are now every bit as important in maintaining the international financial balances of the U.S. economy. Domestic access to oil will remain important, of course, so long as the comfortable classes continue to ride in their SUVs and heat and cool their mega-mansions, but the energy requirements for the domestic production of material goods becomes increasingly less important as production moves to low-wage peripheral areas of the world. Intellectual property rights have become the financial counterweight to deindustrialization, because the revenues that they generate help to balance the massive imports of material goods. Unfortunately, this means of payment still remains woefully insufficient to reimburse the rest of the world for the imports to United States. The strengthening of intellectual property rights is perhaps the **most pressing U.S. foreign policy objective** today, possibly even **more so than oil.** The government’s efforts go well beyond shoring up the legal rights of holders of this kind of intellectual property. The full weight of its power is brought to bear against all evildoers who would dare to create knock offs of a Disney cartoon or a Nike “swoosh.” In the words of Thomas Friedman, perhaps the most enthusiastic proponent of globalization at the New York Times: The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist—McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps….Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.19 Lest the skeptical reader dismiss Friedman’s clever phrasing as nothing more than a rhetorical flourish, consider the words of William Cohen, the secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. In February 1999, upon his arrival in Seattle—a city that a few months later became a symbol of resistance to the policies that he was sent to advocate—to speak to the employees of Microsoft, the secretary told reporters, “I will point out that the prosperity that companies like Microsoft now enjoy could not occur without having the strong military that we have.”20 Friedman and Cohen have expressed what is probably the central thrust of the foreign policy of the government of the United States. Guarding the property rights of typical material commodities is relatively simple. Because most commodities are assembled in stores or warehouses, the owners merely have to watch over the commodities in question to ensure that unauthorized people do not take possession of them. In the case of intellectual property, the materiality of the good is irrelevant. A song or a program can be downloaded virtually everywhere by anybody. As a result, protecting intellectual property requires **control over people rather than things**. Consequently, the protection of intellectual property is necessarily **more intrusive** than for material commodities. Purveyors of intellectual property implore the government, often with success, to mandate modifications that limit the capacity of modern technologies to violate intellectual property rights—even if they cause inconvenience to the consumers whom capitalism is supposed to serve. A frightening, albeit ridiculous, example of this invasiveness came from a Canadian case in which **a farmer was accused of “**stealing” Monsanto’s intellectual property **by planting genetically engineered seeds**. The farmer protested that he had not planted Monsanto’s seeds. The judge ruled that even though the court had no evidence to prove that the genetic material had not **drifted onto his property in pollen from** other farms, this **farmer had the obligation to police his fields** to **protect Monsanto’s intellectual property**. According to the decision, “the source…is really not significant….Growth of the seed, reproducing the patented gene and cell, and sale of the harvested crop constitutes taking the essence of the plaintiffs’ invention, using it, without permission. In so doing the defendants infringed upon the patent interests of the plaintiffs.”21 Of course, to expect farmers to **prevent pollen from drifting onto their** fields strains credulity—even in a corporate-dominated society. So here is a property right that undermines science, burdens the economy with expensive litigation, and infringes on personal freedom. To make matters more absurd, public research forms the basis of the great advances in intellectual property. Yet the leaders of the capitalist world can find no better way to lift the rate of profit than to promote the expansion of intellectual property rights.

#### Intellectual property is a tool of neocolonialism for the US’s project of global control

Ferrer 19 (Cory Ferrer, (now a) PhD in communication, 2019, thesis to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado for a degree in the Department of Communications, "THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS")//gideon

Several efforts have been made to create a **homogenous IP system** for the **whole planet**, beginning with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883. However, 11 these efforts have accelerated significantly since the 1990s, particularly with the rise of **economic neoliberalism**. The US, specifically, has led the way in terms of helping to spread **Western-style IP regimes** around the globe. Across administrations, both Republican Democrat, the United States government has made recognition of **US intellectual property** a **mandatory requirement** for favorable trade terms (Marcellin 15). Losing favorable trade terms with the US could provide a significant blow to countries with smaller economies. The US is currently the largest consumer market in the world, the largest supplier of foreign aid, and one of the world’s largest exporters of foreign direct investment (“Top 10”; “25 Largest”; “World”). As this thesis will demonstrate, the US also hasn’t hesitated in its use of **punitive economic sanctions** to **pressure other nations** into **changing their IP laws for the benefit of US exporters**. This means that countries with smaller economies are often caught between a proverbial rock and a hard place when they must choose between determining their own IP laws and maintaining favorable relations with the world’s largest economy. America’s role in **standardizing global IP laws is no accident**. During the second half of the 20th century, the US export economy shifted heavily from commodities and manufactured goods to industries such as software, entertainment, and pharmaceuticals, all of which are easily copiable and rely heavily on IP protection. Law and media scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan writes: “Not coincidentally, the export of film, software, and the spread of brands like Starbucks around the world followed a period of de-industrialization. If the United States could not sell as many Chevrolets to the rest of the world, at least it could get people to sit through Spider-man movies” (Vaidhyanathan 14). Political economist Sherry Marcellin points out that “in 1947…IP accounted for less than 10% of all US exports…by 1994, well over 50%” (Marcellin 2). US President Donald Trump went so far as to call the US tech industry’s IP the “crown jewels” of 12 America (“China”). The amount of money riding on other countries’ protection of American IP cannot be understated. One estimate maintained that US firms lost **$2.5 billion a year** in the pharmaceutical industry alone in lost sales on account of patent infringement. (Marcellin). However, some observers have pointed out a certain historical hypocrisy, in that while the US has long had strong IP protection for American IP holders, the nation **didn’t recognize other nations’ IP** until the Paris Convention in 1883 and made liberal use of copyrighted works and patented technology from Europe during its own industrial revolution (Vaidhyanathan; Kasson). In addition to pushing IP protections though bilateral trade agreements, the US and its firms have successfully pushed for IP-favorable policy in large multilateral trade organizations, notably the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since the WTO’s trade policy provided the basis for the lawsuit in the case study of this thesis, it’s worth taking a closer look at the organization. The trade federation grew out of a treaty called Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1948 by 23 countries1 . Prior to World War II, most of the world’s major Western economies preferred protectionist trade policies, like tariffs and subsidies, to keep foreign competition out of their domestic markets, and retaliatory trade wars were prevalent (Hoekman). As Western economies developed greater surpluses to export, however, they realized that they could unlock more economic growth by coaxing their fellow countries to lower their import barriers. As political scientist Clara Park succinctly puts it, “Trade agreements are essentially about promoting domestic firms abroad and protecting domestic firms at home against foreign competition” (Park 31). Since lowering your own trade barriers would make your country more vulnerable to foreign competition, it would only be advisable if they agreed to lower their trade barriers for your exporting domestic firms as well. It is important to note that this arrangement is better for wealthier countries capable of generating large surpluses of goods to ship around the world. The GATT treaty essentially created a trade war ceasefire and a set of standards for lowering trade barriers among its signatories (“Fiftieth”). However, the treaty lacked a clear enforcement mechanism. If you felt another country violated your trade rights, you would basically be left to work it out on your own. The WTO was then created in the “Uruguay Round” of negotiations (1986-1993), to provide a consistent, stable institution for negotiating and enforcing trade agreements that would lower export barriers among member countries (Hoekman & Mavroidis). The trade network has now grown to 159 countries since its formal launch in 1995 (Hoekman & Mavroidis). But does it serve all their interests evenly? According to the WTO website, “The [organization] is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole…Decisions are normally taken by consensus” (WTO). While in theory, consensus sounds like the fairest possible standard for making decisions, it’s much harder to pull off in practice. Consensus here doesn’t mean “jury consensus,” where everyone gets an anonymous vote and you keep deliberating until all agree. It’s more like “wedding consensus” where you stop the ceremony partway through and ask, “if anyone objects to this union, speak now or forever hold your peace.” Much of the actual negotiating takes place in **highly exclusive “green room meetings**” (so called because the original room was in fact painted green), and then **prepackaged decisions** are offered to the rest of the member countries to ratify. If a nation’s interests will be negatively affected by the decision, the burden is on them to force the issue (Hoekman & Mavroidis). 14 Capacity also creates barriers to equal negotiations. Smaller and less wealthy countries like Uganda can often only afford to send a handful of negotiators to advocate for their interests, while the US and other wealthy countries often send over **a hundred**. Furthermore, if a nation’s treaty rights have been violated by a member country, initiating a dispute requires considerable **documentation and negotiating capacity**, creating barriers for less economically developed countries (Kim). Lastly, countries with vastly different economic resources are never really in equal negotiating positions. All the leverage previously mentioned that America possesses for bilateral negotiations is still in play for large multilateral agreements. Therefore, it was largely through the **lopsided influence of the US** that the **WTO made IP an important feature of global trade policy**. The TRIPS agreement, mandatory for all WTO members, maintains that each of the member states must recognize the IP claims of other member states. In strictly economic terms, this clearly benefits some countries more than others. Net exporters of intellectual property, like the US, stand to gain from their entertainment and tech industries, whereas poorer countries that mainly export commodities or are net-importers of technology will bear the high costs of paying for the monopoly prices of patented and copyrighted goods without gaining much benefit themselves. The economist E. Penrose, writing in 1951, summed this up succinctly: …any country must lose if it grants monopoly privileges in the domestic market which neither improve nor cheapen the goods available, develop its own productive capacity nor obtain for its producers at least equivalent privileges in other markets. No amount of talk of about the ‘economic unity of the world’ can hide the fact that some countries with little export trade in industrial goods and few, if any, inventions for sale have nothing to gain from granting patents on inventions worked and patented abroad except the avoidance of unpleasant foreign retaliations (quoted in Marcellin 5-6) In other words, global patents represent a “win-lose” rather than a “win-win” situation, with wealthy IP exporters gaining the benefits and IP importers paying the price. Furthermore, 15 research and development (R&D) in cutting-edge industries requires both a highly educated workforce and surplus investment capital, which are typically only found in the industrialized nations of the Global North. The following map (see Appendix, fig 1.) shows each nation according its number of international patents, as of 2006. Together, the US, the EU, Japan, and South Korea practically eclipse the entire rest of the world. The only significant change since 2006 is that, now (2019), China would be significantly larger. However, this map still clearly demonstrates that R&D is highly localized within a handful of the World’s wealthiest nations and follows the “Brandt Line” said to separate the Global South and Global North. The transplantation of intellectual property systems is even further complicated by the fact that not all cultures share the set of values on which Western IP is founded. As legal scholar Akalemwa Ngenda argues, intellectual property is based on Western conceptions of property that are “individualistic- commodity- and incentive based,” presuming that cultural works are the product of one author, that their worth lies in their exchange value, and that their creators are self-interest maximizers driven by the profit incentive (Ngenda 66). He points out that many cultures have their own systems of governing the proprietary rights of cultural reproduction that are directly at odds with IP. For example, in Australian Aboriginal cultures, knowledge tends to be communally owned, and its value is derived from its religious use, placing it at odds with the concept of an individual creating a commodity to be sold. Furthermore, the right of reproducing certain cultural works may come with “custodial obligations—for instance, the obligation not to allow reproduction of a work without a full appreciation of its ancestral meaning or power” (Ngenda 68). Significantly, this approach is also at odds with the idea of a “free for all” cultural commons, what many of IP’s Western critics push for, and what happens to cultural works whose copyrights expire (Ngenda). 16 Thus, transplanting Western standards of intellectual property can create both cultural and economic conflicts, and, as demonstrated by the case of HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa, barriers to accessing vital technology. The World Health Organization (WHO) has even identified strict enforcement of patents across borders as a barrier to accessing essential medicines. All the problems that patent thickets can create for manufacturing high-tech goods can only be amplified in countries with less economic means. Lastly, this practice benefits the Global North at the expense of the Global South, reproducing colonial relationships that privilege powerful (mostly Western) countries at the expense of poorer and often formerlycolonized states. These power relationships will be discussed in the following section. The second half of the 20th century marked a profound shift in the global political order, as, one by one, most of the African, Asian, and Middle Eastern colonies of the old European empires began winning independence, officially ending a geopolitical structure in which legal authority for much of the planet resided solely with Western elites. The 1950s through 1970s saw not only the dissolution of sometimes centuries-old European empires, but the consequential emergence of newly independent nation-states like India, Algeria, and Kenya. The world suddenly appeared much more pluralistic and decentralized. However, many critics have argued those appearances are deceiving. While no longer directly administering the governments of the Global South, Western industrialized nations have continued to benefit from the **historical legacy of colonialism** and from vast **asymmetries of economic and military power**, often using this power to continue influencing life in the former colonies. 17 Kwame Nkrumah, revolutionary and first president of independent Ghana, writes that “neo-colonialism…represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its **most dangerous stage**” (Nkrumah ix). “Neo-colonialism” is a critique of political relations that implies either a new form of colonialism or a continuation of colonial relations. Nkrumah goes on to define the term: “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from the outside” (Nkruma ix). While this “direction” can take a variety of forms, Nkrumah argues that it is most often “exercised through economic or monetary means” (Nkrumah ix). Neocolonialism can include powerful nations using **foreign aid** to **prop up administrations** willing to give favorable trade terms in return for support. It can also take the form of nations from the Global North using their leverage in trade agreements and international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund to create policies and laws which **favor their economies** at the expense of the Global South. The TRIPS agreement, I argue, is such a **neocolonial law** because it privileges the economic interests of the Global North at the expense of people who need medicine (to say nothing of other products) in the world’s poorer countries. This thesis will demonstrate how global **IP enforcement** has been a site of **neocolonial domination**, particularly the ways in which the US has directed other countries’ policies from the outside using various forms of economic coercion. While these relationships of dominance and coercion may be enacted through mostly economic means, they must be **publicly legitimized or concealed** to continue. To excavate the role that rhetoric specifically plays in reinforcing and upholding neocolonial power relations, we turn to de/post-colonial theory. Western thinking about non-Western cultures is historically built 18 on a foundation of colonialism, one in which there is a fundamental division between “the West” and “the Rest” (Hall). Writing specifically about the West’s relationship to Asia and the Middle East, Said writes: “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Said 10). He goes on to argue that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (Said 11). We begin with a relationship of division. If Burke argued that “identification” is the essential feature of rhetoric, here we have an example of “dis-identification,” of creating a clear set of categories by which cultures should be understood as different (Ott et al.).

#### IP exports are a project of both corporations and the government

Ferrer 19 (Cory Ferrer, (now a) PhD in communication, 2019, thesis to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado for a degree in the Department of Communications, "THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS")//gideon

While all IP-exporting countries may, in principle, benefit from a globalized IP system, no nation has pushed more aggressively for its adoption of late than the United States (US). As this chapter will demonstrate, the US has used its **economic power** to **coerce other nations** into changing their policies and has campaigned vigorously for the inclusion of **IP protection in international law**. This chapter will identify the key actors in this campaign and explore their rhetoric. How the world came to have such **strong IP laws** is a story of both corporate influence on the US government and the US government’s influence on foreign countries. Consequently, this chapter will take a multi-pronged approach to this history, analyzing rhetorics from both government and lobbyists. First, I will discuss the United States Trade Representative (USTR), an office of the federal government instrumental in advocating for stronger Global IP protection, examining its IP related public facing documents and the laws which shape and enable its powers. I will then summarize the history of the pharmaceutical industry’s influence campaign on the US government, largely responsible for making **global IP standards a US foreign policy priority**. The chapter will then discuss the USTR’s response to South Africa’s Medicines Act of 1997, demonstrating the agency’s opposition to the legislation and its **rhetorical framing** of states who defy US demands. I will then analyze the USTR’s 2018 report, exploring the ideological commitments both manifest and latent there and discussing the ways in which the organization’s rhetoric has both changed and stayed the same. Finally, the chapter will turn its attention to the lobbying perspective, briefly summarizing the history of the United States Chamber of 23 Commerce (USCOC) and analyzing its 2017 pamphlet “The Roots of Innovation,” which makes a strong case for strengthening IP protection in foreign markets. I will conclude the chapter by discussing the common themes and parallels between these documents. Ultimately, I argue that the ideology supporting this push to align the South African IP regime (and, indeed, those of the Global South more broadly) with those of the United States draws on a neo-colonial conception of world relations, one in which Western standards are understood as universal, modern, and moral.

#### USCOC lobbying overcomes any resistance – shadow corporations fund massive resistance. It’s ridiculous that debate has

Ferrer 19 (Cory Ferrer, (now a) PhD in communication, 2019, thesis to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado for a degree in the Department of Communications, "THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS")//gideon

The second document we will examine represents the perspective of a corporate lobbying group advocating for stronger global IP protection: the US Chamber of Commerce (USCOC). Like patents themselves, chambers of commerce have a long history extending back into Europe, the first being founded in France in 1599 (“Chamber of Commerce”). A chamber of commerce is essentially a **consortium of local** businesses who join forces to lobby governments and advance their mutual interests. Most chambers of commerce operate at the local level, but in 1911, US President William Howard Taft called for all the local chambers in the United States to connect on a national level, appealing for a "central organization in touch with associations and chambers of commerce throughout the country and able to keep purely American interests in a closer touch” (“U.S. Chamber’s History”). Over the past century, the US Chamber of Commerce (USCOC) has become the largest lobbying organization in America, spending over US $132 million on lobbying in 2010, **more than the second, third, and fourth largest lobbying organizations combined** (“The U.S. Chamber”). USCOC’s website proudly describes the organization as a “**lobbying and political powerhouse with expanded influence across the globe**” (“Thomas”). In the words of Alyssa Katz, author of The Influence Machine, “The U.S. Chamber 37 of Commerce is not just a lobbying group, and not just a massive political spending apparatus, and not just a policy shop, and not just a prolific combatant in the courts. It is, rather, all of those things wrapped into one—a well-funded **influence machine** seeking to build an economy where government becomes a tool of big business” (Katz xiii). USCOC has taken several controversial stands throughout US history: opposing the New Deal, opposing US involvement in World War II, opposing portions of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Clean Air Act, as well as supporting McCarthyism (McKibbon; “The U.S. Chamber”). The organization has drawn criticism for allowing member **corporations** to **lobby for unpopular positions without paying a reputational cost**. Since its books are not public, nobody knows who funds the Chamber; however, as of 2010, 55% of its funding came from just 16 businesses (“U.S. Chamber”). Because corporations can lobby through them anonymously, the organization has often drawn companies whose business interests are not in line with what the public wants. Katz goes on to write that the USCOC, …has built its recent success in large part by advancing the **interests of industries whose prosperity is threatened… by** emerging trends in human history—by the evolution of our **values**, **technology**, scientific **knowledge**, and notions of **environmental stewardship**. Its constituents…are mature industries that provide vital goods and services but at mounting costs to society…What unites all these industries…is that achieving **business success** depends on inflicting collateral damage on public well-being… By doing their political and lobbying spending through the Chamber, beloved brand names are never sullied with the causes they finance (Katz xiii-xiv). While not trying to insinuate that everything the USCOC advocates is detrimental (consider their current opposition to President Trump’s trade war, or their support for a new infrastructure spending bill), I would concur with Katz that overall, this organization is an extremely wellfunded, organized lobbying force advocating primarily for companies that would rather not be seen supporting their unpopular causes. 38 Katz goes on to argue that the USCOC “frames the objectives of these specific companies and industries as those of ‘business’ generally…the causes of ‘free enterprise’” (Katz xiv). The rhetorical move of cloaking specific interests behind broad platitudes about progress and free enterprise will be an important part of USCOC rhetoric calling for **IP “harmonization.”** While the USCOC may claim to speak for all US businesses, a growing movement of US firms have disavowed the USCOC as an organization that does not speak for them, especially because the organization’s current stance against addressing climate change. Apple, Microsoft, and Nike have left positions in the USCOC, while local chambers of commerce in Seattle, San Francisco, and New York have cut ties with the national organization (“U.S. Chamber”). While cutting into its public image as an organization that speaks for all US businesses, these defections have not slowed down the USCOC’s lobbying efforts.

#### Gets Coopted – presidential influence, political party control, and the military-industrial complex

**Faunce 5** (Thomas Faunce, PhD, Professor at the Australian National University, Law and Medical school, focus on health law and bioethics. Springer, "GLOBALIZATION ANDHEALTH: Challenges for Health Law and Bioethics ", 7/24/2005, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228174897\_Global\_Intellectual\_Property\_Protection\_for\_Innovative\_Pharmaceuticals\_Challenges\_for\_Bioethics\_and\_Health\_Law, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

From 1981, Edmund Pratt, then CEO of the Pfizer pharmaceutical company, in his capacity as chair of the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had been consulting directly with the US President about placing foreign intellectual property protection on the US trade agenda (Ryan 1998). At this time, the US commenced a series of **bilateral negotiations on patents, copyright and trade** with countries such as Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Hungary and Taiwan. US intellectual property negotiators apparently discovered, however, that financially more effective outcomes emerged once their **trade colleagues did most of the bargaining** (Enyart 1990, 54). The task of making GIPP a primary object of US trade policy was skillfully executed. Pharmaceutical company lobbyists, as mentioned earlier, had previously sowed the idea of linking trade and intellectual property **rights in various levels of the relevant US** bureaucracy, government and academia. At the same time, they increased the size of their contributions to the election **campaign funds of** the two major US political parties. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) seems to have been by-passed in the task of promoting GIPP, perhaps because the US and other OECD nations considered it lacked sufficient enforcement tools or motivation (Abbott 2002, 315).

#### Corporations block it – they have two lobbyists per member of congress

**Gathii 16** (James Gathii, PhD, Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He is a graduate of the University of Nairobi and Harvard Law School. Strength in Intellectual Property Protection and Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Least Developed Countries, "Strength in Intellectual Property Protection and Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Least Developed Countries", 2016, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1577&context=facpubs, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

This new policy of enhanced international protection of U.S. IPR further sought to link trade to IPR. This link would achieve two further U.S. aims. First, it would steer away from WIPO, which was increasingly becoming a center of gravity for the revision of the Paris Convention for developing countries.77 Second, and most importantly, such a move would give the U.S. an additional mechanism, the international trading system, through which to crank up support and observance of its IP rights; particularly through the legally binding and compulsory dispute settlement system established by the Uruguay Round." Of course, these policy shifts did **not** occur **in a political vacuum**. A group of high technology multinational corporations known as the **Intellectual Property Committee** (IPC)79 played a critical role in influencing these policy shifts.so Links between the IPC and the U.S. federal government resulted in a powerful **private/public sector collaboration**. For example, Edmund Pratt Jr., then chairman and CEO of Pfizer, had been a member of President Carter's Advisory Committee on Trade and Policy Negotiations (ACTPN) since 1979, which was created under the 1974 Trade Act.i The role of this private sector advisory group is and was to advise the U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) on trade policy, as well as to review and report to Congress on the work of the USTR.8 2 Pratt and IBM chairman John Opel jointly chaired the IP task force of the ACTPN.83 This successful private/public collaboration is not surprising in part because it was and still is **entrenched within the federal government's trade policy and negotiating apparatus as mandated by law**.84 Businesses also play a central role in shaping U.S. foreign trade policy, particularly because favoring the political process as the primary forum for resolving the interlocking trade concerns through Congressional control over trade policy provides these businesses with "continuous and unlimited opportunities for business lobbying.""8 These private sector groups also had (and continue to have) a **huge stake** in the direction of **U.S. trade policy,** and therefore employ **large numbers of lobbyists to seek legislation on their behalf**. For example, the pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most profitable industries in the United States, employs at least two lobbyists for every member of Congress. As a **result of the efforts** of the IPC and other related groups, the United States supported **inclusion of IP rights** within the international trade agenda during the Uruguay Round of talks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade particularly in the early 1990s.87 As a result of the way in which this group lobbied for support, both within the United States and among U.S. allies, as well as through the pressure of unilateral trade sanctions under super § 301, the TRIPS Agreement was formulated very consistently with U.S. interests." For example, the right of a WTO member country to engage in compulsory licensing, with the exception of emergency situations or in cases of public, non-commercial use, is subject to a multitude of exceptions, making it virtually impossible to "break" patents."9 Additionally, although the TRIPS Agreement refers to technology transfers, it does not place equally rigorous requirements on technology transfer as a precondition for receiving patent protection unlike in prior versions of the Paris Convention. 90 For process patents, the TRIPS Agreement puts the burden of proof in an infringement suit on the defendant." In the developing country and the LDC context, ill-financed defendants will potentially come face to face with "wellfinanced" developed country accusers who could much more easily bear the burden of proving infringement.92 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement contains a number of thoroughly watered down protections of the public interest. It affords a heightened level of protection of patents.93

#### A war on cybersecurity is a war on knowledge

Silveria 13

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Informational capitalism found its growth in the codification and digitalization of knowledge, culture and symbolic and nonmaterial goods and products. Cybernetic technologies operated by software made digital networks viable. These networks covered the planet and became indispensable to the daily life of a large part of society, making communication a structural element of social, economic, cultural and political processes. But digital communication is a form of communication mediated by software. Cybernetic, informational society, which can be seen as a society of control, has in software its principal media. Researcher Lev Manovich (2008) was very astute in affirming that, just as electricity, the machine, and combustion made industrial society possible, it is software that makes global informational society possible. Software, seen as media that guarantees the growing digitalization of social activities and practices, is not apparent to this same society. Its role is not clear, much less evident. Seen as akin to any other technology, and presented by the market as merely a product, software contains source code that defines it and determines what it is capable of doing. Meanwhile, software has the power to completely determine our communication. Its design, its functions, operations and interfaces are defined by the programmers that create and maintain it. This code, in general, is closed-source and incomprehensible to those that use it. This is something obscure, lacking any transparency. For the software market, it is this opacity of the code for its users that makes up part of the intellectual property rights of its creators. The mainstream software market was structured around a model of remuneration of property based on the denial of access to the knowledge of its logically nested routines. But the lack of source code transparency in the context of intense digital codification isn’t limited to the software market. It extends to the bodies and essential codes of the species. It is in the fusion of various disciplines with Biology and Computer Science that biotechnology, nanotechnology, and genetic engineering arise. As Adriano Premebida and Jalcione Almeida point out: With the influence of cybernetics, a live organism is treated like an information system, with an extensive history of adaptation, able to be both interpretable and executed by molecular biology. Politics about life tends to center around the indifferentiation of the borders between species and understand the materiality of living beings as ‘a matrix of virtual,’ or possible, ‘genetic combinations’ (Ferreira, 2002: 238). The junction between techniques and policies in the manufacture of living beings is what will be at the center of the contemporary commercial/industrial dynamic in areas of knowledge informed by genetic engineering. ‘Life can no longer be simply thought of as the result of reproduction. Life is now able to be produced’ (Ibidem, 223). Biological life is part of modern power strategies and currently these strategies also focus on genetic information. (PREMEBIDA; ALMEIDA, 2010) The remuneration model of genetic encoding in cognitive capitalism involves closed source code or restrictions on its use through patent enforcement. Thus we witness the proximity of Microsoft and Monsanto, or Pfizer and Oracle, in their business models. Blocking free access to scientific knowledge is a profound concern for large corporations. And that is exactly where Aaron Swartz was vigorously involved. On January 6, 2011, at 24 years old, Aaron was arrested for electronic fraud, computer fraud and unlawfully obtaining information from and recklessly damaging a protected computer. Specifically, Swartz was accused of downloading 4.8 million documents from the JSTOR academic article archives, violating its terms of use, and circumventing the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) attempts to stop him. According to the report, Swartz bought a laptop in 2010 and registered on the MIT network under a ghost username. On this computer, Swartz wrote a script in the Python language that allowed him to rapidly download articles from JSTOR. JSTOR detected the script and blocked the IP address. According to the report, Swartz repeatedly changed the IP and MAC address to evade JSTOR’s and MIT’s efforts to block access. When JSTOR normalized MIT’s network access some weeks later, Swartz had changed his technique to download the files. He was accused of going to a room containing networking equipment and hiding his laptop behind some equipment so that it would not be found. He thus circumvented existing blocking and filtering mechanisms via the direct connection to the servers, successfully executing his downloads. The police report describes how Swartz, as he went to recover his laptop from its hiding place, had his bicycle helmet clearly filmed, despite using a mask to cover his face. The United States government alleged that Swartz probably downloaded the articles to freely distribute them on P2P (peer-to-peer) networks. However, JSTOR itself recognized that the downloaded content was not used, transferred nor distributed. But, for government representatives, mass downloading many articles from academic journals constitutes a hacker crime and should be punished by imprisonment. The interesting part is that Swartz, as an MIT student, had free access to any of the articles that he downloaded. The criminal attitude was the use of a script to download many articles. The United States federal prosecutors sought an exemplary conviction. They wanted a sentence of 35 years and said they were acting to discourage copyright violation. Pressure mounted on the young Swartz, who had a large role in the campaign against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act bills in the U.S. Congress in January of 2012. These proposed bills sought to block U.S. citizens’ access to digital contents and applications that supposedly were in violation of intellectual property. Furthermore, companies in the United States would have five days to block access to such sites. The stiffening of intellectual property legislation and the shadowy activities of the copyright industry are an attempt to gain control of the sources of creation and knowledge. The case against Swartz is a legal aberration, since the only consistent accusation was over his intention to release academic texts on P2P networks for free downloading. Computer forensics consultant Alex Stamos, who is frequently asked to testify in cases to determine if intrusions in digital systems and informational crimes occurred, wrote on his blog: Aaron did not “hack” the JSTOR website for all reasonable definitions of “hack”. Aaron wrote a handful of basic python scripts that first discovered the URLs of journal articles and then used cURL to request them. Aaron did not use parameter tampering, break a CAPTCHA, or do anything more complicated than call a basic command line tool that downloads a file in the same manner as right-clicking and choosing “Save As” from your favorite browser. (STAMOS, 2012) Following the tragic death of Aaron Swartz, United States federal prosecutors dropped all of the charges against him. Many people around the world noted the truculence and arbitrariness being practiced in order to block the sharing of cultural goods and knowledge. The battles do not appear to be cooling down. The possibilities for collaboration, interaction and digital file exchange will continue to grow if the Internet continues to be open, not proprietary, and not submitted to the telecommunications infrastructure controllers. Still, the copyright industry articulates its next steps to turn cultural goods and symbolic expression proprietary, as if they were limited resources. Governments, such as the United States, coordinate treaties and laws to subjugate the rights of all citizens to the defense of intellectual property. Yes, Aaron was a major victim of this war. But millions of young people do not live and have never lived under proprietary licenses. They want to share the possibilities that information technology creates for all. There no longer seems to be any doubt that one of the principal conflicts of the twenty-first century centers around the sharing of knowledge and cultural goods.

#### Corporates are lobbying for IP laws that gives them more control – congress would not cross them

Schiffner 5/31 – [Christine Schiffner is Bureau Chief for the National Law Journal in Washington, D.C. Former newsroom manager for The Associated Press as well as for various international media organizations; 5/31/22; “As Tech Giants Push for IP Reform, Plaintiffs Firms See New Momentum for Litigation”; <https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2022/05/31/as-tech-giants-push-for-ip-reform-plaintiffs-firms-see-new-momentum-for-litigation/?slreturn=20220621163516>; doa: 7/21/22; Lowell-JL]

Meanwhile, technology giants are spending millions of dollars lobbying for IP reform. “They are lobbying Congress heavily to weaken the strength of patent laws because they don’t like the fact that they are exposed to litigation,” Jacobs said.

In a recent blogpost, Google General Counsel Halimah DeLaine Prado laid out the company’s vision “to support Americas innovation.” In a written response to the National Law Journal, Google emphasized the need for patent reform.

“Patent trolls and opportunistic companies have begun to weaponize patents against their rivals, hindering both competition and innovation, and ultimately harming the quality of new products. America’s prized ‘culture of innovation’ is being undermined by a ‘culture of litigation.’”

Wiggin and Dana partner and NYU Law School adjunct professor Michael Kasdan has represented clients on both sides of the “V” in IP litigation. “If you’re making a product and you have to clear thousands of patent rights … these little guys pop up you didn’t know about.” Big Tech is continually facing repeated challenges to their products, Kasdan said, noting, however, that the important question then becomes whether they are in fact infringing.

Of course, plaintiffs firms and some of those previously involved in the U.S. patent system see Big Tech mostly as an actor rather than a victim.

“All the articulations of the Big Tech giants are just propaganda using buzz phrases and accusations that are not accurate,” Michel said. He calls the Internet giant’s arguments a “PR spin—and they’ve been doing it for dozens of years, they do it to Congress, they do it to the media.”

“To be specific after reading that blog,” Iancu said, referring to Google GC’s blog post, “they want to be permitted multiple challenges against the same patent, and they should explain why that is good for the system of the United States.”

Iancu and Michel both underscored that having a robust IP system is not only a judicial matter, but also one of national security. “It’s important for innovations surrounding artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other cloud information technology,” Iancu said. “Venture capital from U.S. sources used to go almost entirely to U.S. innovators, and now a great chunk is going to innovators overseas, particularly in China,” Michel said.

However, “most of the litigants bringing patent suits are not irresponsible trolls,” he said but rather companies “who spent a lot of time inventing and patenting and are simply trying to enforce their patents,” according to Michel.

Speaking about patent reform, Kasdan proposes “specialized courts deciding these issues.” He believes that it could make case resolution more efficient and predictable rather than “going through a case and have widely different experiences, judges,” then going through appeal. “We’re really a litigious country, a lot of money is spent on litigation—I wonder if we can do better there.”

#### Private companies control IP regulations – pretending they don’t stops us from creating actual change given the reality of corporate lobbying

Obendiek 22 – [Anke Sophia Obendiek is a Postdoc at the Centre for European Integration Research, University of Vienna, “What Are We Actually Talking About? Conceptualizing Data as a Governable Object in Overlapping Jurisdictions”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 66, Issue 1, March 2022, sqab080, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab080>, accessed 7/21/22, Lowell-JL]

The overview over the cases also highlights that the outcome of the conflict not only depends on the invoked governance visions but also indicates several relevant factors, including the institutional context (Fahey and Terpan 2021). Nonetheless, the extent to which agreements represents a compromise between competing visions, for example through the inclusion of additional oversight or review mechanisms, seems to influence the stability of the agreement. Through increased transparency requirements and references to the rights-based conceptualization of data, bulk surveillance practices strongly based on the conceptualization of data as a tool have expanded, as highlighted by the PNR case (Bellanova and De Goede 2020). This also illustrates how legal measures not only constrain but also specifically enable data use practices (Cohen 2019).

The cases also indicate that agreements tilting heavily toward one vision are vulnerable to disruption by actors that draw on principles consistent with an alternative conceptualization of data. Jurisdictional overlap seems to have an empowering effect on non-state actors and actors with (formally) more marginal positions. High-stakes agreements were disrupted successfully due to individuals, such as Schrems in the first example, or companies, such as Microsoft in the third example. In contrast to the suggestion by Faude and Große-Kreul (2020), who find overlap to empower marginalized actors in their own organization, this effect is particularly relevant vis-à-vis actors in other jurisdictions. As demonstrated in the Safe Harbor case, non-state actors were able to disrupt transatlantic data sharing practices more significantly than domestic activities, as the largely unobstructed intelligence activities by EU member states show (Farrell and Newman 2019).

These challengers frequently draw on the local liberal vision of data governance. Thereby, they often antagonize particularly private companies from the United States. In interviews, private company representatives describe “discrimination” (Tech company employee, 2019, personal interview) and “harmful protectionism” (Private sector representative, 2019, personal interview) against US-based companies. In the public sector, the predominantly domestic or local character of governance bodies, such as data protection authorities, and laws, such as the 1995 Data Protection Directive, has left an ideational legacy whereby public authorities tend to reproduce their specific local focus globally, even in disregard of competing local norms or alternative conceptualizations of data. While it empowers individual rights, this approach collides with field-inherent restrictions to sovereignty based on the transnational nature of data transfers. It tends to produce unstable agreements and exacerbate conflicts (see critically Kuner 2015), as demonstrated in the right to be forgotten case. The case also demonstrates that even rights-based conceptualizations of data are not necessarily compatible if there is disagreement concerning the hierarchization of fundamental rights, such as privacy and freedom of speech, the locus of governance, or the public or private character of governance.

Throughout the cases, private companies acted as both challengers and stabilizers of the status quo. While in the first two cases, private companies were less visibly engaged in meaning making processes, the right to be forgotten case and the Microsoft case showed how corporate advocacy relied on a combination of material resources and active participation in object construction processes. Big tech companies attempted to create narratives about their legitimate behavior and even explicitly called for regulation. At the same time, they criticized competitors’ exploitative data practices (Hern 2019) and increased their lobbying activities (Kergueno 2017). By challenging jurisdictional claims from public authorities and actively shaping the rules, they to some extent displayed characteristics of what Eichensehr has termed “Digital Switzerlands” (2019), in the sense that they attempted to shape governance and scrutinize the exercise of public power. In the examples earlier, companies were more successful in jurisdictional conflicts when they actively attempted to make claims that established their responsibility to shape policy making and protect individual rights. They were less successful when attempting to avoid responsibility, as Facebook in the first example. Nonetheless, while companies seem to embrace the concept of responsibility, they have so far been more hesitant to embrace accountability for their actions, which makes a characterization as Digital Switzerlands seem premature.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to understand the prevalence of disruptive conflicts in transatlantic data governance. Drawing on a sociological approach, I have argued that these conflicts are indicative of and amplified by deep normative divisions: While united by a common perception that data governance is important, actors co-create distinct conceptualizations of data that are embedded in different value and justificatory systems. Building on this assumption, I have identified four justificatory bases co-created through jurisdictional claims. While proponents of social interaction driven by the belief in security or economic progress tend to promote loose governance structures at the global level, those focusing on data as an individual rights concern demand increasing legislative control on the domestic or community level. In contrast, proponents of a vision of global coherence and cooperation propose medium interoperable or global protection measures.

The theorization of these different conceptualizations of data governance is tentative and requires additional empirical research. How do, for example, conceptualizations in China or India differ from those presented in this paper? How do claims of control play out in alternative policy areas, such as health? In the current COVID-19 crisis, the importance of conceptualizing governable objects to realize governance goals for specific communities is particularly evident. Whether data are conceptualized as a neutral tool in the fight against an existential threat or as an important part of human dignity impacts assessment of proportionality and necessity in the pandemic's data governance practices. But what can data actually achieve in terms of solving problems or addressing security threats? While there is no shared understanding of the societal problems that are to be addressed by engaging in data governance, even challenging actors, such as the EP or Microsoft, rarely question the idea that data can provide an answer to these problems. Due to this faith into “dataism” (van Dijck 2014) or “solutionism” (Nachtwey and Seidl 2020), actors are frequently complicit in the creation or institutionalization of structures and policies that undermine their wider normative agenda, which amplifies conflicting developments.

This makes the conceptual contribution of the paper so important, focusing on the multidimensional quality of jurisdictional claims as institutional, power-driven, legal, and normative claims. Who are the winners and losers from specific conceptualizations of data? The paper's focus on jurisdictional claims naturally limits the analysis to the carefully curated representations of the involved actors. While the inclusion of diverse data sources, including interviews and leaked documents, addresses some of these limitations, other aspects, such as the overt exercise of power or control through data infrastructures (Bellanova and de Goede 2020), need further research. While de Goede has explored the role of banks and airlines as “reluctant security actors” (de Goede 2018, 3), the empirical cases also demonstrate the importance of further conceptualizing private agency and perceptions of private responsibility in public data management processes.

In addition, the paper's scope is limited to a community of experts. Further research drawing on newspaper articles and opinion polls could incorporate the visions of a broader public, pointing to potential differences and the salience dynamics of those visions. This is relevant, because jurisdictional overlap may obfuscate the decision-making processes between conflicting norms for affected stakeholders (Johns and Compton 2019, 16). The emerging literature that considers not only the foundational societal consequences of contemporary data use (Zuboff 2018) but also the underlying legal (Mitsilegas 2014; Cohen 2019) and power struggles (Farrell and Newman 2019), and data-based value judgments (Aradau 2020) is therefore just a first step toward a more comprehensive analysis of competing normative goals in transnational data governance.

Where does this leave us in terms of the future development of transnational data governance? Jurisdictional conflicts are unlikely to disappear when regulatory measures, such as the GDPR, strengthen the extraterritorial reach of governance provisions. As the geopolitical relevance of data and internet governance increases, the stakes seem to be higher than ever. While jurisdictional conflicts have a productive dimension, they require substantial improvements in terms of access. As the success of Schrems demonstrates, the EU legal order gives significant access opportunities to resourceful individuals but large parts of the conflicts analyzed play out behind closed doors. Kosta (2020) also raises the limits of human agency when faced with machine-based data processing and the targeting of groups rather than individuals. Better data governance requires a broader debate on the construction of data analysis as an opaque and highly complex practice that is moved out of public debate.

### Csec = IP

#### Cybersecurity includes attacks on intellectual property

**Schackelford 16** (Scott Schackelford, PhD, Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Cybersecurity Program Chair, and Director of the Ostrom Workshop Program on Cybersecurity and Internet Governance. Chapman Law Review, "Protecting Intellectual Property and Privacy in the Digital Age: The Use of National Cybersecurity Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Risk", 2016, https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1376&context=chapman-law-review, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

Days after one of the largest data breaches in U.S. government history, in which the private information of more than twenty-two million current and former federal government employees was compromised,1 hackers claiming an affiliation with Anonymous crashed several Canadian government websites.2 Also in mid-2015, myriad firms including Blue Cross Blue Shield were targeted,3 as was German Chancellor Angela Merkel;4 even sports teams seem to be entering the fray with the FBI probing the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team about allegedly hacking into competitors’ databases.5 These events highlight both the tumultuous nature and diverse array of cyberthreats facing the public and private sectors around the world. Some have gone so far to argue that we are facing a market failure when it comes to effective, proactive cybersecurity management in which costs are not being effectively internalized to punish either bad actors or laggards.6 A similar argument could be made looking at an array of national governments that run the gambit in terms of their efforts to enhance national cybersecurity. Are we then facing a global cybersecurity market failure? And if so, what can realistically be done about it to better protect intellectual property and civil rights and liberties in the digital age? These are questions admittedly far too large and complex to comprehensively tackle in this Article, or indeed in a stand-alone volume. However, it is possible to lay a foundation for analysis that helps to break some new ground in the literature while assessing cybersecurity best practices from the public and private sectors that can cross-pollinate to help promote a global culture of cybersecurity. In particular, this Article analyzes State involvement in cybersecurity, including those policies aimed at mitigating cyberthreats targeting intellectual property that fall below the armed attack threshold—namely cybercrime and espionage—by analyzing thirty-four national cybersecurity strategies across the dimensions of economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and civil rights and liberties.7 Although the focus is on national cybersecurity strategies, related domestic follow-up initiatives are also considered, including “voluntary” bottom-up initiatives being pursued by leading cyber powers like the United States and Germany, such as the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Cybersecurity Framework.8 The vital role of the private sector to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices is also considered as part of a polycentric approach to fostering cyber peace.9

#### Cybersecurity involves protecting intellectual property

**Borky and Bradley 18** (\*John Borky and \*\*Thomas Bradley, \*PhD, retired professor of practicce, over 48 years of experience in the Aerospace and Defense (A&D) community, primarily in leadership positions, including research, system and technology development, and operations. He is an expert in systems architecture and engineering with emphasis on information- and software-intensive systems and enterprises; \*\*PhD, department head of systems engineering at Colorado State University. PubMed Central (PMC), "Protecting Information with Cybersecurity", 9/9/2018, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7122347/, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

Cybersecurity risks are associated with information assets (data, systems, processes, etc.) whose value is such that they require protection. The sum of vulnerabilities (or, equivalently, of potential attack vectors) constitutes an Attack Surface. Managing cyber risks then comes down to minimizing the Attack Surface. This is made difficult by the reality of a diverse, growing threat environment; a full listing of known vulnerabilities and attack methods would fill a small book, and a complete description would fill a large one.

The first step in cybersecurity risk management is **risk identification** ( RI) . This begins with asset valuation, meaning a consistent approach to determine both quantitative (cost) and qualitative (relative importance) values. Factors include costs to acquire or develop an asset, initial and recurring data maintenance costs, importance of assets to the organization and to others (including criminals), and public value in terms of things like intellectual property. Next comes threat analysis, involving identification and definition of known and potential threats, consequences of an exploitation, the estimated frequency of threat events, and the probability that a potential threat will materialize. The third element of RI is vulnerability assessment. This can draw on a variety of sources, including published lists of vulnerabilities, a history of security events, and results of vulnerability testing.2

#### Cybersecurity involves protecting from attacks harm intellectual property

**Securities and Exchange Comission 18** (Securities and Exchange Comission. "Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures", Feb/26/2018, https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018/33-10459.pdf, accessed on 7/22/2022)//gideon

Cybersecurity risks pose grave threats to investors, our capital markets, and our country. Whether it is the companies in which investors invest, their accounts with financial services firms, the markets through which they trade, or the infrastructure they count on daily, the **investing public** and the U.S. economy depend on the security and reliability of information and communications technology, systems, and networks. Companies today rely on digital technology to conduct their business operations and engage with their customers, business partners, and other constituencies. In a digitally connected world, cybersecurity presents ongoing risks and threats to our capital markets and to companies operating in all industries, including public companies regulated by the Commission. As companies’ exposure to and reliance on networked systems and the Internet have increased, the attendant risks and frequency of cybersecurity incidents also have increased. 2 Today, the importance of data management and technology to business is analogous to the importance of electricity and other forms of power in the past century. Cybersecurity incidents3 can result from unintentional events or deliberate attacks by insiders or third parties, including cybercriminals, competitors, nation-states, and “hacktivists.”4 Companies face an evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats in which hackers use a complex array of means to perpetrate cyber-attacks, including the use of stolen access credentials, malware, ransomware, phishing, structured query language injection attacks, and distributed denial-of-service attacks, among other means. The objectives of cyber-attacks vary widely and may include the theft or **destruction of** financial assets, intellectual property, or other sensitive information belonging to companies, their customers, or their business partners. Cyber-attacks may also be directed at disrupting the operations of public companies or their business partners. This includes targeting companies that operate in industries responsible for critical infrastructure. Companies that fall victim to successful cyber-attacks or experience other cybersecurity incidents may incur substantial costs5 and suffer other negative consequences, which may include: • remediation costs, such as liability for stolen assets or information, repairs of system damage, and incentives to customers or business partners in an effort to maintain relationships after an attack;6 • increased cybersecurity protection costs, which may include the costs of making organizational changes, deploying additional personnel and protection technologies, training employees, and engaging third party experts and consultants; lost revenues resulting from the unauthorized use of proprietary information or the failure to retain or attract customers following an attack; • litigation and legal risks, including regulatory actions by state and federal governmental authorities and non-U.S. authorities; 7 • increased insurance premiums; • reputational damage that adversely affects customer or investor confidence; and • damage to the company’s competitiveness, stock price, and long-term shareholder value.

# NEG

### Res Good

#### Debates about transatlantic relations are good

**Franke and Hofferberth 21** (Ulrich Franke and Matthias Hofferberth, \*PhD in political science, \*\*PhD, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography. 2021 ISA Annual Convention, "From Transatlantic Relations to World Order: Reconstructing Beliefs as Rules for Action", 4/6/2021, http://colfa.utsa.edu/polisci-geography/docs/Franke\_\_Hofferberth\_ISA\_2021\_final.pdf, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

More specifically, past decades have produced a global power shift away from transatlantic relations as the product of Western, state-driven foreign policy in two respects. As to the first, whether or not one believes the assertion of the dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a unipolar moment for the United States in the early 1990s (Mearsheimer 2019, Ikenberry 2014), undoubtedly the most significant constituent and a sine qua non of any transatlantic relations, new powers have emerged in the meantime and affect these relations significantly. On a global level, in view of the massive increase in military spending, the People’s Republic of China is the first to be mentioned, but on a regional level, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and, certainly in a different fashion but nevertheless relevant, the European Union, another important constituent part of the so-called West, have all expressed different perspectives on and visions of world order recently (Acharya 2017). Collectively, global power shifts in favor of non-Western states can certainly be considered a consensus within International Relations (IR). The same holds for the assumption that this is accompanied by a – relative – loss of importance of the West, specifically in light of President Trump’s disregard for multilateralism and the values of the liberal order as such. Second, power on the international scene understood as the capacity to have an impact on people’s lives whether they want it or not, is also shifted to and increasingly exerted by so-called non-state actors and within intergovernmental organizations (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This includes advocacy groups claiming moral high grounds in global governance as well as multinational corporations, particularly to but not exclusively from the technology sector (Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft to name but a few). - 3 - Against this backdrop of a double power shift away from the West and away from states, **we do** not believe that the declining **relative** relevance oftransatlantic relations **as the internal relationship of the West** diminishes its relevance as an object of IR research. Rather, assuming **discursive importance** as a reference object and as political practice, we assume actors in and of **transatlantic** **relations** respond to these challenges and thereby either reproduce or develop new aspects of said relations. For one thing, we do not assume a zero-sum approach to power. Under the condition of an understanding of power as the enforcement of rules, for instance, the relative loss of power of a political entity can go hand-in-hand with the entity striving to enforce a greater number of rules in absolute terms than before. What these rules-as-visions are about, then, remains important – regardless of the fact that others also (increasingly) have power and enforce (an even more growing number of) rules. Moreover, it can be observed that in case of positional differences between the governments of the U.S. on the one hand and (some) European states on the other hand, major **crises** and the end of transatlantic relations are always **proclaimed** very quickly (and alarmistically) – **by politicians, journalists, but also by IR scholars**. Crisis and catharsis, at least, seem to be recurrent narratives of transatlantic relations, often originating unreflectively within a hybrid discourse of practitioners and think tanks, often derived from the notion that a new U.S. president approaches transatlantic relations in a different light.1 The inherent presentism of think tank thinking and political practice aside, transatlantic relations are thus still a much-noticed object of public debate and consideration as they remain an issue quite **affectively occupied and connected to normative assumptions, in the West as well as beyond**. To **examine transatlantic relations** thus also seems promising from this point of view.

#### NATO is good

Coker 09

(Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 3-27-2009, "Post-modern NATO," Rusi, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/post-modern-nato/>, DOA July 21, 2022)

NATO has expanded beyond its initial notion of an Atlantic community. No longer is it delineated by the Iron Curtain, and the Alliance has resisted calls to define itself against Islamic fundamentalism. NATO still needs a new self-understanding, key to which will be a clearer sense of its relationship with Russia. The Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that we are all confronted by the ‘modesty of history’. In plying their trade historians and political scientists try to identify historic turning points and to date them precisely, but history is more modest. Its essential dates remain secret for a long time. I cite Borges because one of the decisive dates he chose, and one which moved him profoundly (or so he tells us), was the liberation of Paris in August 1944. For what he saw at the time was the conception of something new – a western community or coalition that having triumphed over fascism would stand firm against communism as well. Had Borges been alive today what dates would he have chosen for the transformation of that community in its institutional form, the Atlantic Alliance? Since the end of the Cold War NATO has changed profoundly. If we seek to date that change perhaps we should look to the Partnership for Peace initiative of 1994; or the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed three years later which placed the relationship between the West and its old protagonist on a contractual footing; or the invitation at Madrid in 1999 to three East European countries to begin the process of enlargement. One could choose all or any of these as keystones in NATO’s path to becoming a post-modern alliance. Post western alliance To claim that NATO has become a post-western alliance may strike one as at best ironic, at worst plainly perverse. At the Washington Conference in 1949 one of the participants Paul Henri Spaak called it ‘an act of faith in the destiny of western civilization’. It is worth remembering, in fact, that the alliance was meant to be more than a military alliance. Its founding fathers hoped to forge an Atlantic Community as Christian Herter, John Foster Dulles’ successor at the State Department called it. At the end of the 1950s, in fact, the United States fought to give the alliance a federal framework – a permanent council elected by the NATO Council of Ministers; a political general staff or steering committee, or Atlantic Commission. In the end, an Atlantic Community was not forged. Instead, the United States and Europe began drifting apart. As Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission remarked in 1961, the Europeans were no longer interested in the Alliance as a ‘collective political personality’; they were interested only in a loose association based on two separate pillars – Europe and the United States. Yet until the very end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s ‘Western’ credentials were constantly reaffirmed: in the Atlantic Declaration of 1974 and most recently the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. Even after the collapse of communism and long before 9/11 there was still a hope that NATO would remain a western club, by defining itself against another universal enemy: Islam. In the attack by Islamic fundamentalists on western culture many observers seemed to be confirmed in their conviction that the worlds of secularism and Islam were as fundamentally incompatible as those of capitalism and communism. In Islamic fundamentalism many commentators saw another existential threat to western civilization. In the event, the attempt in February 1995 by the NATO Secretary-General, Willie Claes, to reaffirm the alliance on that basis met with little or no support. History has now moved on. Willie Claes’ ‘Huntingdonian’ predilection for seeing it in cultural terms was not wrong in itself, but the clash of civilizations thesis is based on a very modern definition of civilization. The idea of civilization which the West fought so hard to impose on its enemies can no longer be sustained. It now refers to a distinctive mode of existence in the global age, not an ideal order of human society. It is no longer possible to insist that the peoples of the world are living through a stage in a unitary scale of progress whose apex is western civilization. Indeed, long before the Cold War had run its course this had been conceded by no less a figure than Raymond Aron. Aron shared none of his own countrymen’s fears of American hegemony or their aversion to Anglo-Saxon universalism. He would be among the first to applaud his country’s return to NATO’s integrated military command. But he recognized that if civilization itself was to be defended in the future against fundamentalist forces that challenged everything that made life ‘civil’ the West would have to be less exclusive in its definition. ‘The present phase of civilization is coming to an end’, he wrote in the 1960’s, ‘and for good or ill humanity is embarking on a new phase,’ that of forging a single world civilization for the first time, one truly universal in its appeal. What Aron recognized was that every culture - to take one critical example, human rights - must realize values in its own way. He recognized that the whole debate on human rights had been bedeviled for far too long by western ideas. There is no global consensus on what constitutes those rights but NATO is trying to demarcate what President Bush called ‘the non-negotiable demands of human freedom’. In 1996 in a speech in Aachen Vaclav Havel defined what the term ‘civilization’ meant in the post-modern era. Like Aron he talked of a new West, a wider one, though still distinguished by ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. The West’s task, he argued, should be to rededicate itself to a different project – to admit that there are values which transcend the West itself; to find what it has in common with other cultures; ‘to join forces with them in search for the common moral minimum necessary to guide us’. Let me highlight two key phrases from that speech. NATO must have a normative purpose in the twenty-first century, or what Havel calls ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. But in a post-modern age it cannot have a maximalist one: the desire to impose a western definition of civilized norms. The ‘moral minimum’ is what it must aim for. This is not a minimalist objective, however, for it requires the alliance to intervene for the first time on behalf of those who are not even members. It did this in Kosovo in 1999, the alliance’s first war. It is attempting to do this in Afghanistan today, in its second military venture. Post Atlantic Alliance To call NATO a post-Atlantic Alliance may appear equally perverse given its decision to forge a Euro-Atlantic Partnership and a Euro-Atlantic Council but both of these were conjured into existence for a reason. i.e. ‘Atlanticism’ as it was traditionally understood is no longer sustainable. For most of its history, of course, NATO was an Atlanticism institution whose founding document was not the Washington Treaty of 1949 but the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to which the United States put its name four months before it entered the Second World War. The Charter was not only a statement of principle signed by Britain and the United States. The British signed it on behalf of all but one of the European governments in exile in London. The exception, France, only signed in December 1944 – three months after its liberation (so Borges, perhaps, was right after all, to date the conception of the Atlantic Alliance – as opposed to its birth – to the liberation of Paris). In the words of André Malraux, the Old and New Worlds had been divided by the Atlantic, an ocean which had provided a passage for those fleeing political and economic oppression in Europe. In the 1940s the immigration largely stopped. The Atlantic became a bridge, not a barrier. In that sense, the Old World was conjoined with the New. The Atlantic Alliance was lauded precisely for that reason. It offered, wrote the contemporary historian Hans Kohn, a vehicle through which ‘the nations on the two shores of the Atlantic’ had begun to realise their communality for the first time. Although they had not shared a common past they would, at least, share a common destiny. Atlanticism grew naturally out of the politics and sympathies forged in two World Wars. It was consistent with the very ‘modern’ belief that countries were not states so much as contracts with history. What was the United States, asked the poet William Carlos Williams, but ‘the inspired invention of European thought’. In the political sphere Atlanticism was a also a corner stone of Britain’s supposed ‘special relationship’ with the United States. But it was also vitally important in helping the United States understand itself. For the American elite’s idea of national consensus at the time was also in step with the popular response to assimilation. Indeed, the East and Central Europeans who began arriving after 1910 only to find themselves discriminated against as ‘non-whites’ were the first to benefit from Atlanticism. For at its core was the belief in the force of equality. That ideology, in turn, became a mainstay of the government’s own effort of mobilisation. It facilitated its attempt to unite the nation behind the rhetoric of the Cold War. It marked the historic moment when the ‘ghetto-whites’: the Slovaks, Poles and Ruthenians felt fully accepted as Americans. It was all the more ironic, therefore, that the Atlanticism which helped end social divisiveness within the US and unite the United States should have divided western and eastern Europe. In closing the gap between the old and new worlds, Atlanticism widened the gap between the two in the western imagination. The decision forty years later to enlarge NATO was important for that reason. It spelt the end of what the historian Norman Davies calls ‘the Allied version of history’ – the belief in a unique, secular brand of western civilisation in which the Atlantic Alliance was presented as the pinnacle of human progress with the Atlantic Charter as its key. The Allied version of history was pernicious precisely because it drew an imaginary line behind which the West deemed itself to be more progressive, advanced and civilised. The Hungarian writer Istvan Bibo was probably right to suspect in 1946 - even before the Iron Curtain was drawn across the continent - that many westerners were not unhappy to see Eastern Europe policed by a great power, in part because they suspected its people of ‘an innate barbarism’. It is now clear, of course, that many fault lines have shaped the history of Europe. Some run north/south and divide the members of ‘old Europe’. The lukewarm support for the Kosovo war in the south, and 85 per cent support ratings in the Nordic world highlighted the differences. It is symbolically fitting that NATO should have become the instrument by which Eastern and Western Europe (and the United States, with its large and politically important East European minorities) have rediscovered each other. It is morally important that the Czech Republic has embraced what Havel once described as “the poetic charm” of NATO membership. The phrase reminds me of a passage in the novel Life is Elsewhere by his fellow countryman, Milan Kundera. Referring to the coup of 1948 which his generation welcomed as a new dawn, Kundera reflects that ‘the wall behind which people were imprisoned was made of verse’. The new poetics of history is no longer communism but European integration, and instead of imprisoning people behind a conceptual wall, it offers them a wider horizon. Is the process of NATO expansion complete? Should the Alliance admit Georgia and Ukraine? Historically and culturally neither have been ‘European’ – they have always been on the margins (if that) of the western imagination. The same cannot be said of Russia. Alliance without borders Throughout the Cold War NATO and the Warsaw Pact found themselves locked into a position of strategic inertia. History in the twentieth century, wrote the philosopher Walter Benjamin, was a permanent state of emergency. And like all such states it demanded a suspension of action, (though not, of course, belief). The very concept of movement, Benjamin added, had become associated with the notion of catastrophe – ‘the fact that things move on is the catastrophe’ he warned. History since then has become the permanent revision of what has been achieved, and this is no less true in the security field than every other. In today’s Europe ‘the structure of peace’ is no longer based on two opposing military blocs deterring each other from breaking the peace. Today’s Europe is characterized by change: the transformation of the security environment is the principal theme of politics and security studies. The old system was built on the principle of power restraining power. Great emphasis was based on drawing lines in the sand. Today the emphasis is on inter-penetration and transparency. The British diplomat Robert Cooper describes its chief characteristics : the break down the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs the growth of mutual interference in traditional domestic affairs and mutual surveillance. Intrusive verification which is at the heart of the news arms control regime is a key element of a global order in which state sovereignty is no longer considered to be absolute. the rejection of force for resolving disputes, and the codification of rules of behavior the growing irrelevance of borders the extent to which security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability One of NATO’s twenty-first century missions is to help construct a community in which common identities are constituted by normative practices other than national sovereignty; and in which people find themselves involved in the life of the region as well as their own country. NATO shares that task with other institutions, especially the OSCE which is also trying to forge a common security perspective or ‘single cognitive space’. Peace in Europe is now maintained by the institutional synergy of several security organizations of which NATO is one. The OSCE is another. If anything, the Russians take the OSCE more seriously than most western countries, or, at least, claim to. Some time ago Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, suggested that the second phase of NATO enlargement should include all the participating members of the OSCE (including Russia), and that thereafter, the organization should dissolve itself and become the OSCE’s military arm. This is unlikely to happen but the West needs to find some more permanent basis for its relationship with Russia. For synergy is a process not a product. Each institution increases the effectiveness of the other; it is the relationship between them which enhances each. Since 1991 we have seen the emergence of the Russia-NATO Council. There was also talk of a joint NATO-Russia brigade. The alliance has put much of its history behind it; it has embraced globalization with some real success; it has fought one war and finds itself involved in another. But for good or ill, the relationship with Russia is still crucial to the new alliance NATO is in the process of becoming. Until it is resolved we will not know what the alliance will finally become.

### TVA

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of cybersecurity by imposing regulations on data extraction

#### Regulation is key to solve the consequences of surveillance capitalism – only working with both tech and regulations can solve

Landwehr, Borning & Wulf 21 – [Marvin Landwehr is a Ph.D. student for Pluralist Economics and Socio-Informatics at the University of Siegen, Alan Borning is a Professor Emeritus in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington, Volker Wulf is a professor in Information Systems and the director of the Media Research Institute at the University of Siegen; 12/19/21; “Problems with surveillance capitalism and possible alternatives for IT infrastructure”; <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2021.2014548?src=recsys>; accessed 7/19/22; Lowell-JL]

Turning now to what could be done, one goal should be to limit the damage done by the surveillance capitalism business model, while still retaining key benefits of the services it provides. But if possible, we would like to move beyond damage control and support positive visions of how IT can better support people and communities. Crafting and deploying such solutions is an exceedingly difficult problem. Even though this business model has only recently come into being, the corporations practicing it have become dominant, and the technologies and services are threaded throughout our lives, communities, and economies. Regulation will be a key element of a response. However, regulation should not simply be a reaction to technology and an attempt to curb its worst excesses: technology should not be taken as a fixed, external force that will inevitably follow a particular path. Nor is surveillance capitalism at its root a technological problem amenable to a purely technological fix. Instead, regulation and technology should be co-designed and co-evolved. Citizens and civil society organizations will play key roles as well, by pushing for more effective regulation and supporting technologies, by helping to foster alternative models for providing needed services, and by adopting new social practice.

Regulation and law

Regulation and law form key elements of possible solutions. We suggest four principal goals for regulation: protecting privacy, erecting barriers to behavior manipulation, protecting free speech and civic participation, and (probably most controversially) undermining the economic basis of the surveillance capitalism business model so that alternatives can take root and flourish. Having such alternatives should lessen the dependence on these IT companies, while still having a way that people and society can have access to useful IT services – and beyond this, support positive visions of the role of IT in communities and society.

#### Informed consent and the minimum data approach protect our personal information while browsing – this limits the damage of surveillance capitalism

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Another area of legislative activity is do-not-track legislation. The general goal of these bills is to allow users to decide whether or not they are willing to be tracked by third-party websites while browsing websites and potentially while using other internet-based services.

True informed consent

One reaction to privacy concerns is to implement much stronger requirements for informed consent, of which the GDPR is one important example. Improving information and consent is certainly a good thing, but in our view is inadequate. Being deluged with pages and pages of consent agreements about what information is being gathered about you isn't that useful, and if the alternatives are to check the ‘agree’ box, or to be left out of a great deal of social and political interaction, this is not a particularly meaningful choice. However, stronger implementations of consent are possible.

As a thought experiment, suppose that surveillance capitalist corporations were required to operate under the same conditions that govern research involving human subjects. For example, in response to past abuses, the US government adopted the Belmont Report (1978), which laid out principles for human subjects research. It requires true informed consent, which must be voluntary and ongoing. That implies that the consent form must be straightforward and comprehensible – so no 30 page legal monstrosity as with typical corporate privacy statements – and the subject must be able to withdraw from the experiment at any time. Further, only data needed to conduct the study should be gathered, and must be deleted once the study is over and analysis is complete. The data must also be held confidential and protected – it would be forbidden, for example, to hand it over to another research group without consent.

If similar requirements were placed on surveillance capitalist firms, they would require true informed consent, the ability to withdraw ones data at any time, and would not allow the data to be shared without permission with a third party. People should be able to challenge inaccurate information and have it removed. Note that today people do not even have access to a transparent overview of how their private data is trapped, transferred, sold and aggregated. Therefore, as a prerequisite, these data pathways need to be visible for the user and the public regulators.

Further, in analogy with the human research requirements, only the data needed to provide the service in question could be gathered, but not the cloud of additional data that is gathered and retained as at present. In other words, what we advocate includes (but is not limited to) the concept of ‘minimum data.’ These corporations should not be allowed to collect data that is not necessary to provide their service. However, minimum data alone could still leave loopholes for service providers, e.g., they could claim all personal data collected is necessary for AI-powered algorithms to provide a service optimized to personal needs. Therefore, true informed consent in analogy with human research requirements exceeds the minimum data approach. Finally, the requirements should be much stronger for children and vulnerable populations (e.g., prisoners). For example, in many cases the companies should simply not be allowed to accumulate information on children.

#### The plan is key to interoperability – it’s the only way to reduce the user’s dependence on monopoly organizations

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Adversarial interoperability

The current IT landscape is dominated by a very small number of companies in monopoly positions. Breaking up monopolies would be a useful step in ensuring that users are not too dependent on a single service provider. However, in our view, simply splitting Facebook, for example, into six mini-Facebooks, each with the same surveillance capitalism business model, would not be a particularly effective approach. Better would be to break up companies along functional lines and to regulate the exchange of information among these now-third-party entities. For instance, Facebook could be required to divest from the essentially unrelated parts of its business, including Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram. However, just doing that, each sub-company could hold a monopoly in its niche, so a comprehensive approach must go further. And given the network effect and the resulting centralization mentioned above, which are prevalent for Internet platforms, reverting to a monopoly situation is the most likely outcome without additional regulation and oversight.

Interoperability is one key to reducing the user's dependence on the corporation or organization providing the service, as well as increasing the ability of small competitors to improve upon single features or to serve specialized markets. In his recent book How to Destroy Surveillance Capitalism, Doctorow (2020) uses the term ‘adversarial interoperability’ (or ‘competitive compatibility’ (Doctorow, 2021)), capturing that interoperability cannot be expected to be implemented voluntarily by for-profit companies if doing so might reduce their profits. But having such interoperability would make it easier for for-profit competitors to enter the market, as well as nonprofit or public entities, and therefore should be legally enforced. Doctorow (2020) argues:

‘If our concern is how corporations are foreclosing on our ability to make up our own minds and determine our own futures, the impact of dominance far exceeds the impact of manipulation and should be central to our analysis and any remedies we seek.’

His position that enforcing antitrust legislation in this domain is an important one, although we would add that protecting against surveillance and manipulation is equally important.

Antitrust law may provide a suitable means for motivating requirements for adversarial interoperability. We are not experts in the law, but we can say that it will probably not be enough to apply existing antitrust law consistently to the case of IT services; new regulations will also have to be added. For example, antitrust law as currently interpreted aims at enforcing fair prices for customers. This does not cover the case of free applications, in other words, the users who should be protected are not even the customers in this case.

#### The organizations are supported by advertising – profit will still be available

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For-profit corporations

One option is for-profit corporations. We earlier suggested that the shift from context specific to targeted advertising marks the location of a suitable line to draw and challenge surveillance capitalism by prohibiting advertising based on personal profiling. However, for-profit corporations could continue to offer these services, supported by advertising, including context-specific advertising, just without personal profiling. Another funding option is fee-for-service. These options are thus still very much capitalism, just not surveillance capitalism.

There are existing corporations that use these models. Two systems to be noted in particular are Brave2 and DuckDuckGo3. Brave is an open-source browser that (the company says) blocks ads and trackers, in both mobile and desktop versions. The DuckDuckGo search engine, according to the company, does not collect or share personal information. Its business model is still based on advertising (and also affiliate marketing).

Another option is to nudge the market by having institutions such as libraries, universities, and others buy ad-free, no tracking versions of services for their patrons/students, either from new companies, or from existing large IT corporations if they are willing to unbundle their services to support this. (Note that it would be essential to monitor the corporations carefully to ensure they are not tracking these users (Farivar, 2016; Peterson, 2015).)

### Advocacy Fails

#### Companies backlash by lobbying

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Since these measures directly attack the power position of IT companies, countermeasures are to be expected, including extensive lobbying and media campaigns, as well as the continuing instrumentalization of intellectual property laws. For example, even if an IT service was involved in the creation of content, it should not be granted any intellectual property rights to it. Otherwise, Facebook, for example, could use intellectual property law to prevent users from scraping their own content and uploading it onto competing systems. The same is true for cloud computing providers. Therefore, IP restrictions are quite consequential and must be considered in responding to the expected countermeasures. However, intellectual property is just one way in which law is used to create abstract forms of capital. In her recent book The Code of Capital, Pistor (2020) shows how the law selectively codes claims and ideas into capital. All of these forms need to be considered as expected legal countermeasures big companies will apply against regulation. Furthermore, investigations and whistleblowers will be necessary for identifying misconduct. As a consequence, there should be compensation paid, and since one of the aggrieved parties is society as a whole, it is easily justifiable to channel this compensation into the development of alternatives, as one source for funding for them.

1. J.D. Bernard [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Détourned from Wikipedia [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Détourned from Wikipedia [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Détourned from Wikipedia [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Détourned from Wikipedia [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Détourned from Wikipedia [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Franz Kafka, *The Trial* [↑](#footnote-ref-7)